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CHAPTER 1. INIPŒUCriW 
Agricultural ocmnodity prices are important both economically and 
politically. Ohe level of agricultural prices affects producer, 
processor, and merchandiser incomes; consumer welfare; and the health 
and rate of grcwth of most countries' economies. Historically 
agricultural prices have been hi^ ily volatile relative to the prices of 
most nonagricultural goods and services. The primary causes of the 
randomness in agricultural prices are the biological nature of 
agricultural production and the inability of producers to control many 
aspects of production. Wëather, disease, and insects can affect 
yields; production tends to be seasonal in nature, often once a year; 
maxiy products are perishable and nonstorable, at least at an 
economically feasible cost; and the production process tends to be 
spread out over time, causing slow production adjustments to price 
changes. 
Ihe hic^  degree of price variability has contributed to the level 
of financied risk faced by agricultural firms and producers. Commodity 
futures markets have been available since the 1800s as a tool to help 
participants in the agricultural sector manage the risk associated with 
price uncertainty. Recently, trading in commodity option contracts was 
legalized on the organized trading exchanges. Commodity options 
provide several risk management features vAiich are not available in 
futures contracts and may be used in conjunction with, or even as a 
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substitute for, futures contracts in a firm's risk management 
portfolio. 
A number of previous studies have addressed the issue of optimal 
marketing bâiavior in the presence of ocmnodity futures markets; 
however, relatively little work has been devoted to the stuc^  of 
optimal marketing behavior in the presence of ccmnodity crions 
markets. This stuc^  attempts to examine the cptimad response of 
agricultural producers an^ /or firms to price level uncertainty in 
commodity markets vAiere both futures and options contracts are 
available as risk management tools. Ihe remainder of this chapter 
briefly discusses some of the concepts and mechanics of risk 
management, futures contracts, and options contracts and provides a 
starting point for the stucty. First the conceits of risk and risk 
management are discussed y then futures and options contracts are 
introduced and their use as risk management instruments is considered; 
and finally, the primary c^ jectives of the stucfy are summarized. 
Risk and Risk Management 
Hey (1979) assumes that a decision maker (EM) facing a choice with 
an uncertain outcome perceives the situation as one of ri^  and can 
list all possible outcomes eilong with their probability of occurrence. 
An cLLtemative form of an uncertain situation would be if the CM was 
unable to identic all possible outcomes or attach probabilities to the 
outcomes. Khic^ t (1933), and others, have distinguished l^ tween these 
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two types of uncertain situations, labeling the former type "risk" and 
the latter "uncertainty". This stut^  assumes that the EM faces a 
situatlwi of risk and can Identify, at least subjectively, the possible 
outcomes that can occur and assign probabilities to the outcomes. 
To facilitate a more comprehensive discussion of risk and 
responses to risk it Is helpful to divide total risk into two 
components: business risk and financial rlsk.^  Business risk is the 
variability in net operating returns Inherent in a film's operations. 
It depends only on the risky assets employed by the firm and is 
Ind^ jendent of the financial structure of the firm. Ihe additional 
variability added to the firm's net returns to equity holders that 
results from fixed financial claims against the firm can be labeled as 
financial risk. Gabriel and Baker (1980) and Barry and Baker (1984) 
show business risk and financial risk can be combined to provide a 
measure of total risk and they hypothesize a risk balancing tradeoff 
between the business and financial risk. Die risk balancing hypothesis 
states that the firm maximizes expected net returns subject to some 
tolerable level of total risk. If one of the components of total risk 
receives an exogenous shock, causing a change in the level of total 
risk, then the firm will respond by adjusting its cperating assets 
and/or financial structure in such a manner as to satisfy the 
constraint and maximize net returns. Thus increases (decreases) in 
"Slie following discussion follows closely that of Barry and Baker 
(1984), Chhikara (1986), and Sonka and Patrick (1984). 
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financial risk tend to result in decreases (increases) in business 
risk. 
Business risk in agriculture can be attributed to five major 
sources: (1) production risk; (2) market or price risk; (3) 
technologiced risk; (4) legal and socied risk; and (5) human sources of 
risk. Production risk is the variability associated with the 
production process and is a function of such factors as weather, 
diseeise, insect infestations, fire, wind, and theft. Market or price 
risk results from une}$)ected changes in the cost of ii^ iuts anchor the 
selling price of out^ xxts. Technological risk refers to the possibility 
that current decisions may be rendered suboptimeil by unforeseen 
tediniced advances in the future. New advances in production, 
transportation, processing, and marketing techniques may cause current 
decisions to be less competitive in the near future. Legal and social 
risks likely increase as a firm becomes larger and is more dependent on 
non-farm sources of capital and government policies, such as price 
support programs anchor tax structures. Ihe risk of human capital is 
the risk associated with the labor, management, and ownership of the 
firm. If the firm is heavily d^ )endent on key individuals to perform 
any of the these functions then a loss of that individucil could disrupt 
the firm's qperations. 
Financial risk results from the use of fixed financial obligations 
and primarily consists of the risk of cash insolvency and illiquidity. 
As fixed financial obligations (financial leverage) increase, the more 
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detrimental are the inpacts of unfavorable events on a firm's net 
return to equity holders. Other sources of financic&l risk include the 
variability in the cost and availability of credit arû/or rented or 
leased assets. 
A firm's responses to risk, vAiich usually involve sane type of 
cost, generally focus on reducing the likelihood of business and 
finacial risk, transferring risks to other agents, and increasing the 
firm's ability to operate within a given level of risk. Risk 
management strategies are typically classified into production, 
marketing, and financial strategies. 
laical production strategies used in risk management include 
selection of stable enterprises, diversification, and maintaining 
operating flexibility. Selecting stable enterprises results in the 
production of commodities which tend to provide returns with relatively 
low variability in an effort to reduce the level of risk faced ky the 
firm. Diversification of production enterprises involves cxxnbining 
enterprises with lew levels of correlation in returns to reduce the 
overall variability of returns to the firm. Operating flexibility 
refers to organizing the firm's operations so that the EM can quickly 
switch to more efficient or economical production techniques as they 
become available or shift among current techniques as relative prices 
vary. 
Marketing strategies used as risk management tools include: 
inventory management, sequential marketing, forward contracting, 
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hedging, government caimodlty programs, and vertical integration. 
Inventory management refers to the holding of excess raw material, 
work-in-process, an^ /or finished goods inventory throu^ iout the 
production, processing, and sales stages of the business in an effort 
to reduce friction and uncertainty. Sequential marketing is the 
practice of marketing the product over time rather than all at once, 
resulting in prices being averaged out over time thus reducing 
variability in returns. Forward contracting and hedging refer to 
purchasing inputs anchor selling outputs throu^  forward, futures, 
an^ /or options contracts. Hëdging in the futures market is similar to 
forward contracting eiK:^ * that futures contracts are standardized and 
allcw less flexili^ ility in terms of the contract specifications. 
Participation in government commodily programs may provide the firm 
with price and income si^ jport anchor price and income stabilization. 
Finally, the firm may attempt to vertically integrate the production, 
processing, and marketing functions and eliminate some of the market 
intermediaries in an effort to gain intermediary profits ani/ar 
stabilize income. 
Financial responses to risk emphasize the firm's risk bearing 
capacity, given the production and marketing risk, and the spreading of 
these risks among the debt and equity holders of the firm. Responses 
to financial risk include maintaining a hi^  proportion of self-
liquidating loans, holding liquid assets to meet unezqaected cash 
demands, holding liquid credit reserves, and maintaining formal 
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insurance. Holding the majority of loans in a self-liquidating form 
allows the firm to better match cash inflcws and outflows and reduces 
the risk of cash shortages. Ihe firm may hold a portion of its assets 
in a liquid form, such as hicgily liquidi marketable securities, vdiich 
can easily be converted to cash to meet une^ s^ected cash demands. In 
addition, the firm may leave a porticxi of its available credit to be 
used only in the event of une}^ )ected cash shortages. Hie purchase of 
life, disability, liability, property, and crx^  insurance policies can 
also reduce the risk that the firm will find itself in an illiquid 
position. 
Ihe risk to a producer or firm from agricultural price uncertainty 
is the possibility of loss in income due to unfavorable price level 
changes. This stut^  is concerned with the consequences of ccaranodity 
price variability on producer or firm income and focuses on a firm's 
optimal hedging response to price and income variability in commodity 
markets %Aiere both futures and options contracts are available. 
Ritures and Options Contracts as a Response to Risk 
In a world in vAùch market sc^ lies and demands can not be 
perfectly anticipated, DMs are continuously forced to (^ >erate under 
conditions of price level risk. Ihe ex-ante stochastic structure of 
both input and output prices provide opportunities for both financial 
gain as well as financial loss. In many cases, CMs are unwilling or 
unable to bear the risk of financial loss associated with price level 
8 
risk. Various commodity œntracts have been developed in an effort to 
capture the potential financial gains and avoid the unwanted financial 
risk resulting Aom price level changes. Ihree general types of 
comnodity contracts exist: cash, futures and options. Used in the 
proper combination they provide users the opportunity to capture 
existing profit opportunities anVor avoid unwanted risk ly shifting it 
to other market participants \ilno are willing to accost it. Ihe 
remainder of this section briefly discusses the various types of 
commodity contracts and trading objectives. 
rash nmnitracts 
Cash contracts are traded directly between the buyer and seller of 
the commodity. The contracts are for exchange of ownership of the 
commodity at some specified price. Cash contracts allow bvyers and 
sellers maximum flexibility in specifying contract terms, i.e., the 
contracts are tailor-made to fit the specific needs or desires of the 
buyer and seller. Delivery of the commodity may be immediately or at 
some specified date in the future. Cash contracts for immediate 
delivery of the physical commodity are referred to as spot transactions 
and are said to take place on the spot market. Caidi contracts for 
future delivery of the physical commodity are known as forward 
contracts and are said to take place on the forward market. 
Ca^  contxacts are legal contracts between the buyer and seller in 
vdùch delivery of the commodity is e}^ >ected and required t%) be made. 
9 
The contracts generally specify the commodity price, quality of the 
ccraaodi^ , quantity of the commodity, delivery period, and delivery 
location. 
futures contracts and futures markets 
A futures contract is a standardized legal contract to make or 
take delivery of a commodity during a ^ aecified future period for an 
2 
agreed igxan price. Futures contracts are generally traded through 
third parties, known as brokers, on organized exchanges. All contracts 
on a givai exchange for a specific ccmmodity and delivery period are 
identical exo^ xt for the trading price, vAûch is established \Aen eadi 
individual trade is made. Die holder of one or more futures contracts 
to buy (sell) a commodity is said to be long (short) futures. If the 
contractor is long (short) futures, the contracts may be settled by 
actually taking (making) delivery of the commodity or by selling 
(buying) back the futures contract at the current trading price. In 
practice only a very small percentage of futures contracts are ever 
settled by delivery. 
All futures txades are registered with the exchange's clearing 
corporation v4iich acts as a guarantor of all contracts. Each day the 
clearing corporation matxAies all long and short contracts and records 
the corresponding data such as trading price, number of contracts, and 
2 See Hieronymus (1971) for a detiailed discussion of the economics 
and mechanics of futaires trading. 
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delivery month. Onœ the contracts have been matched they axe said to 
be "cleared" and the clearing corporation then acts as a third party 
between edl long and short futures contracts. ïhe purpose of the 
clearing corporation is to reconcile and inoure the financial integrity 
of all futures transactions. In essence, the clearing corporation acts 
as the biyer to cdl contract sellers and the seller to all contract 
buyers. It is as if the buyer bc^  from the clearing corporation and 
the seller sells to the clearing corporation. To help ensure that 
trades will be honored by both the buyer and seller, each party must 
establish a margin account with his/her broker and in turn the 
brokerage firm ultimately posts the margin with the clearing 
corporation. The initial margin is typically a small portion of the 
underlying contract value, but is usually sufficiently large to cover 
the maximum daily price movement of the underlying futures contract.^  
In many cases the margin requirement can be met by using United States 
government securities instead of cash, allowing the trader to earn 
interest on his/her margin account. Each day the clearing corporation 
ccmputes the gain or loss from each trader's position and credits the 
trader's account if a gain occurs or debits the account if a loss is 
incurred. If the account fedls below some specified minimum margin 
3 The change in the futures price each day for each commodity is 
limited to some specified maximum amount known as the daily trading 
limit. Ohe purpose of the daily trading limit is to give the market 
time to digest major market information and reduce the variability in 
the futures price as the market attempts to incorporate the new 
information into the futures price. 
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level, a maintenance margin is required to restore the account to the 
initial margin level. Aiy excess accumulations credited to a trader's 
account above the initial margin may be removed f£m the account. The 
dadly settlement feature of futures omtracts imposes an additional 
risk on the trader, the rl^  of a margin call. A market which moves 
agzdnst a trader's futures position can lead to cumulative margin 
calls, which may result in cash flow difficulties for the trader. 
Ihe similarities and differences between a futures contract and a 
forward contract are initially confusing and should at least be briefly 
mentioned. Both futures and forward contracts are legal contracts for 
future delivery of a commodity at a price agreed t^ n by the buyer and 
seller. However, the contract specifications in a futures contract are 
standardized, vAiile the contract specifications are negotiated in 
forward contracts. Ihus a forward contract allows for more flexible 
terms between a bi^ er and seller. Delivery is e^ q^ ected in forward 
contracts and it is generally difficult to get out of the contract 
without making delivery. Delivery is seldom made under futures 
contracts and, given the standardized nature of the contracts and the 
trading on organized exchanges, the market tends to provide a great 
deed of liquidity in offsetting a contract position by allowing traders 
to r^ xirchase the contract at the current futures price. Ihe primary 
conoqxtUELl difference between futures and forward contracts is that 
futures contracts are settled each day and gains (losses) are credited 
(debited) to the trader's account. Ihus at the beginning of each day 
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the VEdiie of the futures oontract is set at zero. In a forward 
oontract the gains and losses are accumulated over the life of the 
contract and are settled during the actual delivery period as specified 
in the conbract. In other words, a futures contract can be thou^ t of 
as a series of one day forward contracts over the life of the futures 
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contract. 
Options contracts and options markets 
Options contracts are legal contracts vAiich give the buyer the 
ric^ t but not the obligation to buy or sell the commodity during seme 
future period at a specified price. The primary difference between 
futures and opticais contracts is that the owner of a futures contract 
is legally obligated to liquidate his/her position throu^  delivery or 
cash settlement, vAiile the owner of an options oontract liquidates 
his/her position, throu^  delivery or cash settlement, only if it is 
favorable for him/her to do so. 
Oanmodity options have had a sometAiat diectered history and have 
been traded sporadically in the United States since the middle of the 
nineteenth century.® At times, as recently as the early 1980s, trading 
in commodity cations on organized exchanges was illegal in the United 
S^ee Black (1976) for a detailed discussion of the conceptual 
differences between futures and forward contracts. 
A^bbott (1982) provides a concise history of commodity options 
trading in the United States. 
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States. In 1982, a pilot program edlowing oonmodity options trading on 
certadn organized exchanges for specific commodity futures contracts 
was implemented. By 1985 there were over 20 commodily options on 
futures being traded, including options cm sugar, cotton,, sor^ seans, 
vdieat, com, live cattle, and live hog futures contracts.^  Ihe pilot 
program appears to be successful for at least some commodities as the 
list of options contracts being traded has continued to expand and 
today includes several additional options contracts on agricultural 
futures contracts. 
All options can be described as being either a put or call option 
and either an American or European option. A put c^ ion gives the 
owner the ric^ t to sell the commodity ^ t some specified price and a 
call option gives the owner the ri^ it to purchase a commodity futures 
contract at some specified price. An American coition allows the owner 
to exercise the option at any time during the life of the c^ xtion, lAile 
a European option can only be exercised on the eiqpiration date of the 
option contract. The specified price at \Mch the commodity can be 
bou^ t or sold is called the exercise price. 
In some ways purchasing an option contract is similar to buying 
price insurance. If the price level change is unfavorable to the owner 
of the option he/she siirply eiœrcises the option and avoids the adverse 
effects of the price change; and if the price change is favorable to 
A^very (1985) assesses the early performance of the pilot program 
in commodity options trading. 
the owner of the option he/she sinply declines to exiercise the option 
and takes advantage of the actual price change. However, as in the 
case of an insurance policy, the seller of the option, known as the 
"writer" of the option, requires a fee for providing the option, the 
fee is called the option premium. 
Ihe distinction between futures and options contracts is clearer 
than is the difference between futures and forward contracts. As 
mentioned earlier, options contracts on many agriculture futures 
contracts are currently traded on organized eiœhanges. The owner of a 
call (put) option on a futures contract has the ric^ t, but not the 
obligation, to exercise the option and go long (short) the underlying 
futures contract at the exercise price. As in futures contracts, all 
specific options contracts traded on a given exchange are standardized 
with respect to quantity, qualil^ , and delivery location. However, 
options contracts differ from futures contracts in that the option's 
exercise price is also standardized in a given contract. The exercise 
price is the trading price at vAiich the physical commodity will be 
exzhanged if the option is exercised. The trading price of the futures 
contract is not standard and is determined on the trading floor for 
each contract. Finally, other than brokerage costs, there is no cost 
associated with obtaining a futures contract, vAiile the buyer of an 
coitions contract must pay the option premium, ^Aiich is determined on 
the trading floor of the organized exchange. 
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Trading Objectives and Risk Management 
Three steps are required to determine the correct investment in 
alternative assets. First, the CM must correctly formulate the 
business objective. Second, all relevant information on each 
alternative action choice and its impact on the business objective must 
be determined. Finadly, a decision process using the relevant 
information to achieve the business objective needs to be developed. 
The objective of all trading in futures and options markets can be 
classified as hedging, speculating, arbitrage, or some combination of 
the above. The distinction between hedging, speculating, and arbitrage 
is often heizy, but a general definition of each is useful. Hedging is 
a technique of establishing an approximate price for a cash commodity 
or in some cases ensuring that adequate supplies of some asset are 
available. Speculating can be defined as a ris]^  investment made in an 
effort to achieve a financial profit. Arbitrage is the purchase or 
sale in one market for immediate sale or purchase in another market in 
n 
an effort to capture profits. The mechanics of taking a market 
position for all three types of trackers are the same, the 
distinguishing characteristic between the three types is their 
objective in trading. 
Hedging is done ky market participants vtio are long or short in 
the cash market. Hédgers are typically primary producers, processors, 
n 
Seidel and Ginsberg (1983) provide a more ind^ ith discussion of 
the cono^ Tts of hedging, speculating, and arbitrage. 
marketing intermediaries, and financial intermediaries. Ihe hedger 
takes a position in the futures or options market vAiich is opposite his 
actual or expected cash position. For exanple/ the hedger may have 
some amount of a cash ccmnodity in storage vAiich he plans to market at 
some future date. Ihe future cash price is currently unknown and its 
variability imposes the risk of financial loss on the hedger. In an 
effort to avoid the risk of financial loss the hedger may take a 
position in the futures an^ /or options market vAiich is opposite his/her 
cash position, i.e., the hedger is long in the cash market and hedges, 
for example, by taking a short position in the futures market. Ihe 
hedge occurs because the hedger new holds two market positions, long 
cash and short futures, %Aich tend to provide profits vAiich are hic^ y 
negatively correlated. Ihat is, losses (gains) in the cash market from 
price level changes are offset ky gains (losses) in the futures market. 
A "perfect hedge" occurs vAien the loss (gain) in the cash market is 
exactly offset ly the gain (loss) in the futures market. This 
situation occurs only vAien the spread between the futures and cash 
price on the day the hedge is liquidated is the same as vAien the hedge 
was placed and the total cash commodity position and futures positions 
are the same. Ihe spread between the futures and cash price is called 
the "basis" and is generally not constant over time. A short hedge, 
long cash and short futures, will receive additional profits if the 
basis narrows. A long hedge, short ca^  and long futures, will profit 
from a widening of the basis. The magnitude of the basis d^ )ends on 
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the several factors including the time remaining until the delivery 
period; transportation costs; storage costs; and SLgiply and demand 
conditions in and across markets. Basis patterns often exhibit some 
consistency during certain time periods, but are generally difficult to 
forecast precisely. As a result, hedging does not completely eliminate 
financial risk, the hedge simply r^ laces price level risk with basis 
risk, i.e., the risk of changes in the relationship between the cash 
and futures price. Thus the hedger actually switches from speculating 
in the cash market to speculating on changes in the basis. In theory, 
the cash and futures price should be the same during the delivery 
period (Black, 1976). But in practice, differences tend to exist 
between the cash and futures price even during the delivery period. 
These differences are caused by such factors as the transactions cost 
associated with actually meeting the delivery specification of the 
futures ccmtract and sqpply and demand conditions in the delivery 
market (Hieronymous, 1971). However, in general, the cash and futures 
prices tend to converge as the delivery period is approached. 
Stuc^  Objectives 
The major objectives of this stucfy are: 
1. To determine optimal market positions vAien both futures and 
options markets exist. 
2. To compare optimal market positions under alternative marketing 
strategies such as: participation in only the cash and futures 
markets; participation in only the cash and options market; and 
participation in the cash, futures and coitions markets. 
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3. To compare the cptimal market positions to those implied 
by the standard modeling techniques used to model optimal 
hedging in futures markets. 
4. To examine the effect that different market conditions have on 
the optimal market positions. 
5. To develop a decision-aid model that can be used by IXfs to 
determine the market positions to take in a specific commodity 
market. 
6. To stu(^  the vcilue of both futures and options markets to users 
vAio are primarily concerned with risk management. 
Ihe inclusion of commodity options in a risk management portfolio 
allows a m to create new ^ /pes of income distributions vAiich were 
previously unavailable. Unfortunately, the modeling of c^ imal 
marketing behavior becomes more complicated in the presence of these 
new types of income distributions. Chapter 2 develc^  the expected 
utility hypothesis vdiich is used to model c^ imal marketing behavior in 
the presence of ccmmodity options. Ihe functional forms of several 
utility functions are presented and their corresponding risk preference 
characteristics are discussed. Ihe chapter concludes with a summary of 
the results of several studies whidi have atterrpted to measure EM risk 
attitudes. 
Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of the mean-variance modeling 
framework vAiich has been widely applied in the stu<^  of firm behavior 
in the presence of futures contracts. Next, the functional form of the 
income distribution faced by CMS vdio hold commodity options in their 
risk management portfolios is devel(^ )ed and is shown to violate the 
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known sufficient conditions «Ailch cause the mean-variance model to 
produce results consistent with the expected utility hypothesis. An 
e}^ )ected utility maximization model is then presented vAlch must be 
solved by numerlcêd integration and numerical optimization techniques. 
Ihe dhapter concludes with a discussion of the analytical solutions 
produced by the mean-variance model when commodity options are included 
in the EN's risk management portfolio. Despite the recognized 
difficulties in the use of the mean-variance model vdien colons are 
present, the model does tend to produce relatively simple analytical 
solutions vAiich may be useful in gaining insights into behavioral 
characteristics in the presence of commodily options. In addition, the 
mean-variance model may produce results vAilch are useful as an 
approximation to the true c^ imal solutions. 
Chapter 4 develcps the methods used to study the optimal marketing 
behavior in the presence of ccmmodlty cptlons. Ihe regression 
technique and data design used to estimate the functional relationships 
between the cptiroal market positions and the relevant market factors 
are discussed. Ihe chapter concludes with an explanation of the method 
used to compare the results of the ejq^ ected utillly, mean-variance, and 
regression models. Ihe same technique is used to measure the value of 
futures and options institutions to a CM vAo primarily uses the markets 
for risk management purposes. 
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of market factor levels used in 
the study. Ihe numerical solution procedure used to solve the eiqpected 
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Utility maximization problem is then developed in detail. Next, the 
results of the exget±ed utility and mean-variance models are presented 
for the various combinations of market factors as specified in the data 
design used in .the stuc^ . Ihe chapter concludes with a discussion of 
localized comparative static results tdiich are generated by numerical 
methods. 
Chapter 6 contains the results of the regression models vAiich 
estimate the functional relationships between the optimal market 
positions and the relevant market factors. Ihe approximating ability 
of the regression and mean-variance models are then considered. Ihe 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the measured value of futures 
and options institutions to a risk managing EM. 
Chapter 7 contains a summary of the stucty and the major 
conclusions vAiich can be drawn. Ihe chapter concludes with a 
discussion of some of the limitation of the stu<^ . 
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CHAPTER 2. ÏHBQREnCAL POUNDATimS AND RISK HŒFERENCES 
This chapter attempts to develc^  the theoretical foundations 
underlying the risk management hypothesis in commodity markets vdiere 
both futures and options contracts are available. Ihe chapter begins 
by briefly reviewing the esqiected utility hypothesis. Next, several 
specific utility functions and their risk preference characteristics 
are discussed. The chapter concludes by summarizing the results of 
several studies vAiich have attempted to measure risk attitudes. 
Ejçjected Utility Theory 
IXte are continuously forced to choose among different action 
choices that will produce outcomes vhich are uncertain at th:- Lime the 
choice is made. Although the ex ante outcome is unknown, the 
particular action choice undertaken often does affect the ex post 
realized utility. Ihere are many methods vMch have been used to model 
Q 
decision-making under uncertainty. Despite various criticisms, the 
e)q)ected utility hypothesis, sometimes called Bernoulli decision 
theory, has been suggested ky seme as the best way to model decision­
making under uncertainty.® The expected utility hypothesis was first 
O 
Anderson (1979) provides a brief, critical review of many of the 
techniques used to model decision-making under uncertainty. 
®See Dillon (1979) and Machina (1987) for informal discussions of 
the e}q)ected utility theory, some of its theoretical prdalems, and 
difficulties in application. Dyckman et al. (1969) provides a fairly 
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put forth by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738, in the context of vAiat is now 
kncwn as the St. Petersburg Rucodox, but was not recognized for its 
theoretical importance until 1944 in the work of Von Neumann and 
Morgenstezn (see Von Neumann and Morgenstem (1947) ). The e}^ )ected 
utility theory of decision-making under uncertainty is based on the 
HI'S personal beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain outcomes and 
his personal valuation of the possible outcomes. Ike theory is 
dqiendent on the CM esdiibiting behavioral characteristics consistent 
with the following set of axioms: 
A. Preference Ordering; For any two action choices, the CM 
either prefers one action choice to the other or is indifferent 
between the two action choices. Ihis says that the m must be 
able to make a choice between any two distributions of outcomes 
or else be indifferent between the distributions. 
B. Transitivity: If the CM prefers action choice a^  to 
action choice a^  and action choice a^  to action choice a^ , then 
a^  must be preferred to a^ . If the CM is indifferent between 
a^  and a^  and indifferent between a^  and a^  then he/she must be 
indifferent between a^  and a^ . 
C. Oontinuitv: If the CM prefers a^  to a^  and a^  to a^ , 
then there exists some probability p between 0 and 1 for vAiich 
strai^ tforward derivation of the expected utility theorem. 
the EM is indifferent between and a lottery pa^ +(l-p)ag 
vAere 0<p<l. Ihis indicates that a CM faced with a ris)^  
situation involving a favorable and an unfavorable outcome will 
take the risk if the probability of the unfavorable outcome is 
small enoLKgi. 
D. Independence of Irrelevent Alternatives; If a^  is 
preferred to a^ , and a^  is some otAer action choice, then a 
lottery involving a^  and a^  must be preferred to a lottery 
involving a^  and a^  if the probability of receiving a^  and a^  
is the same in each lottery. 
Ihe e}^ )ected utility theorem follows from the above, or an 
analogous, set of behavioral axioms. Ihe theorem can be stated as 
follows: If a Hi's preferences do not violate the preference axioms of 
ordering, transitivity, continuity, and independence of irrelevent 
alternatives, then there exists a utility fonction U{.} : 
a. vMch assigns a reed number or utility index to all 
possible outcomes such that if U{x^ }>U{Xg} for outcomes x^  and 
then the CM prefers x^  to Xg. Likewise, if U{X^ )=U{X2}, 
then the CM is indifferent between x^  and Xg. 
b. for vMch the expected value, given the CM's subjective 
probability distribution of possible outcomes under each action 
choice, provides a preference measure of the desirability of 
each action choice. For exanple, for aiy two action choices a^  
and a^ , the utility for each action choice will be 
24 
Û(a^ }=E[U(a^ )] and Û{a2)=E[U[{a2}]. 
If f{x^ } is the probability distribution of uncertain outcomes 
associated with any action choice a^ , and U{Xj^ ) is the utility index 
for each outcome, the utility for each action choice can be calculated 
as follcws: 
Û{a^ }=E[U(a^ }]= ^ {x^ }f{x^ } 
or 
J o o  
 ^U{x^ )f(x^ }dxj^  
for discrete and continuous distributions respectively. 
If Û{a^ }>Û{a2}; then action choice a^  is preferred by the EM to 
action choice a^ . Thus, the HI ranks all action choices by their 
expected utility index and chooses the action choice Wiich provides the 
largest utility index, i.e., the CM chooses the action choice vMch 
maximizes his ej^ iected utility. The utility to the EM from a 
particular action choice is measured by the es^ e^cted utility from 
choosing that action choice despite the fact that the CM may not 
actually receive the ejqiected utility level of the decision ex post. 
Several other characteristics of the utility function desribed 
above should be noted. First, any function U^ {.} vAiich is a positive 
linear transformation of U{.} will result in a preference ranking 
identical to the original function, and will serve as well as U{.}. 
Second, the utility index is an ordinal measure and permits judgements 
to be made between the size of alternative measures, but does not 
permit statements to be made regarding the difference between two 
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measures. Finadly, interpersonal cxmparisons are not possible because 
of the intrapersonal nature of the utility function as well as the 
linear transformation property. 
Estimation of Utility Rinctions and Risk Characteristics 
Khowledge of the CM's utility function is essential in the stuc^  
of decision-making in risky environments if the CM is believed to 
behave according to the e>^ }ected utility theorem. Several techniques 
have been applied to elicit a CM's preferences and e}q>ress them in a 
utility function. Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker (1977) discuss 
several c^ ierational procedures to elicit a CM's preferences throu^ i 
direct questioning. The simplest of these methods, the equally likely 
certainty equivedent method (EICE), asks the CM to make dioioes between 
a certain outcome and various sets of equally likely risl^  outcomes 
involving different levels of potential gains and losses. An arbitrary 
scale index is assigned to the hi^ est and lowest possible outcomes and 
the esqjected utility hypothesis is applied to the indicated preferences 
to trace out or estimate the CM's utility function. An alternative 
elicitation method is the equally likely but risky outcomes method 
(E1£0). The EIRO is similar to the EICE method but is designed to 
overcome the potential bias of some respondents against gambling by 
asking the CM to choose between sets of risky alternatives. Ihese 
techniques are fairly easy to ag^ ly when the CM's utility function is 
specified to be unidimensional, i.e., the consequence of any action 
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choice can be r^ resented by a single attribute, such as the CM's 
realized profit level. If the utility function is specified as 
multidimensional the elicitation procedure becomes more complicated. 
Risk preferences may edso be deduced indirectly by observing 
actual decisions and using the observations to estimate the DM's 
utility function. %e indirect method of soliciting [Mis' preferences 
allows for a potentially large set of observations taken from actual 
real-life risky decision situations. However, the indirect method is 
very sensitive to the quédity of the data and the model 
specification. 
Ihe algebraic representation of the utility function allows the 
utility of any outcome to be calculated and permits the develcpnent of 
analytical decision procedures. In many instances an algebraically 
ej^ ressed, smooth utility function is useful. One option is to use 
Taylor's theorem to approximate the utility function as a polynomial 
function. Hdwever, in many cases a more mathematically tractable form 
of the utility function is needed. In these instances greater care is 
taken in ^ seci^ ing the form of the utility function with the primary 
concern given to the qualitative restrictions placed on the function 
°^In the multidimensional utility function the consequences of the 
EM'S action choices are represented by more than one attribute, such as 
profit and leisure. Anderson, Dillon, and Hârdaker (1977) discuss 
preference elicitation for multidimensional utility functions. 
11 See Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) for an example of the indirect 
approach. 
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and the particular requirements of the decision analysis. 
It is common for a CM's preferences to be r^ resented by a 
unidimensional utility function vAiere the single attribute of concern 
to the HI is current income. One difficulty in this r^ resentation is 
put forth in vAiat is known as the Asset Integration Hypothesis (AIH). 
Ihe AIH states that [Ms respond similarly and consistently to changes 
in wealth and income by maximizing eypectoed utility defined over wealth 
and income ly a utility function of the form U{wfy) vdiere w and y are 
the CM's wealth and current income respectively. Ihe hypothesis 
suggests that the CM realizes that his/her utility depends on his/her 
ablility to dstain consumption goods, vAûch is affected by wealth as 
well as current income. The hypothesis implies that in order to model 
a EM'S risk attitudes it may be necessary to measure the impacts of 
action choices on both wealth and current income, vdiich is more 
difficult than simply measuring the iirpacts of action choices on 
current income alone. However, in cases where current income 
r^ resents a relatively large portion of wealth or if the EM ejdiibits 
constant absolute risk aversion (absolute risk aversion is discussed in 
the next section) it may be possible to measure risk attitudes by just 
considering current income. 
Measuring risk aversion 
It is generally accepted that most EM's would prefer an action 
with a sure return to an action Wiich provides a risky return when both 
actions provide the same expexAed return. Ihis preference for 
avoidance of risk is known as risk aversion. Rc^ ison et al. (1984) 
discuss the enpirical results of several studies vAiich attempt to 
measure risk attitudes. Ihey conclude from the results of these 
studies that risk attitudes differ considerably among farmers and that 
most farmers esdiibit some degree of risk aversion. A risk averse HI 
esdiibits a utility function U{y} which is concave, indicating that the 
marginal utility of income decreases as the income level rises. The 
certainty equivalent income is the sure income level that gives the CM 
the same level of utility as the e^ s^ected utility from a given risky 
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action choice. Itie difference between the certainty equivalent and 
the expected value of the risky action choice is called the risk 
premium, or the cost of risk. Die size of the risk premium is a 
function of the shape of the CM's utility function and the probabilité 
distribution of the risky action choice. In general, as the CM becomes 
more averse to risk or as the variability resulting from the risky 
action choice increases, the risk premium increases. The level of risk 
aversion eidiibited by a CM is related to the curvature of the utili^  
function. The more curved the utility function, the greater the level 
of risk aversion. T\vo frequently used measures of the risk aversion of 
a particular utility function are the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, A{y), and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, R{y). 
S^ee Nevtoerry and Stiglitz (1981) for further develc^ xnent of the 
notion of the certainty equivalent and the measuring of risk aversion. 
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nie œefflclent of absolute risk aversion Is defined eis^  ^
A{Y)= -U"{y}/U'{y) (2.1) 
This measure is not dimensionless and depends on the units in vAilch 
inocme is measured, thus when using A{Y}, the Income level and units 
need to be considered. Itie coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
defined as 
vAlch is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income, since R{y} 
is an elasticity it is dimensionless but it is still valued at a 
particular level of income. It is apparent from the definitions of 
A{y} and R{y} that the two measures are related in that 
Special utility functions 
Several ^ )ecial utility functions are frequently used in decision 
analysis because of their tractability for particular types of problems 
and in some cases their desirable representation of risk preferences. 
The following is a list of some of the more frequently used utility 
functions and some of their characteristics: 
1. Ihe logarithmic utility function is a special case of a 
class of utility fuiK±ions vAiich ejdiibit constant relative risk 
R{y)= -y(U"{y)/U'(y)) (2 .2)  
R{y)= yA{y} (2.3) 
and U"{y} respectively denote the first and second partial 
derivatives of U{y) with respect to y. 
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aversion. The logarithmic iitility function is written as 
U{y}=log y. (2.4) 
For this function A{y}=l/y and R{y}=l, thus the level of 
absolute risk aversion is a decreasing function of income and 
the measure of relative risk aversion indicates a unit 
elasticity of marginal utility vAiich is constant over all 
levels of income. 
2. The ei^ xmential utility function ejdiibits constant absolute 
risk aversion. Ihe ej^ nential utility function is written as 
U{y}= -e:q)[-Ay] (2.5) 
The absolute risk aversion measure is simply A and the relative 
risk aversion measure is yA. Thus the level of absolute risk 
aversion is independent of the level of income and the level of 
relative risk aversion is an increasing function of the level 
of income. This function is particularly useful in cases vAiere 
the attribute returns are normally distributed and is discussed 
further in Chapter 3. 
3. Die quadratic utility function is useful in that ea^ iected 
utility can always be ejqpressed in terms of the first 2 moments 
of the risky attributes' distribution for a given action 
choice. The quadratic utility function can be ejqpressed as 
^^ See Nevitoerry and Stiglitz (1981) for further discussion of this 
class of utility functions. 
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U(y}= -(a-by)2. (2.6) 
For this function A{y)= V(V(b-y)) and R{y)= y/(V(b-y)). 
Both absolute and relative risk aversion are iixaneasing 
functions of income. Note that the ntarginsd utility becomes 
negative for incane levels above a/h causing utility to 
actually decrease as income rises. 
4. Hi^ aer order polynomial approximations, such as the cubic 
function e^ diibit simple functional results vAich are analogous 
to the quadratic utility functicai and fay application of 
Taylor's theorem can be useful in describing the CM preferences 
in terms of the moments of the underlying distributiw. "Die 
order polynomial utility function can be represented isa the 
first k moments of the underlying distribution of the utility 
function's attribute. 
5. The power function is another example of a constant relative 
risk aversion function and can be written as 
U{y}= y* 0<x<l (2.7) 
and yields A{y)=(x-l)/y and R{y}=(x-1). Ihus a EM Wiose 
preferences can be r^ resented ty the power function eidiibits 
decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk 
aversion. 
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Empirical Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Preferences 
Earlier in this chapter several techniques were discussed which 
can be used to elicit EM preferences. Most of the early attempts to 
measure risk attitudes and preferences were performed by ezgierimentgiL 
psychologists vAio generally used direct simulated approaches. Several 
attempts have been made ly agriculutural economists to measure CMs' 
preferences and risk attitudes using simulated anchor actual direct 
experiments. Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) use the direct simulated 
approach to estimate risk preferences of a sample of snail farm owners 
and a sample of sharecroppers in northeast Brazil. Ihey attenpt to 
measure risk attitudes using a mean-variance, mean-standard deviation, 
e>^ nential, and a safety-first model. Die results of the stuc^  
indicate that most, but not all, of the peasants tended to be risk 
averse with very diverse risk attitudes. Consequently, the notion of 
reflecting producer attitudes with a single representative utility 
function was not supported by the results. 
The Dillon and Scandizzo study inspired a study of small farmer 
risk attitudes by Binswanger. Binswanger (1980) used both the 
simulated and actual direct approach on small farmers in rural India. 
He used the simulated interview technique of Dillon and Scandizzo on 
his sanple of Indian farmers and found unreliable results. He 
^^ eviterry and Stiglitz (1981) examine several studies which 
attempt to enpirically measure producer risk attitudes and portions of 
this subsection draw heavily from their discussion. 
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œncludes that the direct simulated method produces results vAiich are 
unreliable and potentiedly misleading because of factors such as 
interviewer bias and tiie simulated nature of tlie risly decision. 
Binswanger also used a direct actual approach vftiere actual monetary 
gedns and losses were made available to the farmers. The results 
indicated that most farmers tended to make similar choices at the 
various levels of compensation which seems to si%:port the notion that 
risk attitudes can be approximated by a representative farmer's 
preferences. Binswanger finds evidence to support the eiqpected utility 
hypothesis, while rejecting many of the alternative decision-maldng 
models. The Asset Integration Hypothesis seems to be rejected by the 
results of the stuc^ , indicating that decisions apparently are made 
based only on the impacts of action choices on current income. Hie 
stuc^  results show that producer risk attitudes reflect absolute risk 
aversion levels vAiich decrease sli^ tly and relative risk aversion 
vAiich increases sli^ itly as income fluctuations increase. 
King and Robison (1981) used the stochastic dominance with respect 
to a function technique to attempt to measure risk aversion ky 
specifying absolute risk aversion intervals. Ih^  hypothesized that 
the interval approach is less likely to throw out preferred action 
choices because of errors in specifying the unidimensional utility 
function. Ihe study was conducted on farmers at area extension 
workshop and the results indicate that cms' risk attitudes ranged from 
extremely risk averse to extremely risk loving. Absolute risk aversion 
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seemed to increase at low inccxne levels and decrease at hi^  income 
levels. King and Robison also question the reliability of 
unidimensional utility functions that restrict the value of the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient. 
Antle (1987) presents a general method for estimating parameters 
of the distribution of risk attitudes in a producer pcpilation. Antle 
shows that risk parameter estimation is possible under less restrictive 
assumptions than previously believed if conditions of stochastic 
nonjointness are satisfied. He uses technological relationships in the 
model to estimate risk parameters by observing production behavior. 
Ihe resulting econometric estimate of the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion appears to be consistent with Binswager's interval. 
The empirical results of these studies, and others, indicate that 
attitudes toward risk are an important component in agriculture 
decision making. There do not appear to be any precise statements that 
can be made with regards to specific risk attitudes of [Ms in general. 
Instead, risk attitudes appear to differ significantly among 
agriculture CMs, with most evidence si^ xarting various degrees of risk 
aversion. NeftAsercy and Stiglitz (1981, p. 104) address the issue of 
choosing a particular utility function in the following: 
"... and vdiere it is convenient to e}q)lore the implications of a 
particular choice of utility function we shall variously assume 
constant absolute risk aversion (vAien the distinction between 
income and wealth is irrelevant), or constant partial risk 
aversion, vAiich, from now on, we shall refer to as constant 
relative risk aversion defined on income...". 
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In many cases the convention in choosing a specific utility function 
seems to be to choose a utility function vAiich is in a tractable form, 
given the problem at hand, with consideration edso given to the general 
risk preference characteristics exhibited by the utility function. 
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CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL HEDGING: MODELS AND DIFFICUIOTES 
Most studies on optiincil hedging have been concerned with hedging 
in futures markets. Ihe traditional notion of a hedge is that the 
hedger takes a futures position that is equal to and c^ iposite to his 
cash position in the commodity. Johnson (1959) and Stein (1961) were 
among the first studies to examine "optimal" hedging. These studies 
used modem portfolio theory to show that under certain circumstances 
the optimal hedge may not be equal to the traditional hedge, i.e., the 
optimal futures position may not equal the hedger's cash position in 
the commodity.^ ® More recent studies ty Rolfo (1980), Berck (1981), 
Anderson and Danthine (1983), and others have continued to study the 
optimal hedge of a single agent in a partial equilibrium setting. 
These studies have assumed the CM uses futures contracts as the hedging 
and/or speculating tool. There has been little work done viiich 
considers optimal hedging behavior vAien commodity options are available 
to be used as a hedging and/or speculating tool. The reason for the 
lack of work in this area is most likely the fact that, until recently, 
trading of crions on most commodities has been prohibited on the 
organized exchanges. The apparent success of the current pilot program 
in commodity options suggests that commodity options will likely be 
^^ Brown (1985) modifies the model used both Johnson and Stein 
by using returns in place of price levels and his empirical results 
tend to si%x3rt the traditional hedge vAien the objective is risk 
minimization. 
available to CMS to be used as a hedging and speculating tool In the 
fixture and that additional work is needed in this area. Rltchken 
(1985) skudjed mean-variance (MV) efficient set portfolios vAien estions 
are inclvided in the investment set. The stuc^  suggests that HLadc-
Scholes priced options are inconsistent with an economy consisting of 
investors vdio choose investments front the MV efficient set. When 
options are priced by the Black-Scholes options pricing model, it is 
demonstrated that, in most cases, options should be sold rather than 
purchased and as a result options would cease to trade in a MV economy. 
Wolf (1987) ej^ lores the use of commodity options as risk management 
tools. Wolf examines the optimal futures and colons market positions 
for investors vdio behave according to the "standard" MV model vdiich is 
discussed in the next section. Both studies fall to face potential 
modeling difficulties that occur vAien options are included in the 
model. 
The remainder of this chapter develops a modeling framework vAiich 
will be used to stu*^  optimal hedging in commodity markets where both 
commodity futures and options contracts are traded. First, the 
underlying assumptions of the standard M7 model are discussed and the 
potential difficulties that arise vAien options are Included in the 
model are considered. Next, the income distribution that occurs vAien 
options are used as a hedging and/or speculation tool is developed for 
the case a of certain end-of-period output level. Then the general 
esqsected utility maximization model is presented. Die chapter 
38 
concludes ky extending the standard MV model to include ocmmodity 
options, débité the apparent inconsistency with the general ejq^ ected 
utility maximization model. 
implications of the Standard MV Model 
Ihe MV framework focuses a CM's risk attitudes and the decision­
making process on the first two moments of the underlying attribute's 
distribution, i.e., the mean and the variance, ihe underlying utility 
function is specified in terms of mean and variance of the underlying 
attribute, usueilly income, and implicitly will not depend on any hi^ er 
moments of the distribution. The popularity of the MV model can be 
traced to the tractable theoretical results it produces and the 
computationally convenient empirical applications of the model. 
IMfortunately, the strai^ tforward nature of the MV model results from 
some fairly restrictive assuirptions that are violated when options are 
added to the model and may lead to erroneous conclusions anchor 
results. 
Specifying an ei^ iected utility function in terms of the first two 
moments of the underlying attributes distribution has been shown to be 
consistent with the ejqDected utility hypothesis only if at least one of 
T7 the following sufficient conditions are met; 
17 Tobin (1958), Samuelson (1970), and Meyer (1987) have shown 
that each one of the conditions is sufficient for a mean-variance 
r^ resentation of the ei^ iected utility function to be consistent with 
the expected utility hypothesis. 
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1. the EM'S utility function is quadratic; 
2. the EM has a concave utility function and the random attribute 
is normally distributed; 
3. the random attribute is a monotonie linear function of a single 
random variable. 
Note the above set of conditions have been shown to be sufficient, not 
necessary, conditions for the M7 framework to produce results vAiich are 
consistent with the eiqaected utility hypothesis and, as a result, the 
IW framework may also be consistent with the expected utility 
hypothesis under other, as yet unidentified, conditions. Levy and 
Markowitz (1979) have suggested that the MV model may be used in cases 
vAien the level of risk is small relative to the EM's level of wealth. 
In addition, Tsiang (1972) has shown that a M7 framework may 
approximate e}q)ected utility results vAien certain restrictions are 
placed on the skewness of the income distribution. 
The quadratic utility function is convenient because it produces 
linear demand functions and the estpected utility function can be 
eQ)ressed in terms of the first two moments of the underlying 
attribute's distribution regardless of the true distribution. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, the quadratic utility function implicitly 
assumes that the CM esdiibits increasing absolute risk aversion as 
income rises and decreasing marginal utility above some income level, 
i.e., utility actually falls as income rises above some level. Most 
studies have viewed the assumption of a quadratic utility function as 
unreasonable and have tended to rely on condition 2, that the utility 
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function is concave and the attribute is normally distributed. 
Many utility functions are concave functions of income and can be 
used with a normally distributed income level to yield a MV 
representation of the expected utility function. However, only the 
negative exponential utility function, illustrated in equation (2.5), 
in conjunction with a normally distributed attribute will yield the 
standard MV model vtiich has been used in many studies. ïhe standard MV 
model is typicêaiy specified as 
Màx U= u -(V2)4 (3.1) 
X  ^  ^
vAiere: 
/iy = expected value of end-of-period income; 
A = Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion; 
2 
<7y = variance of end-of-period income; 
X = vector of choice variables. 
Any other concave utility function will also produce a M7 
r^ resentation of the eiqiected utility function vAien income is normally 
distributed, but it will not be the standard model nor a linear 
function of mean and variance. As stated earlier, the standard model 
is desirable because it is a linear function of the mean and variance 
of Income and produces convenient algebraic and computational results. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the negative e^ qxsnential utility function 
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duplies that the EM esdiiblts constant absolute risk aversion and 
increasing relative risk aversion. Ihe literature in this area is 
sanewhat inconclusive, although there does seem to be somme si^ sport for 
decreasing absolute risk aversion over large ranges of income (King and 
Robison (1981) ). However, for relatively snail income flucuations the 
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion may be an acceptable 
r^ resentation of CM preferences. Regardless, most studies have been 
willing to accept the assuirption of constant absolute risk aversion, at 
least as an approximation, in order to obtain the desireable properties 
of the standard MV model. If given that the negative exponential 
utility function is an acceptable representation of the CM preferences, 
the normality of the income distribution still needs to be established 
to ^ ow consistency between the standard MV model and the eiqiected 
utility hypothesis. In the next section, we derive the actual income 
distribution that results Wien both futures and options are used as 
hedging anchor speculating tools by a CM vAio has a certain level of 
end-of-period output and believes the cash price is a normally 
distributed random variable. Ihe resulting distribution is seen to be 
nonnormal, except under the special case in vtiich the CM does not take 
a position in the editions market, thus violating the normality 
assumption and casting doubt upon the use of the MV model #ien options 
are present. 
Ihe less restrictive linearity condition, recently put forth ly 
Meyer (1987), appears to provide justification for application of a MV 
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model, although not the standard M7 model, to many more restrictive 
problems vAiich were previously believed to seriously violate the 
sufficient conditions needed to apply the MV model. Ihe linearity 
ccmdition is addressed in the following section where it is argued that 
monotonie linearity of the income function is violated vAien options are 
included as a risk management tool. Thus the justification for usijig a 
MV model to stuc^  optimal hedging positions vAien options are included 
as a risk management tool appears to be questionable and an alternative 
model may be neccesary. 
Income Distribution with Options and Certain Output 
Ihe income distribution that results Wien options are included as 
a risk management tool is important in determining the appropriateness 
of the M7 model and in the use of the more flexible general ej^ jected 
utility maximization model presented later. The CM is assumed to gain 
utility solely from his end-of-period income vAiich is determined by 
equation (3.2). 
y{p}=P&<-x(f-P)+Iz(E-p)-zk (3.2) 
vAiere: 
y{p)= total end-of-period income; 
p = random end-of-period spot price; 
f = localized futures price for end-of-period delivery; 
Q = certain end-of-period output level; 
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I = an indicator variable=l if p<E 
=0 if FfeE; 
E = localized eœrcise price of a put c^ ion on the spot 
commodity; 
k = put option premium per bushel; 
X = the number of bushels of futures contracts; 
z = the number of bushels of put c^ ion contracts. 
Ihe CM has a single asset, Q, vAiich he may sell at a specified future 
date in the cash market for seme unknown spot price p, in the futures 
market for a certain price, f, or he may purchase the c^ ion to sell 
3.8 the ou^ xit for a certain price E if he so desires. Ihe entire amount 
of output, Q, is not required to be sold in a single market and may be 
divided among the three markets in any way the CM desires. In addition 
the CM may sell a total amount in some combination of the cash, 
futures, and options markets vAich is greater than Q. In this case, 
the CM is no longer just hedging his output, but is also speculating on 
the future value of p. Other forms of speculation the CM may ejdiibit 
are going long in the futures market (x<0) and/or writing put crions 
instead of selling them (z<0). There are assumed to be no transaction 
18 Call options are not included in the c^ r^tunity set of the CM. 
Frcm a risk management stanc^ int, the addition of call options vAien 
futures and put options are available on the CM's output commodity 
would only provide additional speculative opportunities. In addition, 
the inclusion of call options in the model would lead to a singularity 
problem when the exercise price equals the eiqiected spot price level. 
In this case, the CM could combine put and call cptions to create a 
payoff structure identical to a futures contract. Thus one of the 
instruments becomes redundant. 
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cc3Bt, basis uncertainty, or margin calls. 
The only uncertainty faced ty the EM is the output price p. ïhe 
CM has the opportunity to eliminate all or part of the price 
uncertainty by marketing his output in the futures market an^ /or the 
options market. %e choice variables available to the CM are x and z, 
the amount marketed in the futures and options market re^ jectively. 
Ihe model is single period in nature and assumes that the initial 
positions established in the futures and options markets are maintiained 
until the end of the period at v^ ich time all cash, futures, and 
options transactions will take place. Ihe quantity of output tx) be 
sold, the futures contract selling price, the exercise price, and the 
put option premium are known, exogenous variables tx) the CM. 
Ihe CM is assumed to believe that p is distributed normally with a 
mean n and a variance a and, as a result, the required subjective 
20 income distribution can be found as follows: 
First note that the income function differs dependent on vAiether 
19 As discussed in Chapter 1, the commodity options currently 
traded on the organized exchanges are options on commodity futures 
contracts. Ihe income function in equation (3.2) tzreats t:he options as 
options on the spot commodity. Ihe assumption of a certain basis level 
results in the two types of options being equivalent. Ihat is, if the 
basis is known with certainty, then an option on a futures contract is 
equivalent to an cption on the underlying ^ )ot commodity. 
20 Ihe various statistical theorems and definitions used in this 
section are shown in Appendix A. 
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21 the put option is in-the-mon^  or not at maturity. ïhus we can 
express income as two s^ iarate functions depending on the value of E 
and the realized value of p. In other words, equation (3.2) can be 
written as equations (3.3) and (3.4). 
y{P)=TO<-x(f-P)+z(E-p)-zk if p<E (3.3) 
y(P)=PÇM-x(f-P)-zk if FfeE (3.4) 
Let the set of possible inccmes determined by equations (3.3) and (3.4) 
be denoted cis and y^  respectively. 
Second, define the following events; 
A= the event that p<c vAiere c is any arbitrary constant 
between -« and 
B= the event that pcE; and 
B'= the event that p&E. 
Then, using standard probability and set theory, event A can be 
22 
ei^ ressed as equation (3.5). 
(^AnB)U(AnB3 (3.5) 
Thus the probability of event A occurring can be written as equation 
(3.6). 
P(A)=P[(AnB)U(AnB')] (3.6) 
21 If an option has a value vdien exercised, i.e., p<E for a put 
c^ ion, it is said to be in-the-money. If an c^ ion has no value when 
exercised, i.e., p&E for a put cçjtion, it is said to be out-of-tdie-
money. 
22 See Freund and Walpole (1980) for an inturoduction to the 
definitions and 1:heorems of probability and set theory. 
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Using theorem A.l, equation (3.6) can be written as equation (3.7). 
P(A)=P(AnB)+P(AnB')-P[ (AnB)n(AnB') ] (3.7) 
Because the events B and B' are ccaorplementary and hence disjoint, 
equation (3.7) reduces to equation (3.8). 
P(A)=P(AnB)+P(AnB') (3.8) 
T^ lying theorem A.2 allows equation (3.8) to be written as equation 
(3.9). 
P(A) =P(B)P(A| B) +P(B' ) P(A| B' ) (3.9) 
Substituting the definitions for events A, B, and B' into equation 
(3.9) yields equation (3.10). 
P(p<c) =P(p<E) P(p<c I p<E) +P(pb:E) P(p<c I p&E) 
(3.10) 
Equation (3.10) is simply an alternative e)^ ression of the distribution 
function of p. Since the CM believes that p is distributed normally 
with mean n and variance a , the probabilities r and 1-r vAich 
correi^ nd to P(p<E) and P(FfeE), respectively, can be found by 
equations (3.11) and (3.12). 
S 
P(p<E)= exp[-(Pnw)^ /2p^ ]/oV5n àp = r (3.11) 
r 2 7 P(FfeE)= J g e3q)[-(p-/x) /2a /aj^ dp = 1-r (3.12) 
Hie P(p<c|p<E) component of equation (3.10) is the distribution 
function for p conditional upon p<E. Using definition A.l, the 
conditional probability P(p<c|p<E) can be ej^ ressed as equation (3.13). 
P(p<c|p<E)=P[ (p<c)n(p<E) ]/P(p<E) (3.13) 
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Letting P{c)=P(p<c|p<E) and using the result from equation (3.11), 
equation (3.13) can be represented by equation (3.14). 
F(c}= f ejç)[-(p-/i) V2£7^ ]/rffy2Îï dp 
if OE 
if GSE (3.14) 
F{c} is an expression for the distribution function of p conditional on 
p<E. When csE the set of all p<c is a subset of the set of all p<E 
and, unless o=E, there exists some chance that p>c. The P(p<c|p<E) is 
thus described ky the distribution function in equation (3.14) and will 
take some value between zero and one. If oE , then the set of all p<E 
is a subset of the set of all p<c and consequently there exists no 
chance that p>c. Ihus viien oE the P(p<c|p<E) must equal 1. Using 
theorem A.3 and the distribution function F(c}, the density function 
for p conditional on p<E can be written as f{p} in equation (3.15). 
f(p)= exp[-(p-/i)2/2(r^ ]/r(7y^  if p<E (3.15) 
The final component of equation (3.10) is P(p<c|FfeE), the 
distribution function for p conditional on jaE. Using the same 
procedures used to arrive at equations (3.14) and (3.15) allows the 
distribution and density functions for p conditional on jaE to be 
written as equations (3.16) and (3.17) respectively. 
G{c)= / g exp[-(p-/if /2I y{l-v)aj2ii dp if OE (3.16) 
= 0 if FfeE 
= 0 if csE 
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g{p)= exp[-(p-M)V2a^ ]/(l-r)ay2;? if EfeE (3.17) 
= 0 if p<E 
Letting W{c)=P(p<c) and substituting the results from equations 
(3.11), (3.12), (3.14), and (3.16), equation (3.10) can be written as 
equation (3.18). 
W{c}=rF(c}+(l-r)G(c} (3.18) 
Once again, equation (3.18) is the distribution function for p 
e)q)ressed as the wei^ ted average of the distribution functions for p 
conditional on p<E and p&E. Using theorem A. 3 and the results of 
equations (3.15) and (3.17), the density function for p can be written 
as the wei^ ted average of the density functions for p conditional upon 
p<E and F&E as shown in equation (3.19). 
w{p)=rf{p)+(l-r)g{p) for all -^ pg» (3.19) 
Substituting equations (3.15) and (3.17) into equation (3.19) 
yields the esqjression for the density function of p shown in equation 
(3.20). Equation (3.20) is siirply the normal density function for p 
e)q)ressed in conditional terms about E. 
W{p)=IeJÇ)[-(p-/i)V2a^ ]/ay25? (3.20) 
+(l-I)exp[-(p-;i)^ /2a^ ]/ay:; 
for all -«ïspsco 
vAiere: 1=1 if p<E 
=0 if FfeE 
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Finally, the EM requires the distribution of inocme given each 
action choice to determine the utility derived from a given set of 
action choices. Therefore, equation (3.20) must be specified in terms 
of y. Using the transformation of variable technique from theorem A. 4, 
f{p) and g{p) can be ej^ ressed as f{y) and g{y) and consequently w{p} 
can be e)^ ressed as w{y). Solving equation (3.3) for p in terms of y 
yields equation (3.21). 
p=[y-xf-z (E-k) ]/ (Q-x-z) (3.21) 
Using equations (3.15) and (3.21) and the transformation of variable 
technique allows the distribution of income conditional on p<E to be 
written as equation (3.22). 
f{y}= e3ç>[-(y-/iy^ )V2cry^ ]/rffy^ y2;? (3.22) 
for y<y{E) if (Q-x-z)>0 
i^ y{E) if (Q-x-z)<0 
=0 otherwise 
vAiere: y{E)=Y(P) evaluated at p=E 
/iyi =(Q-x-z)M+xf+z(E-k) 
Pyl = (Q-x-z) I Q-x-z I a 
Ihe conditional limits of density function in equation (3.22) are 
in correspondence with equations (3.15) and (3.21). Equation (3.15) 
specifies that f{y) will take on nonzero values only viien p<E. Thus 
the set of possible income values described by the distribution in 
equation (3.22) correspond to the income levels described by equation 
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(3.3). If p=E, the value of y{E) is (Q-x-z)E+xf+z(E-k) and for any p<E 
the vcilue of y{p) is (Q-x-z)p+xf+z (E-k). If (Q-x-z) >0, then y{p}<y{E} 
for any p<E and, if (Q-x-z)iO, then y{p}5:y{E) for ary p<E. In other 
words, if the amount of output sold in the cash market exceeds the 
amount of out^ xit hedged in the futures and options markets, then as 
output price falls below the exercise price, losses in the cash market 
are larger than the total gains in the futures and options markets, and 
income falls. Hcwever, if the amount of output sold on the futures and 
options markets exceeds the output sold on the cash market, then as 
output price falls below the exercise price, the total gains in the 
futures and options markets more than offset losses in the cash market, 
and income rises. 
Next, solving equation (3.4) in terms of p yields equation 
(3.23). 
Using equations (3.17) and (3.23) and the transformation of variable 
technique allows the distribution of income conditional on p&E to be 
e)q)ressed as equation (3.24). 
p=(y-xf+zk)/(Q-x) (3.23) 
g{y )= exp[-(y-z^ g^ ) ^/2a^  ]/ ( l-r) (3.24) 
for i^ y{E) if (Q-x)>0 
y<y(E) if (Q-x)<0 
=0 otherwise 
vAiere; fi^ =(Q-x)fi+x£-zk 
Ihe conditional limits of the density function in equation (3.24) 
are determined and interpreted in a manner similar to those in equation 
(3.22). Equation (3.17) requires that g{y) take on positive values 
only vAien p&E, and as a result the set of income levels described by 
density function in equation (3.24) corresponds to the income levels 
described by equation (3.4). If p=E, then y(E}=(Q-x)E+xf-zk and if 
FfeE, then y{p)=(Q-x)pfxf-zk. If Q-j&O, then y{p)>y{E) for all p&E, and 
if Q-x<0, then y{p)<y{E} for all p&E. Since peE the option will not be 
exercised and changes in income due to price rises above the exercise 
price depend only on gains and losses in the futures and cash market. 
If the amount of out^ t sold in the cash market exceeds the amount 
hedged in the futures market, then as price rises above the exercise 
price, gains in the ccish market offset the losses in the futures 
market, and income rises. However, if the amount of output sold in the 
futures market exceeds the amount of output sold in the cash market, 
then losses in the futures market would offset gains in the cash 
market, and income would fall as price rises above the exercise price. 
Using the transformation of variable theorem and equation (3.19), 
the density function for income can be written as equation (3.25). 
w{y)=rf(y)+(l~r)g{y) (3.25) 
Substituting equations (3.23) and (3.24) into equation (3.25) yields 
equation (3.26). 
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W{y}=Ij^ e3^ [-(y-Myj^ ) (3.26) 
+I2exp[-(y-/iy2) ^/2a^ya^j2ii 
for -<9gyg(o 
vAiere; I.=l for y<y{E) if (Q-x-z)>0 
y&y{E) if (Q-x-z)^ O 
=0 otherwise 
1^ =1 for ^ y{E} if (Q-x)^ o 
for y<y{E) if (Q-x)<0 
=0 otherwise 
Equation (3.26) expresses the density function corresponding to the 
income function in equation (3.2) if the CM believes that p is 
distributed nonmlly with a mean n and variance a . 
Ihe income distribution represented by equation 3.26 takes a 
variety of different forms dependent on the CM's positions in the 
futures and options markets. Figure 3.1 illustrates the general types 
of distributions that would occur if the CM participates only in the 
cash and futures markets, i.e., z=0. If the CM participates only in 
the cash market, i.e., xM) and z=0, the income function in equation 
(3.2) reduces to y= pQ vrtiich is simply a linear function of the 
normally distributed random variable p and the resulting income 
distribution is normally distributed with mean Qix and variance Q cr . 
If the CM takes a partial hedge position in the futures market, i.e., 
0<x<Q, the income function would siirplify to y= pQ + x(f-p) and the 
income density function would follow a normal distribution with a mean 
2 2 (Q-x)/i + xf and a variance (Q-x) a . Figure 3.1 assumes that the 
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Figure 3.1. Incane distribution with futures contracts 
futures price is unbiased, i.e., t=ti, vAiich causes the means of each, 
distribution to equal Qu. The variance of the distribution under the 
partial hedge is smaller than the variance of the cash market 
distribution and decreases as the proportion of output hedged 
increases. As the cash price falls below the futures price, losses in 
the cash market are partially offset by gains in the futures market, 
and income falls less rapidly than in the unhedged case. However, as 
the cash price rises above the futures price, gains in the cash market 
are partially offset by losses in the futures market and inccsne rises 
less than in the unhedged case. If the traditional hedge is made, the 
income variance becomes zero, i.e., income is known with certainty, as 
all losses (gains) in the cash market are offset by gains (losses) in 
the futures market. Finally, if the CM decides to go long in the 
futures market, i.e., x<0, he/she is essentially contracting to buy 
additional output at the end of the period and is speculating with 
regard to changes in the cash price. Ihe income equation and 
distribution are described by the same parameters as in the partial 
hedge case except that the vAien x<0, the variance of the distribution 
is larger than in the unhedged case as shown in Figure 3.1. If the EM 
takes a long position then any losses (gains) in the cash market are 
magnified by further losses (gains) in the futures market and income 
falls (rises) more rapidly than in the unhedged case. 
Figure 3.2 depicts the income distrtoution for the case in vAiich 
the EM takes a traditional hedge in the options market but does not 
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Figure 3.2. Incxsne distribution with options contracts: Traditional 
hedge 
participate in the futures market, i.e., )M) and z=Q. When crions are 
present, the inoane equation differs depending on vAiether the option is 
in-the-money or out-of-the-money. When the option is out-of-the-money 
the income function reduces to y= pQ - zk and the income distribution 
behaves as a the portion of a normal distribution above y{E) with a 
mean and variance <7^  ^. When the option is in-the-money the income 
function becomes y= pQ + z(E-p) - zk and the income distribution 
behaves as the portion of a normal distribution below y{E) with mean 
2 
variance . In the special case,of a traditional hedge in 
the options market the variance of income becomes zero vAien the option 
is in-the-money because all losses in the cash market are exactly 
offset by gains in the options market and the resulting income level is 
fixed at y{E). If the option is out-of-money the CM simply declines to 
exercise the option and the income is allowed to rise directly with 
gains in the cash market. Consequently, Wien the option is in-the-
money the income is fixed at y{E) and vAien the option is out-of-the-
money income follows a truncated normal distribution for income levels 
above y{E} as shown in figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the income distribution for the case %tien 
the CM hedges a portion of his output in the options market but does 
not participate in the futures market, i.e., je=0 and 0<z<Q, and the 
exercise price is equal to the expected spot price, i.e., the option is 
ej^ )ected to be at-the-money when the period ends. The income 
distribution is characterized by the same parameters as before, only 
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Figure 3.3. Inoome distribution with crions contracts: Partial 
hedge vAien the exercise price is equal to the ejqiected 
spot price 
now the variance term does not become zero vrtien the cption is in-the-
money because losses in the cash market are only partially offset by 
gains in the options market and income falls below y{E}, but not as 
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rapidly as in the unhedged case. When the c^ ion is out-of-the-
money, the option is not exercised and income again rises corresponding 
to gains in the cash market. The income distribution now appears as 
two normal distributions each truncated at the income level y{E}, v^ feLch 
in this case is also the mean parameter of each truncated distribution, 
, 24 
1'®"' y^2' 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the type of distributions that 
result if the CM partially hedges his/her output in the estions market 
and the exercise price is different than the eiqaected spot price, i.e., 
vAien the option is expected to be in-the-money or out-of-the-money at 
the end of the period. As in the previous case, each income 
distribution consists of two truncated normal distributions but the 
truncation points no longer occur at the mean parameter of each 
truncated distribution. In Figure 3.4, the exercise price is greater 
than the e3^ )ected spot price and the truncation point occurs to the 
ri^ t of each truncated distribution's mean parameter. When the 
23 Note that the actual value of y{E) depends on level of 
participation in the futures and cations markets. 
*^If the CM writes put options, i.e., z<0, the income distribution 
takes the same form as illustrated in Figure 3.2 except that the in-
the-money segment of the distribution now becomes flatter than the out-
of-the-money segment. 
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Figure 3.4. Income distribution with <^ ions contracts: Partial 
hedge vAien the exercise price is greater than the eiqiected 
sfpot price 
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Figure 3.5. Inoome distribution with options contracts ; Partial 
hedge vAien the exercise price is less than the e}^ >ected 
X^3t price 
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exercise price is below the e)^ )ected spot price the truncation point 
occurs to the left of each distribution's mean parameter as shown in 
Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the case in vAiich the CM ovexhedges in the 
options market, i.e., x=0 and z>Q. The same parameters characterize 
the distribution as in the previous four cases. However, in the case 
of an overhedge in the options market, vAen the option is in-the-money 
losses in the cash market are more than offset by gains in the qptions 
market and income actually rises above y{E). As before, vAen the 
option is out-of-the-money income rises in correspondence to gains in 
the cash market. As a result, income is above y{E} for any price level 
except E. Ihe income distribution thus becomes the sum of the 
distributions vAien the option is in-the-money and out-of-the-money. 
There are an infinite number of alternative distributions v^ ich 
can be created ky the EM throu^  his/her choices on x and z. Ihe 
distributions can become more conplex as futures and options positions 
are taken simultaneously. Figure 3.1 suggests that if the CM 
participated only in the futures market and the underlying spot price 
is at least approximately normally distributed, the assumption of 
income normality may be acceptable and the standard MV model may 
produce reasonable results. Ihe CM is really just choosing among a set 
of normal distributions with different means and variances. However, 
vAien crions are included as a hedging and/or speculating tool, the set 
of income distributions available to the CM is expanded and many of the 
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Figure 3.6. Income distribution with options contracts; Overhedge 
vAien the exetxiise price is equal to the ei^ aected 
sfpot price 
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available distributions are no longer normal distributions. Thus, the 
accuracy of the standard MV model results would seem to be 
questionable. 
Finedly, the possibility of using the linearity condition to 
si%)ort the use of a M7 model needs to be addressed. Examination of 
the income function in equation (3.2) shows that the income function is 
in fact kinked at y{E) and may be an increasing function of cash price 
over some ranges and a decreasing function over other ranges depending 
on the magnitudes of the futures and options positions. Meyer (1987) 
indicates that t±e linearity condition is violated for functions of 
this type and a MV model cannot be justified by this condition. 
The General Ejqjected Utility Maximization Model 
The previous section demonstzrated that the sufficient condition 
viiich is typically used to justi^  the use of the standard MV model is 
violated vdien options are included in the model and, as a result, the 
model may produce unreliable results and/or conclusions. Thus an 
alternative modeling framework is necessary to stuc^  optimal hedging 
vAien options are included in the set of risk management tools used by 
the CM. If the CM is assumed to make decisions consistent with the 
e}^ >ected utility hypothesis and faces the income function and 
conditions indicated by equation (3.2), then the CM will choose his/her 
futures and options market positions to satisfy the following equation: 
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Max Û = £[u{y}w{y)dy (3.27) 
x,z 
Where: 
Û = the EM'S expected utility given his/her choice of x 
and z; 
U{y}= the EM'S utility function? 
w{y}= the income distribution faced by the DM as specified by 
equation (3.26). 
Solving equation (3.27) using the EM's utility function and end-of-
period income distribution, will yield the optimal futures and options 
market positions. Unfortunately, there are no apparent analytical 
solutions to equation (3.27) because the e^ s^ected utility level can not 
be expressed in a form that does not involve integrals. As a result, 
solution techniques involving numerical intiegration and optimization 
procedures are required. Ihe futures and options positions vdiich 
maximize the EM's ejç)ected utility can be found numerically ty the 
following process: 
1. Specify U{y) and w{y} for tiie EM; 
2. Specify an initial level of x and z; 
3. Given X and z, use a numerical integration program to 
find the expected utility level; 
4. Use an iterative optimization program v^ ich altiers the 
values of x and z tx) repeat steeps 1-3 until the maximum level 
of expected utility is determined; 
5. Choose the values of x and z vAich maximize expected 
utility. 
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Ihe above procedure will yield the cptitnal futures and options 
* * 
positions, x and z , given the income distribution in equation (3.27) 
and the CM's utility function. 
Optimal Hedging in a Mean-Variance Framework 
Hie previous discussion has shown that the assumptions underlying 
the standard W model are violated vAen options are held ky the EM. 
Dei^ ite the lack of stçport, the standard MV model may produce 
acceptable results, at least as an econcmic approximation, and/or be 
useful in gaining insights into the inpacts of commodity options on 
optimal market positions. Ihis section extends the standard MV model 
to include options as a hedging and/or speculative tool, ignoring any 
potential modeling problems that occur vAen options are included in the 
model. The section presents six different MV models vAich are used to 
stu£ty the optimal market positions under various situations. Ihe first 
two models illustrate the standard results that occur vAien a CM uses 
only the cash and futures markets for the cases of certain and 
uncertain end-of-period output respectively; models three and four 
extend the standard MV model to examine the optimal options postions 
Vivien a CM uses only the cash and options markets for the cases of 
^^ Much of the debate as to vtiether MV models may be used to 
represent behavior consistent with the ejç)ected utility hypothesis vAien 
the underlying assumptions of the model have been violated has focused 
on the approximating ability of the MV model. See Robison and Barry 
(1987) for further discussion on justifying the use of the MV model as 
an approximation to expected utility maximization. 
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certain and uncertain end-of-period output respectively; and models 
five and six consider the optimal market positions vAen a CM uses the 
cash, futures, and options markets for the cases of certain and 
uncertain end-of-period output respectively. Several siitpli^ ing 
assumptions have been made in the models illustated here. Some of 
these assumptions can easily be relaxed in the standard MV model, 
however, relaxing these assuirptions does significantly complicate the 
general expected utility model. To be consistent with the assuirptions 
in the general es^ iected utility model discussed earlier, the following 
assumptions have been made: 
1. Hie CM acts to maximize the expected utility of the end-of-
period income vAiich can be represented ty the standard M7 
model; 
2. No call options are available to the CM; 
3. The exercise price of the options is exogenous; 
4. The firm produces a single output; 
5. Irput levels are fixed; 
6. There is no time value of money during the single period; 
7. Ihe futures and options contract units are perfectly 
divisible; 
8. No basis uncertainty. 
Ihe models use the following definitions: 
p= random end-of-period spot price; 
f= localized futures price for end-of-period delivery; 
Q= certain end-of-period output level; 
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g= random end-of-period output level; 
B= loceillzed exercise price of the option; 
te= option premium; 
localized value of the qotion at the end of the period 
= max[0,E-p] ; 
the number of bushels of futures contracts; 
z= the number of bushels of options contracts. 
Model 1; Cash and futures with certain output 
Model 1 examines the optimal hedge in a futures market for a CM 
26 
with a certain end-of-period output level. ïhe assunption of a 
certain end-of-period output level may be realistic for commodities 
such as irrigated crc^ , metals, and lumber, or for firms vdio buy and 
resell the commodity over short time intervals, such as grain 
merchandisers. ïhe assunption may be somaAiat unrealistic for come 
feed grain and livestock producers whose output is heavily influenced 
ky factors such as weather, insects, and disease. ïhe end-of-period 
income function is 
y= pQ + x(f-p) (3.28) 
and the standard MV model objective function becomes 
26 As mentioned in the earlier discussion, the MV framework has 
been used extensively to stuc^  risk management in futures markets, 
e.g., see Anderson and Danthine (1983). In addition Wolf (1987) used 
the MV framework to examine risk management with options in a CM's 
portfolio. Consequently, some of the following results have been 
presented in, or may be derived from the results of, previous studies. 
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My - (V2)o^  (3.29) 
vAiere: 
My= (Q-x)Mp + xf 
(O-x)^ ag 
Because there are no constraints in the model, standard calculus can be 
used to solve for the c^ imal futures position. The first and second 
order conditions can be written as 
POC: (f-/i ) + A(Q-x)ff^ =0 (3.30) 
SOC: -A7p<0 if A>0 (3.31) 
Ihe second order condition for a maximum is satisfied as long as the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is positive, indicating that the 
CM is risk averse. Solving the first order condition for x yields the 
optimal futures position to be 
x=Q+ (f-Mp) (3.32) 
-P 
In each of the MV models it is useful to discuss the results in terms 
of the hedging component and the speculative coirponent. Ihe first term 
in the solution can be thought of as the hedging cornponent and is 
simply the futures position that minimizes the variance of end-of-
period income. The second term can be interpreted as the speculative 
component and is the futures position that results if the EM does not 
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have any cash position and obtains his entire end-of-period income from 
then the speculative component disaf^ sears and the optimal futures 
position is the traditional hedge. However, if the futures market is 
biased then the CM believes that he/she can on average make profits by 
speculating in the futures market and thus alters his/her futures 
position by the believed bias adjusted by the level of risk aversion 
and price variability. Œhus the EM may overhedge or underhedge 
depending on vAether the believed futures market bias is positive or 
negative. If the CM becomes more risk averse he/she will tend to 
speculate less and as a EM becomes infinitely risk averse the 
speculative component will disappear and the futures position will be 
equal to the traditional hedge. 
rfodel 2; Cash and futures with uncertain output 
Model 2 examines the optimal futures position for a EM with an 
uncertain level of end-of-period output. Ihe Income function now 
Includes two random variables, p and q, and can be written as 
ïhe e}^ )ected value and the variance of end-of-period income now can be 
written as 
the futures market. If the futures market is unbiased, i.e., f-n 
P 
y= pq + x(f-p) (3.33) 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
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Substituting the equations (3.34) and (3.35) into the standard MV model 
in equation (3.1) and solving for the first- and second-order 
conditions yields 
fDO: f-Ap - = 0 (3.36) 
SOC: -ATp <0 if A>0 (3.37) 
If the CM is risk averse then solving equation (3.36) for x yields the 
optimal futures position to be 
X = 'pg.p + ((-"p) (3-38) 
"P 
The futures position again depends on the hedging and speculative 
components. The speculative coirponent is identical to model 1, which 
is e)q)ected because a speculator would not have a cash position in 
either model and thus the issue of output uncertainty is irrelevant 
from a speculative stanc^ int. If the futures market is unbiased the 
speculative component again disappears and the futures position is 
determined by the hedging component. Ihe hedging coirponent no longer 
corresponds to the traditional hedge. It now depends on the covariance 
between cash market revenue and cash price, and the variance of the 
cash price. Thus even if the futures market is unbiased, the optimal 
futures position will most likely differ from the traditional hedge. 
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Model 3: OARh and options with certain output 
Model 3 applies the standard MV model to examine the optimal 
options market position vAien the CM faces a certain level of end-of-
period output. The end-of-period income level now consists of revenue 
from the cash market plus any revenue fron the coitions market less the 
cost of purchasing the cptions. The income function can be written as 
y= pQ + zT - zk (3.39) 
vrtiere both p and T are random variables. Solving the standard MV model 
subject to the income function in equation (3.39) yields the optimal 
crions position to be 
" ^P,T + (Pp-k) (3.40) 
2 
The hedging and speculative components are analogous to those in models 
1 and 2. If the options market is unbiased, i.e., /i^ =k, the 
speculative coirponent disappears and the optimal options position 
corresponds to the hedging component. Note that, in contrast to model 
1, even vAien output is known with certainty and the option market is 
unbiased, the optimal estions market position does not correspond to 
the traditional hedge. The hedging position is, again, siirply the 
market position vAiich minimizes the variance of end-of-period income. 
In model 1, the variance of end-of-period income was minimized, in fact 
eliminated, by the traditional hedge in the futures market. Ihe 
results of model 3 reflect the fact that income variability cannot be 
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ocirpletely eliminated ty the hedging in the options market because as 
the cash price rises above the exercise price the DM declines to 
27 
exercise the option and the income is allowed to rise. The hedge 
position implied ly ncxiel 3 is the options position that minimizes the 
variance of end-of-period income. If the options market is biased the 
CM modifies the hedge position by his/her level of ezqiected bias, 
adjusted toy the level of risk aversion and variability in the end-of-
28 period options value. 
Model 4; Ca^  and cotions with uncertain output 
Mbdel 4 looks at the optimal hedge for the case of a EM hedging an 
uncertain level of end-of-period output in the options market. . The 
income function can be written as 
y= pg + zT -zk (3.41) 
vAiere p, q, and T are random variables. Using the standard M7 model in 
equation (3.1), the estimai options market position can be shown to be 
z= - (3.42) 
2 - 2 
"T T 
27 Note that if the EM always exercised the option he/she could 
ccïrpletely eliminate inccane variability. However, exercising the 
option when it is out-of-the-money would not be rational for a EM with 
increasing marginal utility of income. 
28 Note that <7 _<0 and its absolute value may be greater than or 
less than a^ . 
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As aqpecked the speculative ccmponent is identical to the one in model 
3. Once again, if the crions market is unbiased the c^ imal options 
position will not be the traditional hedge. Ihe hedge component now 
depends on the covariance between cash revenue and the options value at 
the end of the period, and the variance of the end-of-period option 
value. 
Model 5: Cash, futures, and options with certain output 
Model 5 considers the optimal market positions for a EM with a 
certain end-of-period output level v^ o is able to use both the futures 
and options contracts as hedging and speculating tools. Ihus, the 
assunptions of model 5 correspond to the general expected utility model 
discussed previously. Ihe income function now includes terms to 
account for revenue from the cash market, the futures market, and the 
options market as well as the cost of purchasing the options and can be 
written as 
y= PQ + x(f-p) + zT - zk (3.43) 
Hie first order conditions using the standard M7 model can be written 
as equations (3.44) and (3.45). 
V + ^ p,T (3.44) 
(/i^ -k) - Aza^  - A(Q-X)ap^  ^=0 (3.45) 
29 The covariance between the cash market revenue and 
the crions end-of-period value may be positive or negative 
depending on the correlation between price and output. 
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The hessleoi matrix can be written as 
P/T 
If H is negative definite then the simultaneous solution of the first 
order conditions is sufficient for a maximum solution and solving 
equations (3.44) and (3.45) will produce the optimal futures and 
options positions. The hessian is negative definite as long as A>0 and 
correlation coefficient between p and T is not equal to negative one, 
i.e., the exercise price is not set at an infinite value. Ihus if the 
CM is risk averse and the exercise price takes on a finite value, the 
similtaneous solution of equations (3.44) and (3.45) for x and z will 
provide the market positions v^ ich maximize the standard MV model in 
equation (3.1). 
The cçjtimal market positions in the futures and options markets 
can be expressed as 
0^. The condition ip will be met as long as the 
Q - (f-Mp)a^  + (p2,-k)(7p (3.46) 
2 2 2, 
z= - (''T-kifp (3.47) 
A/ 2 2 2. 
The optimal futures market position consists of a hedging and 
speculative component, vdiile the optimal options market position sinply 
consists of a speculative component. If both the futures and options 
markets are unbiased then both speculative conponents disappear and the 
optimal market positions become the traditional hedge in the futures 
market and no position is taken in the options market. This result is 
due to the fact that with unbiased markets, the CM acts sinply to 
minimize the variance of end-of-period income which is acconpli^ ed by 
the traditional hedge in the futures market vAiich conpletely eliminates 
the income variability. If either the futures market or the options 
market is biased, the speculative conponents are present in both the 
optimal futures and options positions. The CM acts to corpletely 
eliminate risk by taking the traditional hedge in the futures market 
and then speculates in the futures and options markets according to any 
believed bias in the futures and/or options market, adjusted by the 
level of risk aversion and the appropriate variances and covariances. 
Model 6; Cash, futures, and options with uncertain output 
Model 6 examines the optimal market positions for a CM with an 
uncertain end-of-period output level Wio is able to use both futures 
and qptions contracts as hedging and speculating tools. Ihe income 
function can be written as 
y= pq + x(f-p) + zT - zk (3.48) 
The optimal futures and options position using equation (3.48) and the 
standard MV model in equation (3.1) can be expressed as 
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*" p^q,afT^  " •*• (PT'kjfp,? (3.49) 
<^T- Vp) 
(3.50) 
ïhe second order conditions are the same as in model 5. Ihe estimai 
futures and options market positions now both consist of a hedging and 
speculative component. Thus even if both the futures and options 
markets are unbiased, the CM will hedge in both the futures and options 
market but he/she will not hold the traditional hedge in either market. 
Ihe speculative components are the same as in model 5. Once again the 
EM takes a hedge position in each market vAiich together will minimize 
the variance of end-of-period income and then speculates according to 
his/her believed bias as in model 5. In both models 5 and 6 tradeoffs 
occur between the futures and options market for changes in a given 
level of bias. If there is a positive increase in the bias in the 
futures market the EM will increase his/her futures position and 
decrease his/her cçtions position. The futures position has become 
relatively more profitable than the options position so the EM 
increases his/her position in that market. However, as the futures 
market position is increased, the speculative risk increases and the EM 
adjusts for the increase in risk by reducing the now relatively less 
77 
profitable options position. Likewise, a positive increase in the bias 
of the colons market leads to an increase in the options position and 
a decrease in the futures position. 
An option premium is determined by the markets perception of all 
moments of the underlying price distribution while the futures contract 
price is determined by the markets perceptions of the first moment 
alone. Ihe additional moments required to value an option disrupts any 
clear linkage between the bias levels in each market. As a result, one 
market may be biased and the other unbiased or the markets may be 
biased in opposite directions. 
CHAPTER 4. HJNCncmL APPROXIMATIF, DESIGN, AND MODEL OCMPARISŒ 
In Chapter 3, the optimal futures and qotions positions, x and z 
respectively, vAien the end-of-period output level is known were seen to 
be those vMch satisthe e>qpected utility maximization prcdslem in 
equation (3.27). These optjjnal values can be compared to the market 
positions suggested by the standard MV model to obtain some indication 
of the accuracy of the standard MV model as an approximation of the 
c^ imal results when the end-of-period output level is known. As 
indicated earlier, one of the desirable features of the standard MV 
model, at least as an approximation, is that the "cptimal" market 
positions can be solved for algebraically, providing insights into the 
relationships between the optimal market positions and the known or 
believed market characteristics. Ihe standard MV model can also be 
used directly hy a CM to determine his/her market positions rather than 
having to solve the more conplex maximization problem in equation 
(3.27). Despite the MV model's advantages, the sufficient conditions 
vAiich result in a M7 model being consistent with the e^ qaected utility 
hypothesis were seen to be violated vtien options are held in the CM's 
portfolio and tiius the standard MV model results may be erroneous and 
misleading. 
If the standard MV model produces inappropriate results the EM is 
left having to solve the general ej^ iected utility maximization problem 
in equation (3.27). One possible alternative may be to numerically 
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appraximate the futx±ional relationships between the optimal market 
positions, yielded by the general expected utility maximization model, 
and relevant market factors vMch were used as it^ ts in the general 
model. Ihis approximation could provide insists into the 
relationships between the optimal market positions and the market 
factors and may also provide the CM with a numerical equation vAiich can 
be used to determine, or at least be used as a guideline in choosing, 
his/her cptimal market positions. 
Ihis chapter begins by discussing the procedure that will be used 
to numerically estimate the functional relationship between the optimal 
market positions and the market factors. Next, some of the issues 
concerning the choice of observation design and the determination of 
observational levels are addressed. Ihe chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the numerical measurement technique used in comparing the 
results of the general expected utility model, the standard MV model, 
and the numerically approximated models. Hie same measurement 
technique will also be used to stu(^  the value of futures and options 
market institutions to a DM vAiose primary interest in the markets is 
for risk management purposes. 
T^ roximation Functions 
Ihe general expected utility maximization model in equation (3.27) 
can not be solved algebraically for the optimal futures and options 
positions. Ihe optimal values of x and z must be found using numerical 
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procedures as suggested in Chapter 3. The exact functional 
relationships between the optimal futures and options positions and the 
market characteristics, 
X*= and (4.1) 
Z — FgtPff /ffE/k/Q} (4.2) 
are unknown and apparently unknowable. This stuc^  will attempt to 
approximate these functions using second-order polynomials to measure 
the local smoothness prc%)erties of the above relationships. The region 
of operability, 0{.}, can be defined as the entire space in viiich 
(±servations and reqaonses could be measured if so desired. The region 
of interest, R{.}, can be defined as a subregion of 0{.} in viiich the 
main characteristics of a smooth response function may be approximated 
ty a lower-order polynomial. While the approximation abilities of low-
order polynomials may be inadequate over 0{. ), they may be perfectly 
adequate over a local R{.}. 
The exact functional relationships for the optimal market 
positions may be written as 
x*= + Uj^ {/i,a^ ,f,E,k,Q} and (4.3) 
Z*= fg{,ii,<7 ,^f,E,k,Q) + Wg(;i,a ,^f,E,k,Q) (4.4) 
where f^ {. ) and f^ i • ) are the polynomial approximations and •} and 
Wgt") are the model bias, or incorrect model specification, errors 
between the actual and approximated models for the optimal futures and 
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options positions respectively.^  ^ One dsjective in selecting the 
appraximatirai function and t^ pe of design would be to make .} and 
as small eis possible given the cost constraints, such as the cost 
involved in collecting and processing additional observations. Note 
that, unlike standard estimation problems, there is no ei^ ierimental 
error in the model, i.e., for each set of observations there is a 
unique set of optimal futures and options positions that maximize the 
general e}Ç)ected utility maximization model in equation (3.27). 
One possible approximation function vdiich is often used in 
response surface studies is a full second-order polynomial 
32 
approximation. The full second-order polynomial in 6 factors for a 
given R{.} is given 
®24^ *4"^ ®25*2^ "'"®26^ 6^"^ ®34^ 4^''"®35^ 3*5'*'®36^ 6^"^ ®45^ 4^ 5"^  
®46*4*6"^ ®56^ 5^ 6 
vAere: 
Y = value of the response, or dependent, variable; 
^^ nhe bias error for market position i is 
,f,E,k,Q}= ,f,E,k,Q} — ,f,E,k,Q}< 
^^ See Box and Draper (1987) or Khuri and Cornell (1987). 
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= VEdue of factor, or independent, variable i; 
= regression coefficient for factor i; 
B. .= regression coefficient for interaction between factor i and 
 ^ factor j. 
Ihe full second-order polynomieil would likely provide a poor 
p^rodmation over 0{.} but may provide an adequate approximation over 
Ihe most frequently used model estimation technique is ordinary 
least squares (OIS) vMch minimizes the sum of the squared residuals, 
vdiere a residual is the difference between the estimated response value 
and the true value.ïhe model in equation (4.5) differs from the 
"typiced" hypothesized model in that there is no esqjerimental error. 
In a typical model with eigierimental error, the residual error 
generally consists of two conponents: e}g)erimental error and model 
bias error. Ihe method of 015 will still minimize the sum of the 
squared residuals for the model in equation (4.5), however, in this 
33 One dsjective of the stucfy is to develop a simplified decision-
aid model. Althou^  the estimated model in (4.5) may be a simple model 
relative to solving the general expected utility model in equation 
(3.27), it does appear to be, at least potentially, sometAat cumbersome 
in application. Hopefully some of the terms can be removed without a 
significant loss in the precision of each model's estimates. 
^^ See Johnston (1984) for further discussion of the OIS estimates 
and their properties. 
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35 
case, the only ccnponent of residual error is model bias error. 
(Xaservation Design 
Experimental design is concerned with how the data vAiich will be 
analyzed are collected. E)q)erimsntal design helps answer such 
questions as: how many observations should be taken; in vAiat order 
should experiments be run; or vAiat input variable levels should be 
used?^  ^
TSie R{.} for which f^ {.} and f^ (.} are believed to provide 
acceptable approximations is implicit given the choices on design type, 
input variables, levels of the iiput variables, and variable 
transformatiwis. In practice the type of design employed, the 
variables iiicluded in the design, the levels of each variable, the 
variable transformations, and the form of the approximation function 
are often matters of judgement and consequently are dependent on the 
individual(s) conducting the study. Box and Draper (1987, p. 433) 
state the following: 
"... optimal design prc^ jerties are critically dependent on this 
matter of choice of region. Because this choice contains so many 
35 Additional error may result for ary error in specifying and 
solving the general esqpected utility model in equation (3.27). Errors 
related to incorrect specification of the CM's utility function anchor 
the income distribution, or errors in the solution procedure may j^ e^ t 
iQ response values vdiich are not the true optimal values, i.e., x and 
z will not be the market positions vtiich maximize e^ qpected utility. 
36 See Hicks (1981) for a more in-depth discussion of e)q)erimental 
design and analysis. 
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arisltrary elem^ ts, it is somewhat dubious how far we should push 
the finer points of chinai theory 
The iirplications here are that potential gains due to fine tuning the 
observation design are relatively small and that the choice of region 
of interest is especially important. 
A design property which is often considered desirable is to 
construct the design so the the input variabes are orthogonal. 
Orthogonal designs are constructed so that the regressor variables are 
uncorrelated. As a result, an orthogonal design implies that the 
coefficient estimates will be uncorrelated and estimates can be made 
independently. In addition, greater precision of coefficient estimates 
are (±tained from orthogonal designs (Box and Draper (1987) ). 
One common type of design is called a factorial design. A 
factorial design is one in vAiich all levels of a given factor are 
combined with all levels of every other factor in the esqperiment. 
Factorial designs tend to be "efficient" in terms of the amount of 
experimentation and use of the data. Box and Draper (1987) list the 
following desirable prc$)erties of factorial designs: 
1. They allow multitudes of conparisons to be made and so 
facilitate model creation and criticism; 
2. Ihey provide hi^ ily efficient estimation for 
constants (parameters), i.e., estimates vAiose variances are as 
small, or nearly as small, as those that could be produced by 
any design occcçying the same space; 
37 Hicks (1981) also discusses the strengths of factorial designs. 
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3. They give rise to simple calculations. 
Even thcu^  factoried designs tend to efficiently extract information 
from a given amount of data, the number of observations does increase 
rapidly as the number of levels anchor ir%)ut variables increase. For 
example, a factorial design vAiich considered 3 levels of each irpat 
variable in this study would be a 3 level factorial in 6 factors, or a 
3^  factoried, and would result in 729 separate observations. 
Khuri and Cornell (1987), and others, have suggested an 
alternative to the 3 factorial design vAiich is known as the central 
composite design (CCD). A CCD consists of 
k 1. a complete 2 factorial design vAiere the factor levels are 
coded as -1, +1 values; 
2. n^  center points (n^ l) ; 
3. two axial points on the axis of each design variable at a coded 
distance 7 from the center of the design. 
The factor levels in the 2 factorial portion of the design are coded 
as 
(J^ j^ ""Xj^ )/Sj^  1^ 1,.. .n i=l.. .k (4.6) 
vAiere 
x^ = coded value of factorial level u for input variable i; 
value of factorial level u for input variable i; 
X. = mi(%)oint of the factor levels 
= (l/n) (gX )^ ; 
S .= measure of dispersion of factorial levels 
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n » the number of factorial levels. 
The center point for input variable i is siiiply mi(%)oint of the 
factorial levels, and its coded value, using equation (4.6), will 
be 0. Ihe axial points are coded by substituting each axial point 
level into equation (4.6) for The resulting coded value, x^ , is 
the coded 7 value for the axial point. The total number of design 
points for the CCD is I# 2N-2k+nQ. 
A CCD in k=2 factors with n^ =l takes a design form of 
X= 
0 
0 
0 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
7 
-7 
0 
(4.7) 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the CCD in 2 iiput variables with the coded 
axial points located at 7=72. 
After examining equations (4.3) and (4.4), a reasonable approach 
in construction a CCD for this stucty would seem to be to use , f, 
E, k, and Q as the it^ xit variables; choose the relevant levels of each 
variable within some R{.} ; construct the CCD; and then measure the 
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(-1.414,0) 
(-1.1) 
(-1,-1) 
X (0.1.414) 
(0,0) 
* 
(1.1) 
(1.-1) 
(0.-1.414) 
(1.414,0) 
Figure 4.1. Design points for a 2 factor OCD 
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optimal market positions for each (±servation. A closer look at the 
characteristics of factorieil type designs suggests that constructing 
the CCD in terms of fi, a , f, E, k, and Q could eeisily cause the design 
to contain unrecilistic specifications of market behavior unless the 
R{.} is restricted to be relatively small. Ihe difficulty results from 
the fact that factoried type designs consider all combinations of all 
levels of each factor in the design. For example, consider the 
consequences of choosing 3 levels of m and f to each be $3.00, $3.20, 
and $3.40. Holding the other ii^ Hit variables constant, a factorial 
type design would consider the optimal market responses to the 
following combinations of m and f: 
conservation ft f 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
The large bias in the futures market suggested by observations 2, 3, 4, 
6, 7, and 8 would appear to be unrealistic in a true market setting.^ ® 
A similar difficulty exists with regards to bias in the crions market. 
The cçtions market bias is further complicated by the fact that the 
38 (Hie issue of bias in futures and options markets is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
$3.00 $3.00 
3.00 3.20 
3.00 3.40 
3.20 3.00 
3.20 3.20 
3.20 3.40 
3.40 3.00 
3.40 3.20 
3.40 3.40 
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levels of E, n, , and k eill combine to determine the bias in the 
options market. Ihe properties of factorial designs would also result 
in potentially large differences between the exercise price and the 
39 
e)q)ected end-of-period spot price. One solution is to construct the 
design so that the range of e^ qjected bias in both the futures and 
options markets and the level of the exercise price relative to the 
eaqaected spot price are restricted to a more realistic levels. For 
example, by estimating the functional relationships between the optimal 
market positions and input variables as 
* (4'8) 
and 
(4-9) 
vAere 
difference between the exercise price and ejqpected spot price 
B-- futures market bias 
= f-/i, and 
B = options market bias 
= E[Max(0,E-p) ]-k 
E 
(^E-p)w{p}(%) - k, 
the CCD can be used without introducing any obvious unrealistic market 
behavior into the model. For example, if the levels of are chosen to 
39 In practice the levels of the exercise price are set the 
organized exchanges at specified increments around the current futures 
price. 
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be $3.00, $3.20, and $3.40 and the levels of futures market bias are 
chosen to be -$0.02 , 0.00, and $0.02, then, holding the other ii^ t 
variables constant, a factorial i^ pe design would consider the optimal 
market position responses to the following combinations of n and 
Qaservation n Corresponding f 
1 $3.00 -$0.02 2.98 
2 3.00 0.00 3.00 
3 3.00 0.02 3.02 
4 3.20 -0.02 3.18 
5 3.20 0.00 3.20 
6 3.20 0.02 3.22 
7 3.40 -0.02 3.38 
8 3.40 0.00 3.40 
9 3.40 0.02 3.42 
Each observation will new consist of a particular level of n, , 
Bg, BQ, and Q. Note that for each observation there will be a 
corresponding set of irçut variables , f, E, k, and Q, for vAiich 
the optimal market positons can be determined using the general 
expected utility model in equation (3.27). 
% to this point, it has not been necessary to specify a specific 
form of utility function to represent the CM's risk preferences. It is 
useful to address the utility function issue at this point because it 
suggests an additional ii^ put variable to include in the design and also 
allows the elimination of one of the other iiput variables vAiich is 
currently included in the design. In order to facilitate comparison 
with the M7 model results, and for lack of a clearly superior utility 
function from a theoretical and computational standpoint, this stuc^  
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will use the negative exponential utility function discussed in Chapter 
2 to r^ resent the CM's risk preference structure. As a result the 
user is required to specif his/her level of absolute risk aversion, 
A{y}, vdiidi will implicitly be constant over all income levels for a 
particular One characteristic of the constant absolute risk 
aversion utility function is that a locational shift in the income 
distribution will not effect the solution to the expected utility 
maximization problem. For example, subtracting a given level of fixed 
cost from the income function in equation (3.2) will not effect the 
* * 
m's choices of x and z for the eiqiected utility maximization problem 
in equation (3.27) as long as the EM has constant absolute risk 
aversion. Consequently, the level of vAiich simply shifts the 
location of the income distribution in equation (3.26), has no direct 
* * 
effect on the EM's choices of x and z and may be removed from the 
design. After removing the level of /i from the design and adding the 
risk aversion parameter to the design, the polynomial approximation 
model can now be formulated as 
*°If the EM is not aware of his/her level of risk aversion, he/she 
may be able to estimate it ky using one of the elicitation techniques 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
level of must be sillied as an iiput variable to specify 
the income distribution faced by the EM. While the level of /i is 
irrelevant, the iipit variable values for E, f, and k must be set in 
accordance to the relationships between the design values E , B_, and 
B and the specified level of w For example, if /i is set at $7.00 and 
tne design value of E is $0.05, the value of the irput variable E must 
be set at $7.05.  ^
and 
(4.11) 
Hie CCD needed for this study will be in 6 iqput variables, thus 
requiring a toted of 77 design points. The cxxJed CCD in terms of the 6 
factors used in this study is shown in Table 4.1. Each coded factor 
value corresponds to one of the five possible observation levels for 
that factor: one of the two factorial points; one of the two axial 
points; or the center point. Each set of responses, and z^ , 
r^ resent the optimal futures and options postions given the set of 
input variable levels that corre^ xsnd to the market factor levels for 
that observation. For example, for observation l in Table 4.1, the 
responses x^  and r^ resent the optimal futures and crions postions 
that are generated ly the general exepected utility model in equation 
(3.27) viien the ir^ xit variables /i, f, E, k, Q, and A each take on 
the value corresponding to the i%)er factorial levels of the market 
2 factors l^ , a , Bg, BQ, Q, and A, i.e., the values listed in row 1. 
i^ roximating the rei^ nses as function of the input variables can 
now be done ly estimating equation (4.5) using the 77 factor 
observations provided the OCD. The estimation can be made using 
either the actual factor levels or the coded values. Using the coded 
values offers several advantages vAiich are related to the orthogonality 
properties of the coded ir^ xit variables. If a second-order model such 
as the one in equation (4.5) is estimated using OlS, the regressor 
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Table 4.1. Coded central composite design in terms of the market 
factors 
Design levels Responses 
(^ sservation Bf Bo Q 
* * 
X z 
;l 
!2 
*3 3^ 
*4 4^ 
5^ h  
*6 !6 
7^ 
*8 !8 
JJ9 !9 
*10 1^0 
1^1 !ii 
1^2 
1^3 fl3 
4^ Jl4 
5^ !l5 
5-6 1^6 
*17 fl7 
!JI8 1^8 
9^ ?19 
*20 2^0 
1^ 2^1 
*22 2^2 
Ï23 23 
4^ 2^4 
*25 2^5 
6^ 2^6 
7^ 2^7 
*28 > 
*29 2^9 
*30 3^0 
3^1 3^1 
*32 3^2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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(Continued) 
Design levels 
Q 
Responses 
I 
5^4 5^4 
*55 5^5 
x56 5^6 
*57 g57 
*58 5^8 
*59 5^9 
*60 6^0 
*61 6^1 
*62 Z62 
x63 6^3 
64 6^4 
Table 4.1. (Oantinued) 
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Design levels Responses 
Ctservation \ ®  ^ ** 
Center Point 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 Xg5 Zgg 
Axial Points 
66 7 0 0 0 0 0 x.g Zgg 
67 7 0 0 0 0 0 X% Z% 
68 0 7 0 0 0 0 X^ n 
69 0 -Y 0 0 0 0 x!® z!° 
70 0 0 7 0 0 0 XÏQ Z70 
71 0 0 -y 0 0 0 xl" z'" 
72 0 0 0 7 0 0 xij z'; 
73 0 0 0 -y 0 0 AX 
74 0 0 0 0 7 0 Al 
75 0 0 0 0 -Y 0 3d: z'J 
76 0 0 0 0 0 7 *7° z'° 
77 0 0 0 0 0 -y Al ^11 
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variables of the model will be orthogonal with the exception of the 
intero^ t and the quadratic terms. The partial orthogonality of the 
regressor variables simplifies the computations of the coefficient 
estimates, helps avoid singularity difficulties in estimating the 
coefficients, and results in nonguadratic terms vMch can be either 
added to or removed from the model without affecting the other 
coefficients. In addition, the quadratic variables can be added to or 
removed from the model without affecting the nonguadratic terms. As 
mentioned earlier, Box and Draper (1987) also suggest that the 
coefficients estimated from orthogonal designs are more precise than 
those from designs vMch are not orthogonal. The coded values and 
estimated coefficients may be uncoded following estimation if so 
desired. 
To illustrate the estimation procedure and the orthogonality 
properties of the second-order model using a CCD, consider the full 
second-order model in 2 iiput variables as written in equation (4.12). 
y= Bj, + + % + =12% *hA + ^ 2^^  (4.12) 
Given the coded CCD in ej^ ression (4.7), the X matarix of observations 
needed to fit the second-order model in (4.12) is 
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X= 
*1 *2 % 4 4, 
0 
0 
0 
1 
-1 
1 
-1 
0 
0 
7 
1 
-1 
-1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
7 
0 
(4.13) 
The OLS coefficients are determined ky equation (4.14). 
B= (X'X)"^ 'Y 
\idiere 
B= vector of coefficient estimates 
(4.14) 
- [ Bq ®2 ®12 ®H ®22 
X= observation matrix; 
Y= vector of response values corresponding to the ctoservation 
matrix 
= [ Yl 72 Ys 74 yg Ye Y? ^ 8 ^ 9 ' 
Ihe (X'X)"^  matrix will be a partitioned matrix of the following form 
(X'X)"^ = 
®0 ®1 ®2 ®12 
a.. 0 0 0 
O-^ -^  a,, 0 0 
0 a__ 0 
0 0 0^  ^a, 
C.. 0 0 0 
cjjo 0 0 
®11 ®22 
0 0 
0 0 
?11 Sl2 
1^ *22 
(4.15) 
viiere the elements a^ , buj, c\j, and dj^ j are nonzero values. The X'Y 
98 
matrix will take the following fom 
yin2^3-yihVs-iye 
yi-y2+y3ir4+ry7-ry8 
yi-yj+yj-y, 
yi+yj+yj-^ j+t^ -hf^ yg 
(*'*)= (4.16) 
Hie Véllues of the estimated model coefficients would be 
®0^  ^ 11*^ 1 1^1^ 5 1^2*^ 6 
®1~ ^ 22*^ 2 
2^^  ^®33^ 3 
®12~ *44^ 4 
(4.17) 
®11 °11^ 1 "'• 1^*^ 5 1^2*^ 6 
®22~ °2l''^ l 1^*^ 5 2^2*^ 6 
Notice that if one or more of the nonquadratic regressor variables 
corresponding to the coefficients or are removed from the 
model, none of the other coefficient estimates will change. However, 
if one of the quadratic regressor variables corresponding to the B^  ^or 
Bgg coefficient is removed from the model then the remaining quadratic 
coefficient estimate, as well as the intercept estimate, will change 
because vdien quadratic coefficient is removed from the model the 
corresponding rw and column in the (X'X)"^  matrix and the 
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oorresponding element in the (X'Y) vector are also eliminated from the 
regression data set. Note, however, that removal of the quadratic 
terms will not affect the estimates of the nonquadratic coefficients 
and The second-order model is orthogonal in the 
nonquadratic regressor variables and partially orthogonal in the 
quadratic regressor variables. 
Model Comparison and Measuring the Value of Ritures and Options Markets 
Chapter 3 argued that the c^ imal futures and options market 
positions are those vAiich satisfy the general esqpected utility 
maximization model in equation (3.27). Ihe standard MV model discussed 
in Chapter 3 and the approximated model discussed earlier in this 
chapter edso provide estimates of the c^ imal market positions. Ihese 
estimated market positions will likely differ from the optimal market 
positions suggested by the general eaqiected utility maximization model. 
The resulting market positions from each of the models can be directly 
compared. . However, the conditions under vAich the standard MV model or 
a particular approximated model produce results that are acceptable as 
an alternative to solving the general ejçjected utility model seem 
difficult to determine. The market positions produced by each model 
could be tested for statistically significant differences. If no 
statistical differences were found, then the hypothesis that the models 
yield identical market positions could not be rejected and it could be 
argued that the models produce identical results. However, even if 
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statistically significant differences are found between the market 
positions produced by the different models, it is still difficult to 
say if "economic" differences exist. It may be that the CM is 
satisfied with the market positions produced by the approximated model 
or the standard M7 model, given the êiltemative of solving the general 
e}^ )ected utilily model, even thou^  he/she knows that the estimated 
positions pn*ably differ from the true optimal market positions. In 
essence, this amounts to a value of information problem. Thus, one 
measure of the significance of the differences between the different 
model results would be to find the amount of monetary compensation 
required to make CM equally satisfied to use each of the models. iMs 
amcunts to answering the following question: if the CM takes the 
market positions estimated hy the standard M7 model, or the 
approximated model, how much additional income must he/she be given to 
provide the same level of e}$)ected utility as the optimal market 
positions yielded ly the general expected utility model? Ihe 
measurement of the value of knowing the true optimal market positions 
is again complicated by the inability to solve the general model for 
algebraic solutions, but the same numerical techniques used to solve 
the general maximization problem can be used to determine the value of 
^^ Ihe additional costs of detaining the hardware and software and 
the associated learning costs may more than offset the gain that occurs 
from adjusting the market positions from the levels estimated ly the 
standard MV model or the a^ roximated model to the estimai levels 
produced by the general e^ s^ected utility model. 
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knowing the optimal market positions. For example, if, given the 
relevent market factors, the general expected utility maximization 
model yields the optimal futures and options market positions to be x* 
and z*, the EM could obtain an eiqiected utility level of EU{Y{x*,z*)). 
If the CM decided to take the market positions suggested ky the 
A A 
standard MV model, x and z, he/she would obtain an ejqpected utility 
level EU{Y{x,z}} vdiich must be less than E[J{Y{x*,z*}}, unless the 
estimated market positions are identical to the estimai market 
positions. It should then be possible to find the level of additional 
income, V, vdiich causes the CM to receive the same level of e)^ )ected 
utlity using the estimated market positions as vAien he/she uses the 
optimal market positions, i.e., find level of V vAiich causes 
nJ{Y{x,z}+V) = E[J{Y{x*,z*)}. The value of V will provide a measure of 
the value to the EM of knowing the c^ imal market positions vAiidh 
maximize e)q)ected utility as opposed to the estimated market positions 
provided by the standard MV model. Hie same procedure can be used to 
find the monetary value of knowing the optimal market positions as 
opposed to taking the market positions suggested ky the approximation 
models. 
The value of futures anchor options market institution (s) to a CM 
vtio is primarily concerned with using the markets for risk management 
purposes can be measured using the same numerical measurement technique 
as is used to compare the standard M7 and ajproximation models to the 
eipected utility model. For example, the additional value of an 
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options market to a CM >Aien a futures market currently exists can be 
measured by determining the value V vAiich would provide the CM vAio only 
uses the fixtures market with the same e}^ )ected utility level he/she 
would recieve from using the both the futures and editions markets 
simultaneously. In mathematical terms, the value to the CM of adding 
an qotions market when a futures market currently exists will be the 
'M'ft 'êt'ft 
value V vAiich causes EtJ{y{x ,0)+V)=EU(y{x ,z }} vAiere x is the 
optimal futures positions vAien the CM uses only the futures market and 
X and z are the optimal futures and options positions, 
respectively, vAien the CM uses both markets simultaneously.^  ^
Note that the c^ imal 
uses just the futures market 
options markets. 
value of X may be different \A)en the CM 
than vAien he/she uses both the futures and 
103 
CHAPTER 5. OBSERVanmS, SOUmŒ PROCEDURES, AND RESUUTS 
In Chapter 4 the data design, model approximation procedures and 
model ccnpariscn technique that will be used in the stuc^  were 
discussed. Chapter 5 begins by discussing the actual factor levels 
used in the stucfy and the corresponding factor design vMch is used to 
determine the input variables required by each model. Next, the 
solution procedure for the general ej^ iected utility maximization model 
is discussed, The results of the expected utility and standard MV 
models are then presented for three different marketing strategies. 
The chapter concludes with a gragdiical examination of the directional 
changes that occur in the optimal market positions as the level of each 
of the market factors changes around its center point value. 
Oaservation Levels 
The choices of design and factor levels are critical in 
determining the R{.} to be studied. Once a specific design has been 
chosen, there are many possible criteria vhich can be used to determine 
the factor levels and the corresponding Irçjut variables. One Inportant 
criterion in choosing the factor levels would seem to be to select 
levels vAiich most likely reflect the decision-making space faced by the 
EM. The data levels used in this stucfy are necessarily subjective but 
are intended to represent the decision space faced by soviaean producers 
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in the Midwest.Table 5.1 summarizes the observation levels used in 
the study. 
The center point for the difference between the exercise price and 
the e}$)ected spot price is set at a value of zero, i.e., B=/i. Ihe 
factorial points and axial points are subjectively set at increments of 
$0.05 from the center point to capture the effects of expected in-the 
45 
mon^  and out-of-the money options. 
Ihe center point for the eaqpected variance of end-of-period spot 
price was set using historic sq^ o^ean price data. Ihe average November 
spot prices received by Iowa soybean producers during 1976-86 (Iowa 
Agriculture D^ artment (1976-86) ) were adjusted ky the implicit GNP 
deflator (U.S. Commerce Department (1976-86)) and the resulting 
variance estimate for the adjusted prices was calculated to be 1.08. 
Ihe center point for the variance estimate was then set at 1.00 and the 
factorial and axial points were subjectively set at increments of 0.25 
from the center point. 
Ihe question of bias in the futures market has been a much debated 
theoretical and empirical topic in the last 30 years. For exairple, the 
the dialog between Telser and Cootner (see Peck (1977)) serves to 
44 Note however, that the results of the stuc^  should be valid for 
any EM vAio meets the assumptions of the model and faces a decision 
space encompassed by the one employed in this study. 
^^ Because the exercise price is an exogenous variable in this 
study, the level faced by the CM is assumed to be near his/her 
e}Ç)ectation of the end-of-period spot price. 
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Table 5.1. Observation levels used to construct the CCD 
Factors 
.2 
Bf Bo Q A 
levels ($) ($2) ($) ($) (bu.) 
l%)er Aadal 0.10 1.50 0.04 0.04 25,000 0. 00045 
Utper Factorial 0.05 1.25 0.02 0.02 20,000 0. 00035 
Center Point 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 15,000 0. 00025 
lower Factorial -0.05 0.75 -0.02 •0.02 10,000 0. 00015 
Lower AxieLL -0.10 0.50 -0.04 •0.04 5,000 0. 00005 
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illustrate sente of the theoretical and empirical difficulties that are 
encountered in addressing the bias issue. These authors convincingly 
draw vastly different conclusions from the same or nearly the same sets 
of data. Telser presents both theoretical and empirical results to 
suggest that futures markets are unbiased vAiile Cootner presents 
evidence to the contrary. Ihe debate has continued in the literature 
with various authors landing on both sides of the bias issue. Gray 
(1977) presents evidence that futures markets tend to be biased vdien 
trading is thin or composed of a relatively large amount of hedger 
trading. As markets become successful, and volume increases, evidence 
of market bias disa^ iears. Gray presents evidence that the sq^ aean 
market was biased in its infancy but the bias was removed as the market 
matured. Just and Fausser (1981) studied forecast errors of various 
commodity forecasts including the futures market for sq^ Deans. I%)on 
decomposing the forecast mean square error estimates for the sq^ tean 
futures market their results suggest that the bias in the soybean 
market is not significantly different frcan zero. Conorella and Pollard 
(1985) use a wide range of empirical techniques on com, soybeans, 
vdieat, sqj^ sean meal, and sq^ s^ean oil data to test the efficient market 
hypothesis in a framework of rational es^ iectations. Ihe results of 
their stutfy tend to siçport the hypothesis that commodity futures 
markets are unbiased and are an efficient predictor of spot prices. 
%e literature on bias in ccanmodity cations markets is less 
complete. Ifcst studies, e.g., Tucker (1985), Whaley (1986), Jordan et 
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al. (1987), and luft and Fielitz (1986), test the ability of Black's 
option pricing model to predict the option premium for a commodity that 
trades on an exchange. Ihe predicted premium is e>q3ected to be less 
than the actual premium because Black's model is designed to price 
European options, vAiile the options trading on the exchanges are 
American options. The results generally seem to suggest that Black's 
model provides prices vAiich are close to the actual premiums vAien the 
options are at-the-money. The model tends to overprice or underprice 
options v^ en they are either in-the-money or out-of-the-money. The 
results also suggest that little of^ rtunily exists to earn economic or 
riskless arbitrage profits through the trading of options. One 
difficulty with these studies is that any conclusions regarding 
efficiency in the options market must assume that the cption pricing 
model is strictly correct to begin with.^ ® 
The literature in this area leaves the reader in a state of mild 
confusion and with a feeling that if any bias does exist in either the 
futures market or the options market, it is probably small and may not 
consistently exist for any extended period of time. As a result, the 
center point bias in both the futures and options markets was set at 
$0.00 and the factorial and axial points were subjectively set at $0.02 
^^ ote that the valuation of options in this stuc^  will differ 
from Black's option pricing model because of differences in 
assunptions. In particular, this stuc^  assumes that the underlying 
price distribution is normally distributed and no time value of money 
exists vMle Black's model assumes that prices are lognormally 
distributed and some time value of money exists (Black (1976) ). 
108 
increments from the center point. 
Ihe center point for the out^ t level was set at 15,000 bushels. 
A producer vdio averages a 35 bushel yield per acre would need to plant 
about 430 acres to produce 15,000 bushels of sq^ seans. The factorial 
and axial points were set at 5,000 bushel increments from the center 
point. 
King and Robison (1981) suggest that the levels of absolute risk 
aversion should be concentrated in the -0.0001 to 0.001 range because 
actueil measurements for most individuals have tended to fall in that 
interval and several empirical decision problems have indicated that 
choices are most strongly affected ky changes in absolute risk aversion 
within this range. The center point for absolute risk aversion was set 
at 0.00025 and the factorial and axial points were set at increments of 
0.0001 from the center point. 
Table 5.2 presents the CCD in terms of the uncoded levels of E^ , 
2 
a , Bg, Q, and A. Corresponding to the levels of each set of 
market factors in the CCD are the irpit variable values for fi, , f, 
E, k, Q, and A vAiich are required by the various models. For example, 
if n-$7.00 and E^ =$0.05, the irçjut value of E for that observation 
would be $7.05. Likewise, if B^ =$0.02 then the ijput value of k for 
that observation would be the eiqiected value of [E-p|p<E]-0.02. Table 
5.3 presents the irç)ut values for fi, , f, E, k, Q, and A that 
correspond to each set of market factors in Table 5.2. 
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60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
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(Oontinued) 
Factors 
Sn 
,2 
Bf Bo Q A 
($) ($f) ($) ($) (bu.) 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00015 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 1.25 -0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 0.75 0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00035 
-0.05 0.75 0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00015 
-0.05 0.75 0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 0.75 0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 0.75 0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00035 
—0.05 0.75 0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00015 
—0.05 0.75 0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 0.75 0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 0.75 -0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00035 
—0.05 0.75 -0.02 0.02 20,000 0.00015 
-0.05 0.75 -0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 0.75 -0.02 0.02 10,000 0.00015 
-0.05 0.75 -0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00035 
-0.05 0.75 -0.02 -0.02 20,000 0.00015 
—0.05 0.75 -0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00035 
-0.05 0.75 -0.02 -0.02 10,000 0.00015 
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Table 5.3. Input variable values corresponding to the market factors 
in the CCD 
Input Variables 
M 
*2 f E k Q A 
Observation ($) ($2) ($) ($) ($) (bU.) 
1 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.45132551 20,000 0.00035 
2 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.45132551 20,000 0.00015 
3 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.45132551 10,000 0.00035 
4 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.45132551 10,000 0.00015 
5 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.49132551 20,000 0.00035 
6 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.49132551 20,000 0.00015 
7 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.49132551 10,000 0.00035 
8 7.00 1.25 7.02 7.05 0.49132551 10,000 0.00015 
9 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.45132551 20,000 0.00035 
10 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.45132551 20,000 0.00015 
11 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.45132551 10,000 0.00035 
12 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.45132551 10,000 0.00015 
13 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.49132551 20,000 0.00035 
14 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.49132551 20,000 0.00015 
15 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.49132551 10,000 0.00035 
16 7.00 1.25 6.98 7.05 0.49132551 10,000 0.00015 
17 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.35095212 20,000 0.00035 
18 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.35095212 20,000 0.00015 
19 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.35095212 10,000 0.00035 
20 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.35095212 10,000 0.00015 
21 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.39095212 20,000 0.00035 
22 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.39095212 20,000 0.00015 
23 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.39095212 10,000 0.00035 
24 7.00 0.75 7.02 7.05 0.39095212 10,000 0.00015 
25 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.35095212 20,000 0.00035 
26 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.35095212 20,000 0.00015 
27 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.35095212 10,000 0.00035 
28 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.35095212 10,000 0.00015 
29 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.39095212 20,000 0.00035 
30 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.39095212 20,000 0.00015 
31 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.39095212 10,000 0.00035 
32 7.00 0.75 6.98 7.05 0.39095212 10,000 0.00015 
37 
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(Continued) 
Irpit Variables 
ti f E k Q 
($) ($^) ($) ($) ($) (bu.) 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.40132870 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.40132870 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.40132870 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.40132870 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.44132870 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.44132870 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.44132870 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 7.02 6.95 0.44132870 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.40132870 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.40132870 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.40132870 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.40132870 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.44132870 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.44132870 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.44132870 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 1.25 6.98 6.95 0.44132870 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.30095531 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.30095531 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.30095531 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.30095531 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.34095531 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.34095531 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.34095531 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 7.02 6.95 0.34095531 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.30095531 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.30095531 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.30095531 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.30095531 10,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.34095531 20,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.34095531 20,000 0.00015 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.34095531 10,000 0.00035 
7.00 0.75 6.98 6.95 0.34095531 10,000 0.00015 
Table 5.3. (Oonbinued) 
Iiput Variables 
A» *2 f E k Q A 
CSsservation ($) ($2) ($) ($) ($) (bu.) 
CENTER POINT 
65 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 0.39880822 15,000 0.00025 
AXIAL POINTS 
66 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.10 0.45079808 15,000 0.00025 
67 7.00 1.00 7.00 6.90 0.35080446 15,000 0.00025 
68 7.00 1.50 7.00 7.00 0.48843832 15,000 0.00025 
69 7.00 0.50 7.00 7.00 0.28200000 15,000 0.00025 
70 7.00 1.00 7.04 7.00 0.39880822 15,000 0.00025 
71 7.00 1.00 6.96 7.00 0.39880822 15,000 0.00025 
72 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 0.34880822 15,000 0.00025 
73 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 0.43880822 15,000 0.00025 
74 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 0.39880822 25,000 0.00025 
75 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 0.39880822 5,000 0.00025 
76 7.00 1.00 7.00 7,00 0.39880822 15,000 0.00045 
77 7.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 0.39880822 15,000 0.00005 
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Numerical Solution Prooecture 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the solution to the general ejqsected 
utility maximization problem must be cAstained numerically tdien options 
are included in a CM's risk management portfolio. The first step in 
the solution process is to determine the set of iiput variables that 
2 the m believes to exist, i.e., vAiat are the values of n, a , t, E, k, 
Q, and A. In practice, the CM could provide these values for each 
decision situation. For the purposes of this stu<^  these values are 
determined by the levels of the market factors in Table 5.2 and are 
listed in Table 5.3. 
Because the CM's objective is to maximize eaqaected utility, it is 
necessary to integrate the EM'S utility function over the possible 
inccme levels created ly choosing values of x and z given the relevant 
set of input variables n, , f, E, k, Q, and A. This integration will 
give the es^ iected utility to the EK if he/she takes market positions x 
and z. Ihe CM must then repeat the procedure for all possible values 
of X and z. The values of x and z vAich give the hi^ est expected 
utility value will be the c^ imal futures and options position, 
respectively, given the values of n, , f, E, k, Q, and A. 
Ihe numerical integration subroutine used in this stuc^  is taken 
from a software package called MINTDF (Kaylen and Preckel (1986) ). 
Ihis is a fortran subroutine designed for n-fold numerical integration 
in conjunction with certain optimization and equation solving problems. 
The subroutine is designed for functions that are integrated over 
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finite regions. Hiis causes a potential prdalem because the range of 
integration for the income level in equation (3.26) is unbounded over 
the ncaitruncated regions. As a result, the integration bounds for the 
income levels in equation (3.26) are altered slightly to eliminate any 
uhbcunded regions. Whenever the domain for integration is not finite, 
the bcund is set at a Vcilue of four standard deviations from the mean 
parameter describing that segment of the income distribution, given the 
values of the input variables. Because the income distribution 
described by equation (3.26) is sum of truncated normal distributions, 
adding additional truncation points at four standard deviations from 
the mean should not introduce a significant amount of error in the 
solution procedure. The algorithm used to solve the integral is based 
on the product repeated midpoint formula combined with Richardson's 
extrapolation as described in Stroud (1971). Ihe functional value of 
the utility function and the inccatie density are passed to the 
integration program via another, user written, subroutine. 
The integration and function subroutines allow the eigected 
utility to be calculated for any specified values of x and z given /i, 
2 
a , f, E, k, Q, and A. To find the the values of x and z vdiich 
maximize ei^ sected utiliiy, an optimization algorithm is needed vAiich 
will systematically alter the values of x and z until the optimal 
values are found. Ihe optimization subroutine used in this stufy is 
part of a numerical optimization package called GQOPT/PC (Quandt and 
Goldfeld (1987) ). This package contains several optimization 
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algorithms vAiich can be used to find local pptimums (althou^  not 
cilways global optimnns). Ihe performance of each of the methods used 
varies significantly given the function to be analyzed, the initial 
starting points for the decision variables, and the accuracy levels 
desired. Quandt and Goldfeld suggest several qptimization methods be 
tried at several different starting points. Ihis study uses three of 
the qptimization methods provided in GQOFT/PC. Following many trial 
runs, a decision was made to use a single starting point for the first 
qptimization method instead of multiple starting points. Ihis decision 
was justified fcy the length of time involved in solving the model for 
each starting point and the apparent high accuracy of the standard M7 
model to provide solutions vAich could be used as starting points for 
the first qptimization method. Trial runs indicated that starting the 
grid secirch algorithm at the standard MV model solutions generally 
resulted in good convergence to the global c^ iraum. Hius, the 
qptimization procedure begins by using the standard MV model solutions 
as the initial starting points for the first optimization method, a 
grid search algorithm called PATEFN (see Hooke and Jeeves (1961) for a 
description of the algorithm used). PATEIRN tends to provide results 
which are in the nei^ iboxhood of the global optimum, althou^  the 
convergence tends to be relatively slow, ihe solutions provided by 
PATERN are then used as the starting points for the second optimization 
method, a simplex algorithm called NMSIMP (see Nelder and Mead (1965) 
for a description of the algorithm used). Finally, the solutions 
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provided by NMSIMP are used as the starting points for the third 
optimization method, a gradient algorithm called GRADX (see Goldfeld 
and Quandt (1972) for a discription of the algorithm used). NMSIMP and 
GRADX tend converge to the glcdxil optimum more quickly than PATTERN if 
the starting points are in the nei^ iborhood of the glcdsal optimmi. 
However, both NMSIMP and GRADX have difficulty converging to the global 
optimum if the starting point is not in the neic^ rhood of the global 
optimum. Consequently, the above sequence of optimization methods was 
used to help ensure convergence to the glcdaal optimum and to reduce the 
required run time of the optimization program. The resulting values 
for X and z are then taken as the global optimum values of the futures 
and options market positions. Table 5.4 summarizes the numerical 
solution procedure used for the observations specified in the OCD. 
Results of the Expected Utility Miaximization Model 
The market factors in Table 5.2 and the corcespondlng input 
variable values listed in Table 5.3 were used as the set of market 
characteristics faced a CM under three different marketing 
strategies: cash and futures; cash and options; and cash, futures, and 
options. The solutions to the first strategy are the optimal futures 
positions for a DM vAio participates in only the cash and futures 
markets (CF) ; the solutions to the second strategy are the optimal 
options positions for a EM vAio participates in only the cash and 
options markets (00) ; and the solutions to the third strategy are the 
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Table 5.4. Summaxy of solution procedure used to find the optimal 
futures and options positions in a general e)q)ected 
utility framework 
1. Start ly reading the values for daservation i 
Result: 
2. Next, transform values of observation i, from step 1 ,  to obtain 
iqput variables needed to define the income and utility functions 
Result; 
3. Using the ii^ t variables from step 2 ,  calculate MV solution for 
(Aservation i 
Result: (3^ ,z") 
4. Use the numerical integration program to find the eiqaected utility 
from the M7 solution found in step 3 
Result: (EuJ) 
5. let the initial optimum values be those produced ty the MV solutions 
Result; (EU%EU?, zt=z?) 
6. Use t^ e optimization algorithm(s) to alter the current values of x* 
and  ^
Result; (3^ /Z^ ) 
7. Use the num^ ical mtegration program to find EU for the market 
positions x< and z^  
Result: (EuJ) 
Table 5.4. (Continued) 
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8. EU^ >E(J£ then let new optjjnum values be those produced ]:y and 
H 
Result: nj?=EU^ , z^ =z^  
9. Repeat steps 6-8, with j+1 replacing j and so forth, until the 
accuracy level is acceptable 
yig 
10. If the accuracy level is met then x. and z. are the optimal futures 
and options positions for obziervation i ana produce an eaqpected 
utility level of EUj^  
Result: (xT, zT, and Eut) 
11. If i is less than the total number of dDsexvations in the CXO 
then let i=i+l and repeat steps 1-10 
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optimal futures and options positions for a CM vAio participates in the 
cash, futures, and options markets simultaneously (CFO). Table 5.5 
lists the optimal market positions for each of the three strategies in 
an eiqpected utility framework for each set of market factors in Table 
5.2. 
Ihe results of the CF strategy show the CM will take a short 
futures position near the level of end-of-period output but will 
deviate away from the output level as the levels of and A 
change. Ihe largest deviation from the output level is 178 bushels, a 
maximum deviation of 1.78 percent. Ihe optimal options position in the 
00 strategy does not follow the output level as closely as the futures 
position did in the OF strategy and the options position is always 
greater than the output level. Ihe options position in the 00 strategy 
is affected by changes in the levels of Q, and A. In the 
CFO strat:egy, the optimal futures position remains near the cash 
position but the options position becomes relatively small and seems to 
play a much smaller role in the risk management portfolio than futures 
contracts play in the CFO strategy or than options contracts themselves 
play in the 00 strategy. Ihe optimal futures position in the CEO 
strategy is affected to various extents by changes in the levels of 
a , B^ , B^ , Q, and A, vMle the optimal options position is affected by 
changes in the levels of E^ , a^ , B^ , B^ , and A but not by changes in 
the level of Q. 
The results of the three marketing strategies in an expected 
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Table 5.5. Optimal market positions for the OF, GO, and CFO strategies 
in an e>qpected utility framework 
Marketing Strategy^  
CF 00 CFO 
End of 
Period Futures Options Futures Options 
Output Position Position Position Position 
CSsservation (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
1 20,000 20,046 23,166 19,918 249 
2 20,000 20,107 25,284 19,809 582 
3 10,000 10,046 12,437 9,918 249 
4 10,000 10,107 13,559 9,809 582 
5 20,000 20,046 22,690 20,419 -731 
6 20,000 20,107 24,367 20,977 -1,706 
7 10,000 10,046 12,029 10,419 -731 
8 10,000 10,107 12,772 10,977 -1,706 
9 20,000 19,954 23,166 19,529 807 
10 20,000 19,893 25,284 18,902 1,884 
11 10,000 9,954 12,437 9,529 807 
12 10,000 9,893 13,559 8,902 1,884 
13 20,000 19,954 22,690 20,079 -238 
14 20,000 19,893 24,367 20,184 -555 
15 10,000 9,954 12,029 10,079 -238 
16 10,000 9,893 12,772 10,184 -555 
17 20,000 20,076 23,777 19,864 414 
18 20,000 20,178 26,034 19,682 965 
19 10,000 10,076 12,804 9,864 414 
20 10,000 10,178 13,964 9,682 965 
21 20,000 20,076 23,040 20,696 -1,208 
22 20,000 20,178 24,618 21,624 -2,819 
23 10,000 10,076 12,176 10,696 -1,208 
24 10,000 10,178 12,734 11,624 -2,819 
25 20,000 19,924 23,777 19,189 1,374 
26 20,000 19,822 26,034 18,108 3,206 
27 10,000 9,924 12,804 9,189 1,374 
28 10,000 9,822 13,964 8,108 3,206 
29 20,000 19,924 23,040 20,132 -391 
30 20,000 19,822 24,618 20,307 -912 
31 10,000 9,924 12,176 10,132 -391 
32 10,000 9,822 12,734 10,307 -912 
F^utures position= short futures position. Options position >0= 
purchased put options. Options position <0= written put options. 
Table 5.5. (Continued) 
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Marketing Strategy 
CF CO CPO 
End of 
Period Futures Options Futures Options 
Output Position Position Position Position 
(Ssservation (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
33 20,000 20,046 23,608 19,918 269 
34 20,000 20,107 25,974 19,809 627 
35 10,000 10,046 12,759 9,918 269 
36 10,000 10,107 14,000 9,809 627 
37 20,000 20,046 23,054 20,387 -716 
38 20,000 20,107 24,924 20,903 -1,672 
39 10,000 10,046 12,291 10,387 -716 
40 10,000 10,107 13,109 10,903 -1,672 
41 20,000 19,954 23,608 19,571 785 
42 20,000 19,893 25,974 18,998 1,832 
43 10,000 9,954 12,759 9,571 785 
44 10,000 9,893 14,000 8,998 1,832 
45 20,000 19,954 23,054 20,079 -255 
46 20,000 19,893 24,924 20,184 -595 
47 10,000 9,954 12,291 10,079 -255 
48 10,000 9,893 13,109 10,184 -595 
49 20,000 20,076 24,461 19,863 456 
50 20,000 20,178 27,054 19,681 1,063 
51 10,000 10,076 13,284 9,863 456 
52 10,000 10,178 14,602 9,681 1,063 
53 20,000 20,076 23,571 20,629 -1,178 
54 20,000 20,178 25,377 21,469 -2,748 
55 10,000 10,076 12,537 10,629 -1,178 
56 10,000 10,178 13,165 11,469 -2,748 
57 20,000 19,924 24,461 19,282 1,323 
58 20,000 19,822 27,054 18,324 3,088 
59 10,000 9,924 13,284 9,282 1,323 
60 10,000 9,822 14,602 8,324 3,088 
61 20,000 19,924 23,571 20,131 -427 
62 20,000 19,822 25,377 20,307 996 
63 10,000 9,924 12,537 10,131 -427 
64 10,000 9,822 13,165 10,307 -996 
Table 5.5. (Gontinued) 
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End of 
Marketing Strategy 
CF CD CPO 
Period Rttures Options Futures Options 
Output Position Position Position Position 
C&xservation (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
Center Point 
65 15,000 15,000 18,631 15,000 .00 
Axial Points 
66 15,000 15,000 18,165 14,999 1.22 
67 15,000 15,000 19,159 15,000 1.02 
68 15,000 15,000 18,259 15,000 .00 
69 15,000 15,000 19,260 15,000 .62 
70 15,000 15,160 18,631 15,568 -814 
71 .15,000 14,840 18,631 14,359 930 
72 15,000 15,000 19,659 13,794 2,412 
73 15,000 15,000 17,921 15,829 -1,658 
74 25,000 25,000 29,518 24,999 1.14 
75 5,000 5,000 6,809 5,000 .00 
76 15,000 15,000 17,580 15,000 .37 
77 15,000 15,000 20,988 15,000 .00 
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utility framework may be interpreted, to some extent, using the 
standard MV models put forth in chapter 3. Ihe assunptions of the CF 
strategy are sufficient to cause the results of MV model 1 to provide 
solutions vMch maximize ejqiected utility. As a result, MV model 1 can 
be used to directly interpret the results of the CF strategy in Table 
5.5. As discussed in Chapter 3, the CM hedges his output using the 
traditional hedge in the futures market, i.e., the CM takes a futures 
position vAiich is equal to and opposite his/her cash position, and then 
speculates according to any expected bias in the futures market 
adjusted the resulting variability in the iixxame distribution and 
the level of risk aversion. If no bias exists in the futures market, 
the EM would take a traditional hedge as indicated by observations 65-
69 and 72-77. Observations 1-64 and 70-71 indicate the resulting 
market positions that occur vAien the futures market is believed to be 
biased in the presence of the other market factors. 
ïhe assunptions of the 00 strategy do not meet the sufficient 
condition to allow MV model 3 to provide results vAiich are consistent 
with expected utility maximization. However MV model 3 may still be 
useful in providing intuitive insists into the numerical results 
produced ky the e}q)ected utility maximization model using the 00 
strategy. In the 00 strategy, the CM can no longer eliminate all risk 
by taking a traditional hedge but can reduce risk by purchasing put 
cptions. The results of the 00 strategy seem to suggest, as MV model 3 
inplies, that the CM does use options to hedge risk, althou^ i he/she 
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does not take a traditional hedge. This can be seen in cdsservations 
65-71 and 74-77 vdiere no bias exists in the crions market and a Hi 
using the 00 strategy would take crions positions which are not equal 
to the traditional hedge. In fact, the CM tends to ovediedge ty 
purchasing an amount of put crions which is larger than the end-of-
period output level. When the (%>tions market is biased, the CM changes 
the options position to account for any believed bias in the options 
market adjusted by the resulting income distribution and risk aversion 
level as is seen in the remaining observations 1-64 and 72-73. 
As in the 00 strategy, the assumptions of the CFO strategy do not 
meet the sufficient condition to cause MV model 5 to produce results 
consistent with ej^ iected utility maximization; however, the MV model 
results again seem to lend insists into the numerical results produced 
ty the expected utility maximization model using the CFO strategy. As 
MV model 5 suggests, the EM seems to hedge in the futures market by 
taking a traditional hedge and then speculates in each market according 
to the level of eiqaected bias in each market adjusted by the resulting 
incone distribution and the level of risk aversion. Observations 65-69 
and 74-77 illustrate the case vAiere no bias exists in either market and 
the EM takes the traditional hedge in the futures market and no 
position in the crions market^ .^ If a bias is introduced into either 
^^ Ihe small deviations from the traditional hedge in the futures 
market and a zero options position vAien both markets are unbiased leads 
one to suspect a small error in the results at these observation points 
vMch can be attributed to several factors including: rounding error 
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market, the CM edters his/her market positions accordingly as seen in 
observations 1-64 and 70-73. Ihe effect of each market factor on the 
optimal market position(s) in the 00 and CFO strategies is discussed 
further at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 6. 
Results of the standard MV Model 
Earlier sections of this paper have presented arguments vdiich 
suggested that the use of the standard MV model in the presence of 
commodity crions is not strictly consistent with expected utility 
maximization. Ifowever, it was also suggested, as illustrated in the 
previous section, that the analytical results of the standard M7 model 
may provide useful insists into the optimal results produced by using 
numerical methods to solve the ejçjected utility maximization model. In 
addition, the standard MV model may provide results vhich are useful as 
approximations of the optimal results produced by the e^ qaected utility 
maximization model. The first-order conditions for the standard M7 
models vAich result from the assunptions of the CF strategy (M7 model 
1), the 00 strategy (M7 model 3), and the CFO strategy (MV model 5) 
were solved for the same iiput variables used to produce the expected 
utility maximization model results, i.e., the input variables in Table 
in the value of the estions premium; truncation of the tails of the 
inccme distribution; anchor imprécision in the optimization an^ /or 
integration algorithms. This also suggests that the results produced 
at the remaining observations are subject to sliest estimation or 
modeling errors. 
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5.3. Table 5.6 shows the market positions suggested hy each standard 
M7 model. Itie results of the CF strategy in the standard MV model 
framework are the same as the e)q)ected utility model as is e^ i^ected. 
Ihe results of the 00 and the CFO strategies in the standard M7 model 
framework are, again as es^ iected, different from the ejqsected utility 
model. Ihe accuracy of the results of the standard MV model in the 
presence of options contracts fluctuates as the levels of the market 
factors change; however, the M7 model results seem to generally 
approximate the expected utility results with some precision. Hie 
largest difference between the esq^ ected utility and standard MV models' 
results for the 00 strategy occurs in observation 37 vAiere the options 
position for the e}^ 3ected utility model is 23,054 bushels and the 
cations position for the standard MV model is 26,420 bushels, a 14.6 
percent deviation from the optimal position. In the CFO strategy, the 
largest difference between futures positions in the two models occurs 
at observation 28 tdiere the futures position in the eï^ e^cted utility 
model is 8,108 bushels and the futures position for the standard MV 
model is 9,267, a 14.3 percent deviation from the c^ itimal position. 
Conservation 28 also produces the largest deviation in the options 
positions for the CEO strategy. The options position in the ejçiectied 
utdlity model is 3,206 bushels while the crions position in the 
standard UN model is 1,578 bushels, a 50.8 percent deviation from the 
optimal position. The accuracy of the standard MV model and the 
importance of ary error in the resulting market position (s) are 
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Table 5.6. Optimal market postions for the OF, 00, and CFO strategies 
in a standard M7 model framework 
Marketing Strategy® 
CF 00 CFO 
End of 
Period Ritures Options Futures Options 
Position Out^ xit Position Position Position 
C&>servation (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
1 20,000 20,046 25,786 19,977 197 
2 20,000 20,107 26,009 19,946 461 
3 10,000 10,046 12,977 9,977 197 
4 10,000 10,107 13,200 9,946 461 
5 20,000 20,046 25,451 20,189 -409 
6 20,000 20,107 25,227 20,440 -955 
7 10,000 10,046 12,641 10,189 -409 
8 10,000 10,107 12,418 10,440 -955 
9 20,000 19,954 25,786 19,811 409 
10 20,000 19,893 26,009 19,560 955 
11 10,000 9,954 12,977 9,811 409 
12 10,000 9,893 13,200 9,560 955 
13 20,000 19,954 25,451 20,023 -197 
14 20,000 19,893 25,227 20,054 -461 
15 10,000 9,954 12,641 10,023 -197 
16 10,000 9,893 12,418 10,054 -461 
17 20,000 20,076 25,759 19,962 324 
18 20,000 20,178 26,127 19,912 756 
19 10,000 10,076 13,018 9,962 324 
20 10,000 10,178 13,385 9,912 756 
21 20,000 20,076 25,208 20,314 -676 
22 20,000 20,178 24,840 20,733 -1,578 
23 10,000 10,076 12,466 10,314 -676 
24 10,000 10,178 12,098 10,733 -1,578 
25 20,000 19,924 25,759 19,686 676 
26 20,000 19,822 26,127 19,267 1,578 
27 10,000 9,924 13,018 9,686 676 
28 10,000 9,822 13,385 9,267 1,578 
29 20,000 19,924 25,208 20,038 -324 
30 20,000 19,822 24,840 20,088 -756 
31 10,000 9,924 12,466 10,038 -324 
32 10,000 9,822 12,098 10,088 -756 
F^utures position^  short futures position. Options position >0= 
purchased put options. Options position <0= written put options. 
Table 5.6. (Oonbinued) 
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Marketing Strategy 
CF 00 GEO 
End of 
Period Ritures Options Futures Options 
Position Output Position Position Position 
Observation (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
33 20,000 20,046 26,787 19,973 219 
34 20,000 20,107 27,031 19,937 512 
35 10,000 10,046 13,485 9,973 219 
36 10,000 10,107 13,730 9,937 512 
37 20,000 20,046 26,420 20,191 -437 
38 20,000 20,107 26,175 20,445 -1,019 
39 10,000 10,046 13,118 10,191 -437 
40 10,000 10,107 12,874 10,445 -1,019 
41 20,000 19,954 26,787 19,809 437 
42 20,000 19,893 27,031 19,555 1,019 
43 10,000 9,954 13,485 9,809 437 
44 10,000 9,893 13,730 9,555 1,019 
45 20,000 19,954 26,420 20,027 -219 
46 20,000 19,893 26,175 20,063 -512 
47 10,000 9,954 13,118 10,027 -219 
48 10,000 9,893 12,874 10,063 -512 
49 20,000 20,076 27,065 19,954 371 
50 20,000 20,178 27,478 19,893 867 
51 10,000 10,076 13,688 9,954 371 
52 10,000 10,178 14,101 9,893 867 
53 20,000 20,076 26,445 20,318 -735 
54 20,000 20,178 26,032 20,742 -1,716 
55 10,000 10,076 13,068 10,318 -735 
56 10,000 10,178 12,654 10,742 -1,716 
57 20,000 19,924 27,065 19,682 735 
58 20,000 19,822 27,478 19,258 1,716 
59 10,000 9,924 13,688 9,682 735 
60 10,000 9,822 14,101 9,258 1,716 
61 20,000 19,924 26,445 20,046 -371 
62 20,000 19,822 26,032 20,107 -867 
63 10,000 9,924 13,068 10,046 -371 
64 10,000 9,822 12,654 10,107 -867 
Table 5.6. (Continued) 
Marketing Strategy 
CF CO CPO 
End of 
Period Futures Options Ritures Captions 
Oitput Position Position Position Position 
Conservation (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
Center Point 
65 15,000 15,000 19,573 15,000 .00 
Axial Points 
66 15,000 15,000 18,796 15,000 .00 
67 15,000 15,000 20,449 15,000 .00 
68 15,000 15,000 19,573 15,000 .00 
69 15,000 15,000 19,573 15,000 .00 
70 15,000 15,160 19,573 15,288 -376 
71 15,000 14,840 19,573 14,712 376 
72 15,000 15,000 20,340 14,530 1,379 
73 15,000 15,000 18,960 15,376 -1,103 
74 25,000 25,000 32,622 25,000 .00 
75 5,000 5,000 6,524 5,000 .00 
76 15,000 15,000 19,573 15,000 .00 
77 15,000 15,000 19,573 15,000 .00 
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addressed further in the next chapter. 
Localized Oanparative Static Results: Numerically 
Examination of the e}^ 3ected utility results in Table 5.5 suggests 
several behavioral characteristics, some of vAiich were discussed 
earlier in the chapter. Ihe results in Table 5.5 will again prove 
useful in Chapter 6 to help estimate approximation functions, stuc^  the 
value of futures and options institutions, and compare the usefulness 
of the approximation and standard MV models' results to the results 
produced by the e3^ )ected utility maximization model. However, it is 
somaAat difficult to identify the general behavioral diaracteristics 
exhibited in the results of Table 5.5 visual examination of the 
table. Graphical examination of the changes in the optimal market 
positions as the level of each market factor changes may be a useful 
aid in illustrating at least some of the these behavioral 
characteristics. The following cases focus on the changes in the 
optimal market positions that occur around the center point values of 
2 E^ , a , B^ , B^ , Q, and A and the vçper and lower factorial levels of B^  
and B^ . In each case, the level of one market factor is allowed to 
change around its center point value Wiile holding the other market 
factors constant. The optimal market positions are found at each level 
and then gra#ied. Figures 5.1 throu^  5.6 illustrate the changes in 
the cçtions position for the 00 strategy. Figures 5.7a throu^  5.12b 
show the changes in the futures and crions positions for the CPO 
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strategy, i^ ipendices B and C contain the dsservation points used to 
draw each figure for the 00 and CFO strategies respectively. 
localized conparative statics for the cash and options strategy 
Figure 5.1 shows that the options position is not affected ly the 
level of bias in the futures market vAien the CM does not include 
futures contracts in his/her risk management portfolio. Ihe EM does 
not trade in the futures market so the level of the futures price has 
no iiipact on his/her end-of-period income and consequently no effect on 
the optimal options position. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the options position increases as the level 
of end-of-period output increases. For every one unit increase in the 
out^ jut level, the EM buys more than one unit of put options, resulting 
in the options position always being larger than the output level. Ihe 
EM prefers to overhedge in the crions market even vAien the options 
market is believed to be unbiased. The rate of increase in the options 
position decreases slightly as output increases but becomes sli^ tly 
larger as the expected bias level in the options market increases, 
i.e., as the options market bias becomes less negative or more 
positive.^ ® From a hedging standpoint, the tendency to overhedge in 
the options market reflects the EM's preference for income 
48 Ihe rate of change is difficult to see in some of the figures 
presented in this section. Ihe interested reader is referred to the 
observation points in the respective appendices. 
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distributions vAiich provide increases in income for price changes in 
either direction. These distributions are truncated distributions 
vMch are the sum of two truncated normal distributions but are not 
truncated normal distributions themselves, as illustrated in Figure 
3.6. 
In Figure 5.3, the options position decreases at a sli^ tly 
decreasing rate as the variance of the end-of-period spot price 
increases. The options positions that result vAien the options market 
is biased tend to converge on the unbiased options market position as 
the variance level increases, suggesting that the DM speculates less as 
the variance becomes larger. Once again, the CM overhedges even vAien 
the options market is e)q)ected to be unbiased, althou^ i the overhedge 
position tends to decrease as the variance level increases. As the 
variance level increases, the CM's income distribution preference 
apparently begins to switch toward the truncated normal l^ pe of 
distribution produced by the traditional hedge as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 5.4 indicates that the options position decreases as the 
level of risk aversion increases, i.e., the overhedged position is 
reduced as the CM becomes more risk averse. When the bias in the 
options market is positive the options position decreases at decreasing 
rate. When the options market e^ diibits a negative eiqaected bias then 
the cations position first decreases at an increasing rate and later at 
a decreasing rate as the level of risk aversion continues to rise. As 
the level of risk aversion increases, the options positions that result 
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when the options market Is biased tend to converge on the options 
posltlcn that results vdien the qptlons market Is unbiased indicating 
that the CM speculates less as the level of risk aversion Increases. 
Ihe overhedge position decreases as the level of risk aversion 
Increases even When the options market Is e^ qiected to be unbiased, 
again reflecting a shift In the Income distribution preference tcward 
the distribution resulting from the traditional type of hedge. 
Figure 5.5 shows that the options position Increases as the level 
of bias increases. When the eiq^ ected bias in the options market is 
negative, the speculative tendency is to reduce the number of put 
options purchased for hedging purposes. Fran a speculative standpoint, 
this is equivalent to writing put colons. As the level of e)^ )ected 
bias becomes positive, the speculative behavior is to purchase 
additional put options and Increase the overall options position. 
Figure 5.6 shows the cations position decreases at a slightly 
decreasing rate as the exercise price increases relative to the 
e}^ 3ected spot price regardless of the e)^ )ected bias in the cptions 
market. Hie options positions that result when the options market is 
biased tend to move closer to the position that results vAien the 
options market is e^ s^ected to be unbiased, suggesting that the EM 
>^eculates less as the exercise price increases relative to the 
0^ )ected spot price. As the exercise price increases relative to the 
expected spot price the EM, once again, moves toward the traditional 
type of hedge. 
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In general, the options market plays both the hedging and 
speculative role. A bias in the futures market has no impact on the 
size of the crions position. The options position varies positively 
with the level of end-of-period output e^ diibiting a greater than one-
to-one hedging relationship. Even vAien the options market is unbiased, 
the EM hedges his/her end-of-period out^ )ut level by taking an options 
position vAiich is greater than his/her end-of-period out^ jut level. As 
the variance of end-of-period ^ t price, risk aversion level, and 
exercise price increase, the options position decreases even vAien the 
options market is unbiased indicating a decrease in the hedging 
component relative to the output level. ïhe decrease in the options-
cash hedge ratio as these market factors change represents a shift in 
the type of income distribution preferred the CM. Ihe speculative 
position also decreases as the variance of end-of-period spot price, 
risk aversion level, and exercise price increase. As eqiected, the 
options position tends to increase as the bias level in the options 
market increases. 
localized comparative statics for the cash, futures, and options 
strategy 
Figures 5.7a and 5.7b show how the EM responds to changes in the 
level of end-of-period out^ t vAien both futures and options are 
included in a risk management portfolio. "Die futures position 
increases one-for-one with the level of end-of-period output vAiile the 
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Option* Position (Bu) 
20000- B0"$0.02 
18000 V. 
BO—$0.02 
-0.02 0 0.02 
Futures Market Bias (Bu) 
Figure 5.1. Change in the crions position as the e^ q^ ected bias in the 
futures market changes using t±ie 00 strategy 
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Options Position (Bu) 
B0-$0.0 
B0-$0.02 
20000 
B0-$0.02 
16000 
16000 12000 18000 
End-of-Period 
Output (Bu) 
Figure 5.2. Change in the crions position as the end-of-period output 
level changes using the 00 strategy 
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Option» Position (Bu) 
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B0-$0.02 
18000 
BO—$0.02 
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Expected Spot g 
Price Variance ($ ) 
Figure 5.3. Change in the citions position as the e3^ pec±ed spot price 
variance changes using tiie 00 stratzegy 
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Options Position (Bu) 
22000-
B0-$0.02 
B0-$0.0 
18000 
0.0001 0.00026 0.0004 
Risk Aversion 
Figure 5.4. Change in the options position as the level of risk 
aversion changes using the 00 strategy 
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Option» Position (Bu) 
19000 
18000 
0.03 0 -0.03 
Options Market Bias (S) 
Figure 5.5. Cha^ e in the estions position as the ea^ pected bias in the 
options market changes using the CO strategy 
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Option» Position (Bu) 
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18000 
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Expected Spot Price ($) 
Figure 5.6. Change in the options position as the exercise price 
changes relative to the e^ qiected spot price using the 
strategy 
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options position is not affected by changes in the output level. The 
implication is that the CM hedges the end-of-period output by taking 
the traditional hedge in the futures market and then speculates in both 
markets according to his/her e:q)ected bias in both markets. Hie actual 
level of the futures and colons depends on the eqaected bias levels in 
each market. When the CM buys (writes) options, he/she tends to reduce 
(increase) the corresponding short futures position reflecting the 
speculative tradeoff tendency between futures and options contracts. 
In addition, as the speculative position in the options market 
increases, the speculative position in the futures market, i.e., the 
difference between futures position and the end-of-period output level, 
also increases. Ihe largest speculative positions occur vdien the bias 
in one market is positive and the other is negative. Ihe rationale for 
this type of behavior is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Figures 5.8a and 5.8b illustrate how the CM's cptimal market 
positions change as the ejçjected variance of the end-of-period spot 
price changes. As before, the speculative tradeoff between futures and 
options is seen in the respective market positions for given bias 
levels in each figure. As the variance level increases, the futures 
position tends to move toward the levels of end-of-period output, in 
this case 15,000 bushels, and the options position tends to move toward 
zero implying that the CM, being risk averse, tends to speculate less 
in both markets. Ihe rat:e of change in both markets decreases as the 
variance level rises. 
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Figures 5.9a and 5.9b show the CM's futures position moves toward 
the level of end-of-period output and the options position moves toward 
the value zero as the level of risk aversion increases. As expected, 
the level of speculation decreases as the CM becomes more risk averse. 
Ihe rate of change in both markets again decreases as the level of risk 
aversion rises. 
Figures 5.10a and 5.10b illustrate that the futures position tends 
to increase and the options position tends to decrease as the eiqiected 
bias in the futures market increases. As the eaqpected bias in the 
futures market goes taking additional short futures positions 
becomes relative more profitable than the existing futures market 
position and thus the speculative tradeoff nature between the two 
markets results in larger short futures positions and smaller options 
positions becoming more attractive. Also, as the ej^ e^cted bias in the 
futures market increases the difference between the market positions at 
different ejipected bias levels in the options market decreases 
sli^ tly. 
Figures 5.11a and 5.11b show that as the level of eiqaected bias in 
the options market increases, the relative profitability of buying 
more, or writing fewer, put options increases and the resulting futures 
position tends to decrease v4iile the options position increases. As 
the eiqiected bias in the options market becomes larger, the difference 
between the market positions at different expected bias levels in the 
futures market becomes slightly larger. 
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Figures 5.12a and 5.12b illustrate how the optimal market 
positions change as the difference between the exercise price and the 
ei^iected spot price changes. The general response bdiavior is 
d^)endent on the expected bias in eadi market. When the expected bias 
has the same sign in each market, the futures position shews very 
little change as the exercise price increases relative to the expected 
spot price. When the ejqjected bias is negative in both markets, the 
futures position increases sli^tly as the exercises price rises to 
the level of the subjected spot price and then decreases sli^tly as the 
exercise price rises above the expected spot price. The behavior is 
reversed vAien the bias in positive in both markets. The options 
position increases for negative bias levels in both markets and 
decreases for positive bias levels in both markets. When the bias 
levels in the futures and options markets are positive and negative, 
r^jectively, the options position tends to decrease and the futures 
position increases as the exercise price rises relative to the e)q)ected 
spot price. Ihe behavior reverses itself vAen the expected bias levels 
in the futures and cations markets are negative and positive, 
respectively. Thus, as the exercise price increases relative to the 
es^jected spot price, the EM tends to speculate more if the direction of 
bias is different in each market and less if the direction of bias is 
the same in the two markets. 
In general, the CM hedges his output in the futures market using 
the "traditional" hedge and then speculates in both markets according 
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to his/her e}(pec±ed level of bias in each market, risk aversion level, 
and perception of the resulting income distribution. If a bias exists 
in either market the EM speculates by taking an additional position in 
the opticms market and adjusting his/her futures position away from the 
traditional hedge. A speculative tradeoff behavior exists between 
futures and qptions contracts in that biying additional put options 
tends to be associated with obtaining additional long futures 
contracts, or reducing a short futures position, and writing additional 
put options tends to be associated with obtaining additional short 
futures contracts. As the variance of end-of-period spot price and 
risk aversion levels increase, the CM speculates less in both markets. 
As the bias in the futures market increases, i.e., becomes less 
negative or more positive, the EM increases his/her short futures 
position and buys fewer, or writes more, put options. This tradeoff 
behavior between futures and options contracts reverses itself ^en the 
bias in the crions market increases. If both markets are biased in 
the same direction, the EM tends to speculate less as the level of the 
exercise price increases relative to the %^)ected spot price. If the 
markets are biased in c^^posite directions, the EM tends to speculate 
more as the exercise price rises relative to the ej^Dected spot price. 
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Futures Position (Bu) 
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End-of-Perlod Output (Bu) 
Figure 5.7a. Change in the futures position as the end-of-period 
output level changes using the CFO stxategy 
Options Position (Bu) 
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End-of-Perlod Output (Bu) 
Figure 5.7b. Change in the options position as the end-of-period 
output level changes using the CFO stzatiegy 
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Future# Position (Bu) 
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Expected Spot 
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Figure 5.8a. Change in the futures position as the eiqpected variance 
of the end-of-period spot price changes using the CFO 
stzatiegy 
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Option» Position (Bu) 
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BF—$0.02, B0"-$0.02 
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-2000-
1.0 0.7 1.3 
Expected Spot 
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Figure 5.8b. Change in the crions position as the «qaected variance 
of the end-of-period spot price changes using the CPO 
strategy 
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Future» Position (Bu) 
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Figure 5.9a. Change in the futures position as the level of risk 
aversion changes using the CEO strategy 
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Option» Position (Bu) 
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Figure 5.9b. Change in the options position as the level of risk 
aversion changes using the CFO stxategy 
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Future» Position (Bu) 
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Figure 5.10a. Change in the futures position as the e}$>ected bias 
in the futures market changes using the CFO strategy 
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Option* Position (Bu) 
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Figure 5.10b. Change in the options position as the ei^aected bias 
in the futures market changes using the CFO strategy 
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Future» Position (Bu) 
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Figure 5.11a. Change in the futures position as the eiqaected bias 
in the options market changes using the CFO straliegy 
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Figure 5.11b. Change in the options position as the e}Ç)ec±ed bias 
in the options market changes using the CPO strategy 
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Future» Position (Bu) 
BF—$0.02, BO—$0.02 BF-$0.02, BO—$0.02 
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16000 
14000 
BF-$0.02, BO-$0.02 
BF—$0.02, B0-$0.02 
0 0.16 
Exercise Price Less 
Expected Spot Price ($) 
Figure 5.12a. Change in the futures position as the exercise price 
changes relative to the e)$)ected spot price using the 
CFD sizrategy 
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_L 
0.16 
Exercise Price Less 
Expected Spot Price ($) 
Figure 5.12b. Change in the options position as the esœrcise price 
changes relative to the eiqaected spot price using the 
CEO strategy 
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CHAPTER 6. APPROXIMATIŒf MODELS, INSTTIUTKmL VAIUE, 
AND MODEL OOMBARISŒ 
Chapter 5 discussed the market factor levels used in the study, 
the corresponding iiput variable levels, and the numerical solution 
procedure used to solve the expected utility maximization model. 
Results from the CF, CO, and CFO strategies were presented for both the 
e)q)ected utility maximization and the standard MV modeling frameworks 
and local comparative static results were examined gragdiically for the 
e}q>ected utility model. Chapter 6 begins ky discussing the results of 
the regression models used to estimate second-order polynomial 
approximations of the functional relationships between the optimal 
market positions and the market factors. Next the value of futures, 
options, and futures-options market institutions are each examined from 
the viewpoint of a EM vAiose primary interest in the markets is for risk 
management purposes. The chapter concludes hy measuring the accuracy 
of the standard MV and approximation models' results in a value of 
information framework. 
Regression Model Results 
Ihe functional relationships between the optimal market positions 
in an eaqaected utility framework and the market factors are estimated 
by regressing the optimal market positions on the full second-order 
polynomial function (see equation 4.5) of the coded market factors in 
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table 4.1. The market factors, or independent variables, 
Q, and A are r^resented in the polynomial regressions by the 
terms EXER, VAR, BF, BO, WT, and RA and the hi^ier order terms are 
represented as the respective products and cross products of the market 
factors. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 contain the results of the full second-
order polynomial regression models for the 00 and CEO strategies 
respectively. Examination of the results provides insic^ts into CM 
behavior under the two strategies as well as into the inpacts of 
changes in the market factors on the optimal market positions. All 
three estimated regression models have large F statistics and 
values, which suggest the models will serve well as approximations to 
the true functional models at least over the decision space used to 
estimate the models. 
Ihe regression model results for the CFO strategy in table 6.2 
suggest several behavioral characteristics. Ihe estimated coefficient 
for the variable C2OT is statistically significant in the futures 
position model but not in the crions position model while all hic^er-
order terms involving ©OT are nonsignificant in both models and most 
49 have estimated coefficient values of zero. The estimated value for 
the coded QNT variable coefficient suggests the futures position 
changes ly one bushel for each bushel change in the level of end-of-
49 For the remainder of this chapter the terms significant and 
nonsignificant are equivalent to statistically significant and not 
statistically significant respectively. 
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Table 6.1. Full regression model for the options position using the CO 
strategy 
Options Position 
Independent Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Intercept 18,665, ,66** 46. 328 
EXER -258. 70** 8 .155 
VAR -227, ,09** 8, .155 
BF 0, .00 8, .155 
BO 445. 78** 8, .155 
WT 5,707. 89** 8, .155 
RA -757. 31** 8. 155 
EXER*EXER -3. 05 13. 817 
VAR*VAR 21. ,26 13. 817 
BF*BF -10. 80 13. 817 
BO*BO 28. 87* 13. 817 
QNR*QNT -127. 72** 13. ,817 
RA*RA 152. ,37** 13. ,817 
EXER*VAR 46. 50** 8. ,649 
EXER*BF 0. 00 8. ,649 
EXER*BO -34. 83** 8. 649 
EXER*QTN! -55. 45** 8. 649 
EXER*RA 44. 62** 8. 649 
VAR*BP 0. 00 8. 649 
VFTR*BO -100. 29** 8. 649 
VAR*QJ«T -79. 85** 8. 649 
VAR*RA -1. 78 8. 649 
BF*BO 0. 00 8. 649 
BF*QÎOT 0. 00 8. 649 
BF*RA 0. 00 8. 649 
BO*QNT 35. 01** 8. 649 
BO*RA -140. 53** 8. 649 
QWr*RA -271. 19** 8. 649 
F-value 18,710. ,92** 
Total observations 77 
Model 0.9999 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.2. Full regression models for the futures position and options 
position using the CFO strategy 
Ritures Position Options Position 
Coded 
Ind^)endent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error 
Intero^ 14,973.69** 62.090 55.69 108.131 
EXER -3.19 10.929 1.73 19.033 
VKR 10.55 10.929 -17.90 19.033 
BF 376.47** 10.929 -551.56** 19.033 
BO -558.19** 10.929 1,115.06** 19.033 
QWr 4,999.98** 10.929 0.03 19.033 
m 11.60 10.929 -19.72 19.033 
EXER*EXER 8.08 18.517 -17.12 32.248 
VAR*VAR 8.22 18.517 -17.32 32.248 
BF*BF -0.87 18.517 -6.30 32.248 
BO*BO -38.93* 18.517 76.91* 32.248 
QJ)T*QflT 8.15 18.517 -17.26 32.248 
RA*RA 8.22 18.517 -17.36 32.248 
EXER*VAR 1.68 11.592 -0.91 20.188 
EXER*BF 24.19* 11.592 -24.20 20.188 
EXER*BO -24.18* 11.592 0.40 20.188 
EXER*QNT 0.00 11.592 0.00 20.188 
EXER*RA 1.43 11.592 -0.78 20.188 
VftR*BF -97.32** 11.592 142.37** 20.188 
VRR*BO 142.01** 11.592 -283.30** 20.188 
VAR*QMr 0.00 11.592 0.00 20.188 
VaR*RA -4.75 11.592 8.05 20.188 
BF*BO 29.42* 11.592 -39.51* 20.188 
BF*GOT 0.00 11.592 0.00 20.188 
BF*RA -154.30** 11.592 226.06** 20.188 
BO*QNr 0.00 11.592 0.00 20.188 
BO*RA 225.75** 11.592 -450.90** 20.188 
wr*RA 0.00 11.592 0.00 20.188 
F-value 7,922. 21** 191. 08** 
Total observations 77 
_ _ _9 _ 
77 
Model 0.9998 0.9906 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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period output. All the remaining significant terms in each model 
involve at least one of the bias variables, i.e., BF and/or BO. Hiese 
results tend to siçport the hypothesis that a CM, bdiaving in an 
e)$)ected utility framevA^rk, tends to hedge his output in the futures 
market and then speculate in both the futures and qptions markets 
according to his/her believed market biases adjusted by the resulting 
income distribution and the level of risk aversion. If neither market 
is biased, the CM takes the traditional hedge in the futures market and 
no position in the options market. From a hedging standpoint, the CM 
behaves as in the standard M7 model by hedging all out^t in the 
futures market. Ihe difference between the e>^)ected utility model 
results and the standard MV model results lies in the speculative 
behavior of the CM. The consideration of the true income distribution 
in the eaçected utility model leads the CM to speculate differently 
than in the standard M7 model. In addition to QNT, the coefficients 
for the variables INTERCEPT, EXER*BO, and EXER*BF are significant in 
the futures model but not in the cations model. Interestingly, all the 
variable coefficients vrtiich are commonly significant in both regression 
models have c^çxjsite signs, e.g., the estimated coefficient for the BF 
variable is 376.47 in the futures position model and -551.56 in the 
crions position model. These variables all relate to the market bias 
levels and the opposite sign characteristic reflects the speculative 
^^This is easier to see in Table 6.4 vAich is presented later. 
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trade off between futures and options contracts that was also seen in 
standard MV models 5 and 6 in Chapter 3 and the graphiceil comparative 
static ancilysis in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the estimated values of 
each significant coefficient in the options position model are of 
larger magnitude than their counterparts in the futures position 
51. 
model. Ihe larger coefficient estimates in the options model 
probably result from the truncated risk-return prc^ierties of options 
contracts. Ihe speculative tendency of the DM is to either buy put 
crions and go long futures or write put options and go short futures 
with the speculative position in the options market always being larger 
than in the futures market. Ihese types of speculative positions 
result in payoff patterns vAich are called "straddles". A selling 
straddle is created by taking a short futures position and 
simultaneously writing a larger number of put options. Ihe selling 
straddle makes money if the spot price stays close to the market's 
eiq^ectations; however the gains are limited to a fixed maximum amount. 
As the price moves in either direction from the expected level, the 
straddle makes less money and eventually loses money. If large price 
movements occur in either direction, the selling straddle may result in 
large losses. A buying straddle is created by taking a long futures 
position and then buying a larger number of put options. Ihe buying 
straddle loses money if the spot price stays near the market's ei^iected 
®Sfolf (1987) derives the equivalent to this result in a mean-
variance framework. 
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level; however, like the gains in the selling straddle, the losses are 
limited to a fixed maximum amount. The losses decrease as the spot 
price moves away from the expected level and the straddle makes money 
if the price moves far enough from the markets' eoqiectations. If large 
price movements occur in either direction, the buying straddle can 
result in large gains. The EM prefers this straddle position, to vdiat 
in some cases are more profitable combinations of futures and options 
positions, apparently because it decreases the risk ej^xssure. For 
example, in the cdaservations vAiere a positive bias exists in both 
markets the CM would e:q)ect the hi^est return by purchasing put 
options and going short futures. However, the expected utility 
solutions call for the EM to take a long futures position and purchase 
put options with the options exposure being greater than the futures 
e^qposure, i.e., a buying straddle. In this case, the e}^>ected return 
from the buying straddle is lower than buying puts and going short 
futures, but the risk eoqxasure is also reduced. This probably accounts 
for the larger speculative positions that result vAien the bias levels 
have opposite signs in each market as was seen in Figures 5.7a throu^i 
5.12b in Chapter 5. When the bias levels have qg^xasite signs in the 
futures and (^ions markets, the type of market positions vAiich are 
most profitable individually, e.g., buying put options and going long 
futures vrtien the futures and options market have negative and positive 
bias levels respectively, also produce the less risky straddle position 
and so the EM tends to take a larger speculative position. However, 
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vdien the bias levels have the same sign in each market, the market 
positions vAiich are most profitable individually do not produce the 
straddle position and so the speculative position is reduced. Ihe 
general tendency is to use futures and crions together as speculative 
tools and reduce the risk eiqaosure, scmetimes at the eiqiense of a lower 
expected return. Note that the believed bias level in the options 
market is determined by the differences between the market's and the 
CM's perorations of 1) the relationship between the levels of the 
ejœrcise price and e^qiected spot price and 2) the level of the variance 
of end-of-period spot price. If the CM believes that the market has 
under estimated the variance, suggesting a positive bias in the cptions 
market, he/she speculates with a buying straddle, hoping to capture 
profits from larger price level changes than the market anticipates. 
If the EM believes the market has overestimated the variance, he/she 
believes the price level change will not be as extreme as the market 
has anticipated and, as a result, takes a selling straddle hcping to 
capture profits from relatively small price level changes. 
TSie exact payoff pattern of the straddles depends on the relative 
magnitudes of the futures and options positions and these magnitudes 
are affected ly the level of e^çjected bias in each market, the shape of 
the income distribution, and the level of risk aversion. 
Most of the coefficient estimates in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 can be 
related to the localized coirparative static gra;Ais in Chapter 5. For 
example, the estimated coefficients for the futures position regression 
167 
model in Table 6.2 indicate that as VAR increases, the futures position 
will increase «Aien B0>0 and decrease vtien BCXO. The rate of change 
will increase as the BF moves in the opposite direction relative to BO. 
Ihe same behavioral pattern is seen graphically in Figure 5.8a. 
The major difference between the options positions in the 00 and 
CEO strategies is a result of the joint hedging and speculating role 
played ky options in the 00 strategy as opposed to the purely 
speculative role played by editions in the CPO strategy. This can be 
seen by the importance of Çjn? and hi^er-order terms involving in 
the 00 regression model. In addition, because futures are not 
available to the CM, all variables vAiich are affected by the level BF 
have nonsignificant coefficients and all but one have estimated 
coefficients with a value of zero. All other variables are significant 
except EXER*EXER, VAR*VAR, and VAR*RA. Ihe number of independent 
variables with statistically significant coefficients affecting the 
options position in the 00 regression model is 18 as opposed to 12 and 
8 in the futures position and options position regression models in the 
CPO strategy respectively. 
Table 6.3 shows the results of estimating linear approximation 
models for the 00 and CPO strategies. Ihe F statistic in all three 
models and the R value in the options model drcp noticeably from the 
those in the full second-order polynomial regression models. An F-test 
for joint significance of all the nonlinear terms was conducted for 
each model and the hypothesis that all the nonlinear terms have zero 
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Table 6.3. First-order regression models for the 00 and CFO 
strategies 
Market Strategy 
00 CEO 
Options position Ritures position Options position 
Ooded 
Independent Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 18,722.64** 
(41.255) 
14,967.02** 
(36.782) 
57.13 
(67.233) 
EXER -258.70** 
(42.663) 
-3.19 
(38.038) 
1.73 
(69.529) 
VKR -227.09** 
(42.663) 
10.55 
(38.038) 
-17.90 
(69.529) 
BF 0.00 
(42.663) 
376.47** 
(38.038) 
-551.56** 
(69.529) 
BO 445.78** 
(42.663) 
-558.19** 
(38.038) 
1,115.06** 
(69.529) 
OUT 5,707.89** 
(42.663) , 
4,999.98** 
(38.038) 
0.03 
(69.529) 
RA -757.31** 
(42.663) 
11.60 
(38.038) 
-19.72 
(69.529) 
F-value 3,064.87** 2,931.94** 53.38** 
Total observations 77 77 77 
Mbdel 0.9962 0.9960 0.8206 
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients. 
* Significant at the O.IO level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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effect on the cptimal market positions is rejected at the O.Ol level in 
each model. The estimated coefficients for the linear independent 
variables in the reduced regression models are the same as those in the 
full regression models because of the orthogonality properties of the 
coded market factors. Ihe intercepts in the reduced models are 
slic^tly different from those in the full models because of the omitted 
quadratic variables. 
Table 6.4 contains the estimated values of the model coefficients 
for the 00 and CFO regression models that correspond to the uncoded 
vedues of the market factors. Diese cofficients can be used with the 
uncoded values of the market factors to estimate the cptimal market 
positions for each strategy. To use the model, the user must specify 
2 
the level of each market factor, a , B^, B^, Q, and A, and then 
calculate the square of eacAi factor as well as the cross product for 
each pair of factors. In total, the user is required to sijçjply 27 
variables if he/^e wishes to use the full regression model. Die 
statistical nonsignificance of the estimated coefficients for some of 
the regression variables in the full regression models suggests that 
some of the independent variables have no effect on the c^imal market 
positions and thus it may be possible to remove sane of these variables 
frcm the model without a significant loss in the accuracy of the 
approximation. A stepwise regression procedure was used to help 
determine vMch independent variables ^ould be included in the model. 
Four different model selection methods were used for both the 00 and 
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Table 6.4. Unooded regression model coefficients for the GO and CFO 
strategies 
Market Strategy 
00 CFO 
Unooded 
Independent 
Variable 
Options model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Futures model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Options model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
INTERCEET 1,476.6925 111.265 -283.96 
EXER -7,798 -269.7 146.4 
VKR -612.68 -173.34 402.14 
BF 0 57,575 -84,309.5 
BO 54,661.75 -84,530.25 168,775.5 
ONT 1.494317 0.990218 0.020718 
RA -6,984,700 -105,000 348,800 
EXER*EXER -1,220 3,232 -6,848 
VAR*VAR 340.16 131.52 -277.12 
BF*BF -27,000 -2,175 -15,750 
BO*BO 72,175 -97,325 192,275 
-0.0000051088 0.000000326 -0.0000006904 
RA*RA 15,237,000,000 822,000,000 -1,736,000,000 
EXER*VAR 3,720 134.4 -72.8 
EXER*BF 0 24,190 -24,200 
EXER*BO -34,830 -24,180 400 
EXER*WR -0.2218 0 0 
EXER*RA 8,924,000 286,000 -156,000 
V%R*BF 0 -19,464 28,474 
VRR*BO -20,058 28,402 —56,660 
VAR*QNT -0.06388 0 0 
VAR*IA -71,200 -190,000 322,000 
BF*BO 0 73,550 -98,775 
BF*WR 0 0 0 
BF*RA 0 -77,150,000 113,030,000 
BO*QNT 0.3501 0 0 
BO*RA -70,265,000 112,875,000 -225,450,000 
QNT*RA -542.38 0 0 
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ŒO strategies. Ihese methods were the forward, backward, stepwise, 
and maximum inprovement (MAXR) selection techniques (SAS (1985) ). 
Hie forward selection technique begins with no variables in the 
regression model and then starts adding the variables, one at a time, 
that produce the largest significant F statistic for the model. The 
process is r^)eated until no variables produce a significant F 
statistic. The backward selection method begins with the full 
regression model. The independent variables are then deleted, one by 
one, until the remaining variables produce a significant F statistic. 
The stepwise method is similar to the forward selection technique but 
differs in that variables already in the regression model may be 
removed. Variables are added one by one based on the F statistic; 
however, after a variable is added, the stepwise procedure looks at all 
independent variables in the model and removes any that do not produce 
a significant F statistic. The MAXR selection technique is considered 
superior to the stepwise technique and almost as good as all possible 
regressions. This method does not settle on a single regression model, 
but attempts to find the best one-variable model, two \7ariable model, 
and so forth. The method adds variables, one at a time, vAiich produce 
the hi^est R . Once a variable is added, each of the variables in the 
model is compared with each of the variables not in the model. If 
r^lacing one of the existing variables in the model increases R^, the 
switch is made. The process continues for each model size from one 
variable to the full regression model. 
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Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show the results of the stepwise 
regressions for the GO and CFO regression models. The variable 
selection in the CO regression model is the same for each selection 
method with the e)K:^)tion of BF*BF in the forward selection method. 
Because all terms including BF should have no effect on the market 
position in the 00 regression model, the BF*BF tern was left out and 
the reduced model was specified to include variables 1-18 in Table 6.5. 
Die variables selected in the CFO regression models were the same under 
each selection method except for some additional variables included at 
the end of the forward selection technique. ïhe reduced regression 
models for the CFO strategy were i^aecified to include the variables 
selected by the forward selection technique for each model. Thus, the 
reduced futures position regression model consists of variables 1-14 in 
Table 6.6 and the reduced options position regression model consists of 
variables 1-11 in Table 6.7. In addition, the reduced options position 
regression model was estimated without the intercept term in the CFO 
strategy. 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 contain the results of the reduced regression 
models for the 00 and CFO strategies respectively. All coefficients 
are statistically significant in the CO regression model. In the CFO 
regression models, all coefficients are significant except for the 
The same variables are also included ky the MAXR selection 
technique. Hcwever, the model size using the MAXR selection technique 
is determined the user, not ky the selection method's algorithm as 
is the case in the other three solution techniques. 
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Table 6.5. Stepwise regression variables for the options position 
regression model using the 00 strategy 
Selection Method® 
Variables Forward Backward Stepwise MakR 
Included Selection Selection Selection Selection 
1 çm ONT QNT QNT 
2 m m RA RA 
3 BO BO BO BO 
4 EXER EXER EXER EXER 
5 wr*PA 0fr*RA QNT*RA QNT*RA 
6 VAR VAR VAR VAR 
7 BO*RA BO*RA BO*RA BO*RA 
8 RA*RA RA*RA RA*RA RA*RA 
9 VaR*BO VaR*BO VaR*BO VAR*BO 
10 C3NT*QNT ®ir*Qi»r WR*QNT ®n?*Gwr 
11 vaR*QNr VaR*GNT VAR*WT VAR*QNr 
12 EXER*QNT EXER*07R EXER*(^ EXER*WT 
13 EXER*VAR EXER*VAR EXER*VAR EXER*VAR 
14 EXER*RA EXER*RA EXER*RA EXER*RA 
15 BO*GNT BO*WT BO*QiNT BO*WT 
16 EXER*BO EXER*BO EXER*BO EXER*BO 
17 BO*BO BO*BO BO*BO BO*BO 
18 VAR*VAR VAR*VAR VAR*VAR VAR*VAR 
19 BF*BF BF*BF 
^Ihe forward, st^wise, and Msoat selected variables are listed in 
the order of importance in the model. The backward selected variables 
are the grotç of variables remaining after the least iirportant 
variables are removed frcsn the model. 
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Table 6.6. Stqwise regression variables for the futures position 
regression model using the CFO strategy 
Variables 
Included 
Forward 
Selection 
Selection 
Backward 
Selection 
Method® 
St^wise 
Selection 
Ma3dl 
Selection 
1 ONT QNT QNT 
2 BO BO BO BO 
3 BF BF BF BF 
4 BO*RA BO*RA BO*RA 
5 BF*RA BF*RA BF*RA BF*RA 
6 VaR*BO VAR*BO V2VR*B0 VaR*BO 
7 VaR*BF VKR*BF VAR*BF VaR*BF 
8 BF*BO BF*BO BF*BO BF*BO 
9 BO*BO BO*BO BO*BO BO*BO 
10 EXER*BF EXER*BF EXER*BF EXER*BF 
11 EXER*BO EXER*BO EXER*BO EXER*BO 
12 RA RA 
.13 VRR VAR 
^Ihe forward, stepwise, and MaxR selected variables are listed in 
the order of importanoe in the model. Ihe backward selected variables 
are the groi^ of variables remaining after the least important 
variables are removed from the model. 
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Table 6.7. • Stepwise regression variables for the options position 
regression model using the CFO strategy 
Selection Method^ 
Variables Forward Backward St^wise MaxR 
Included Selection Selection Selection Selection 
1 BO BO BO BO 
2 BF BP BF BF 
3 BO*BA BO*RA BO*RA. BO*RA 
4 VAR*BO VAR*BO VAR*BO VAR*BO 
5 BF*RA BF*RA BF*RA BF*RA 
6 VRR*BF VAR*BF VAR*BF VAR*BF 
7 BO*BO BO*BO BO*BO BO*BO 
8 BF*BO BF*BO BF*BO BF*BO 
9 EXER*BF EXER*BF 
10 RA RA 
11 VAR VPR 
^Hie forward, st^wise, and MaxR selected variables are listed in 
the order of importance in the model. Ihe backward selected variables 
are the groip of variables remaining after the least important 
variables are removed from the model. 
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Table 6.8. Reduoed regression nndel for the options position using 
the 00 strategy 
Options Position 
Coded 
Ind^)endent Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Intercast 18,643, .50** 28. .633 
EXER -258, .70** 7. ,545 
VAR -227, .09** 7. ,545 
BO 445. .78** 7. ,545 
ONT 5,707. .89** 7. ,545 
RA -757. .31** 7. 545 
VftR*VaR 23, ,73* 12. 283 
BO*BO 31. .33* 12. 283 
QNT*QHT -125. ,25** 12. 283 
RA*RA 154. ,83** 12. 283 
EXER*VAR 46. ,50** 8. 003 
EXER*BO -34. 83** 8. 003 
EXER*QNT -55. 45** 8. 003 
EXER*RA 44. 62** 8. 003 
VAR*BO -100. 29** 8. 003 
VAR*Qjn? -79. 85** 8. 003 
BO*WT 35. 01** 8. 003 
BO*RA -140. 53** 8. 003 
QNT*RA -271. 19** 8. 003 
F-value 32,782 .67** 
Total C83servatlons 77 
Model R^ 0.9999 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.9. Reduced regression models for the futures position and 
options position using the CFO strategy 
Futures Position Options Position 
Coded 
Indi^jendent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error 
Intercept 15,006.88** 17.200 
VAR 10.55 9.722 -17.90 16.622 
BF 376.47** 9.722 -551.56** 16.622 
BO -558.19** 9.722 1,115.06** 16.622 
QNT 4,999.98** 9.722 
RA 11.60 9.722 -19.72 16.622 
BO*BO -42.62** 15.405 68.43** 14.395 
EXER*BF 24.19* 10.311 -24.20 17.631 
EXER*BO -24.18* 10.311 
VftR*BF -97.32** 10.311 142.37** 17.631 
VAR*BO 142.01** 10.311 -283.30** 17.631 
BF*BO 29.42** 10.311 -39.51* 17.631 
BF*RA -154.30** 10.311 226.06** 17.631 
BO*RA 225.75** 10.311 -450.90** 17.631 
F-value 20,794.69** 615.90** 
Total (&)sevatlons 77 77 
Model 0.9998 0.9904 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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variables selected ly the forward but not the backward or stepwise 
selecticoi techniques. The orthogonality properties of the coded market 
factors cause the estimated coefficients for the linear and 
interactions terms included in the reduced regression models to be the 
same as those in the full regression models. However, the intercept 
and quadratic coefficients in the reduced models differ sli^tly from 
those in the fUll models because of the emission of other quadratic 
an^/or intercut terms in the reduced regression models. The F 
statistic testing the joint significance of the variables not included 
in the reduced models was nonsignificant at the O.Ol level for each 
reduced model suggesting that the set of omitted variables in each 
model have no significant effect on the c^imal market positions. 
Table 6.10 contains the estimated coefficients for each reduced 
regression model vAiich correspond to the uncoded values of the market 
factors. These reduced models can be used by the EM in conjunction 
with the uncoded market factors to approximate the optimal market 
positions for the 00 and the ŒO strategies. Table 6.11 contains the 
approximated market positions for the 00 and CFO strategies using the 
reduced regression models for the set of market factors in each 
dDservation in Table 5.2. The 00 regression model tends to produce 
results vAiich are closer to the optimal market positions than are the 
standard M7 model results. In the CPO strategy the reduced futures 
position regression model also outperforms the standard MV model. In 
the <^ions position regression model, the standard MV model does 
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Table 6.10. Uncoded coefficient estimates for the reduced regression 
models using the 00 and CPO strategies 
Market Strategy 
œ CPO 
Options Position Futures Position Options Position 
%ooded 
Independent Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
INTERCEPT 1,549.4575 -64.26 120.9 
EXER -7798 
VAR -709.52 42.2 -71.6 
BF 57,575 -84,309.5 
BO 54,661.75 -84,530.25 168,775.5 
WT 1.491353 0.999996 
RA -7,178,900 116,000 -197,200 
EXER*EXER 
VAR*VAR 379.68 
BF*BF 
BO*BO 78,325 -106,550 171,075 
QJfP*QiNT -0.00000501 
RA*RA 15,483,000,000 
EXER*VAR 3,720 
EXER*BF 24,190 -24,200 
EXER*BO -34,830 -24,180 
EXER*WT 0.2218 
EXER*RA 8,924,000 
VRR*BF -19,464 28,474 
VAR*BO -20,058 28,420 -56,660 
VAR*WT -0.06388 
VAR*RA 
BF*BO 73,550 -98,775 
BF*QWr 
BF*RA -77,150,000 113,030,000 
BO*QHR 0.3501 
BO*RA -70,265,000 112,875,000 -225,450,000 
QNT*RA -542.38 
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Table 6.11. Reduced regression model market positions for the 00 and 
CFO strategies 
Marketing Strategy^ 
00 CEO 
Options 
Position 
Futures Options 
(Aservation Position Position 
(bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
1 23,083 19,950 165 
2 25,332 19,784 654 
3 12,410 9,950 165 
4 13,574 9,784 654 
5 22,672 20,321 -518 
6 24,359 21,058 -1,832 
7 12,140 10,321 -518 
8 12,742 11,058 -1,832 
9 23,083 19,593 659 
10 25,332 18,810 2,052 
11 12,410 9,593 659 
12 13,574 8,810 2,052 
13 22,672 20,081 -182 
14 24,359 20,201 -592 
15 12,140 10,081 -182 
16 12,742 10,201 -592 
17 23,804 19,840 482 
18 26,053 19,674 972 
19 12,812 9,840 482 
20 13,976 9,673 972 
21 22,993 20,778 -1,333 
22 24,679 21,515 -2,648 
23 12,141 10,778 -1,333 
24 12,742 11,515 -2,648 
25 23,804 19,094 1,546 
26 26,053 18,310 2,939 
27 12,812 9,094 1,546 
28 13,976 8,310 2,939 
29 22,993 20,150 -428 
30 24,679 20,269 -839 
31 12,141 10,150 -428 
32 12,742 10,269 -839 
^Futures position= short futures position. Options position >0= 
purchased put options. Options position <0= written put options. 
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(Oontlnued) 
Marketing Strategy 
00 CPO 
Opticms Ratures Options 
Position Position Position 
(bu.) (bu.) (bu.) 
23,598 19,950 213 
26,026 19,784 702 
12,704 9,950 213 
14,046 9,784 702 
23,049 20,224 -469 
24,914 20,961 -1,784 
12,294 10,224 -469 
13,075 10,961 -1,784 
23,598 19,690 610 
26,026 18,907 2,003 
12,704 9,690 610 
14,046 8,907 2,003 
23,049 20,081 -231 
24,914 20,201 -641 
12,294 10,081 -231 
13,075 10,201 -641 
24,506 19,840 531 
26,933 19,674 1,020 
13,292 9,840 531 
14,634 9,674 1,020 
23,555 20,681 -1,285 
25,420 21,418 -2,599 
12,481 10,681 -1,285 
13,262 11,419 -2,599 
24,506 19,190 1,497 
26,933 18,407 2,891 
13,292 9,190 1,497 
14,634 8,407 2,891 
23,555 20,150 -477 
25,420 20,269 -887 
12,481 10,150 -477 
13,262 10,269 -887 
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Table 6.11. (Continued) 
Marketing strategy 
00 CEO 
Options Futures Options 
Oaservation Position Position Position 
(bu. ) (bu. ) (bu. ) 
Center Point 
65 
Axial Points 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
18,644 
18,126 
19,161 
18,284 
19,193 
18,644 
18,644 
19,660 
17,877 
29,558 
6,727 
17,748 
20,777 
15,007 
15,007 
15,007 
15,028 
14,986 
15,760 
14,254 
13,720 
15,953 
25,007 
5,007 
15,030 
14,984 
0 
0 
—36 
36 
-1,103 
1,103 
2,504 
-1,956 
0 
0 
-39 
39 
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better than the reduced regression model for some observations; 
hcwever, the reduced regression nodel, again, seems to generéilly 
outperfonn the standard MV model. 
Model Comparisons 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that to find the estimai market 
positions for a DM vAio includes options contracts in his/her portfolio 
it is necessary to solve the expected utility model numerically. Ihe 
e)^)ected utility solutions to this problem were presented in Table 5.5 
for the set of market factors in Table 5.2. The standard MV model was 
used to provide estimates of the optimal market positions for the 
market factors in Table 5.2 and the results were presented in table 
5.6. Earlier in this chapter, the results of estimating the functional 
relationship between the c^imal market positions and the market 
factors using second-order polynomial regression models were presented 
for the CO and CK) strategies. Uie estimated market positions 
resulting from the reduced regression models were presented in Table 
6.11 for the set of market factors in Table 5.2. 
Despite the potential theoretical and empirical flaws, the 
standard M7 anchor reduced regression models can be used by a EM to 
provide estimates of the optimal market position (s) as an alternative 
to solving the e)q)ected utility maximization problem. The value to the 
EM of knowing the optimal market positions as opposed to the positions 
estimated ly the standard M7 model or the reduced regression mcxiel can 
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be examined in a framework similar to that used in the previous section 
to mecisure the value of each market institution. The level of monetary 
ccnipensation is found vAich provides the CM vAio uses the standard MV 
model, or reduced regression model, market position(s) with the same 
level of expected utility as he/she receives from using the c^imal 
market positions given ly solving the e)^)ected utility maximization 
model. 
Table 6.12 contains the value to the CM of using the c^imal 
market positions instead of the standard M7 and reduced regression 
models' market positions for the 00 and CFO strategies. Ihe value of 
the e)q)ected utility solutions over the standard MV model solutions is 
clearly greatier than over the reduced regression model solutions. In 
fact, there is little value in using the e^qiected utility solutions 
instead of the approximate solutions for the levels of the market 
factors considered in the study. Furthermore, the value of the optimal 
solutions over the standard M7 solutions is relatively small. For 
example, the largest value to the CM of using the optimal market 
position instead of t±e standard MV model market position occurs in 
conservation 37 in the 00 strategy and is $342, or about $0.02 per 
bushel. Ihe relatively hic^ values vAiich occur in every fourth 
cixservation following the first observation in the 00 stratiegy 
As before, the measured monetary condensation can also be 
thou^t of as the value of acquiring the information needed to maximize 
e)q)ected utility ty a person vAio already knows how to use the standard 
M7 model, or the reduced regression model. 
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Table 6.12. Value of the optimal market positions relative to the 
standard VN model and reduced regression model 
solutions 
Market Strategy 
00 CPO 
Reduced Reduced 
Standard Regression Standard Regression 
Conservation MV Model Model VN Model Model 
($) ($) ($) ($) 
1 223.99 0.28 0.27 0.17 
2 10.58 0.05 0.63 0.06 
3 12.94 0.04 0.27 0.17 
4 3.16 0.01 0.63 0.06 
5 275.45 0.02 3.23 1.01 
6 16.46 0.01 7.53 0.18 
7 18.40 0.63 3.23 1.01 
8 3.40 0.03 7.53 0.18 
9 223.99 0.28 3.97 0.45 
10 10.58 0.05 9.25 0.22 
11 12.94 0.04 3.97 0.45 
12 3.16 0.01 9.25 0.22 
13 275.45 0.02 0.31 0.29 
14 16.46 0.01 0.71 0.02 
15 18.40 0.63 0.31 0.29 
16 3.40 0.03 0.71 0.02 
17 88.03 0.02 0.44 0.08 
18 0.12 0.01 1.03 0.01 
19 1.34 0.01 0.44 0.08 
20 5.21 0.01 1.03 0.01 
21 119.70 0.07 5.40 0.26 
22 0.74 0.06 12.59 0.20 
23 2.81 0.05 5.40 0.26 
24 7.16 0.01 12.59 0.20 
25 88.03 0.02 7.02 0.31 
26 0.12 0.01 16.38 0.49 
27 1.34 0.01 7.02 0.31 
28 5.21 0.01 16.38 0.49 
29 119.70 0.07 0.52 0.02 
30 0.74 0.06 1.21 0.03 
31 2.81 0.05 0.52 0.02 
32 7.16 0.01 1.21 0.03 
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(Continued) 
Market Strategy 
œ CTO 
Reduced Reduced 
Standard Regression Standard Regression 
MV Model Model MV Model Model 
($) ($) ($) ($) 
272.27 0.01 0.26 0.07 
19.25 0.05 0.60 0.06 
19.92 0.13 0.26 0.07 
1.57 0.05 0.60 0.06 
342.03 0.01 2.60 1.78 
30.20 0.01 6.05 0.12 
28.96 0.01 2.60 1.78 
1.34 0.03 6.05 0.12 
272.27 0.01 3.20 0.79 
19.25 0.05 7.45 0.24 
19.92 0.13 3.20 0.79 
1.57 0.05 7.45 0.24 
342.03 0.01 0.30 0.06 
30.20 0.01 0.70 0.03 
28.96 0.01 0.30 0.06 
1.34 0.03 0.70 0.03 
120.16 0.05 0.42 0.08 
1.97 0.17 0.96 0.06 
3.93 0.01 0.42 0.08 
3.30 0.02 0.96 0.06 
169.94 0.01 4.07 0.16 
5.42 0.03 9.49 0.15 
7.86 0.01 4.07 0.16 
3.98 0.14 9.49 0.15 
120.16 0.05 5.31 0.33 
1.97 0.17 12.39 0.19 
3.93 0.01 5.31 0.33 
3.30 0.02 12.39 0.19 
169.94 0.01 0.51 0.04 
5.42 0.03 1.19 0.08 
7.86 0.10 0.51 0.04 
3.98 0.14 1.19 0.08 
Table 6.12. (Oonbinued) 
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Market Strategy 
00 CPO 
Reduced Reduced 
Standard Regression Standard Regression 
Conservation VN Model Model MV Model Model 
($) ($) ($) ($) 
Center Point 
65 22.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Axial Points 
66 11.80 0.05 0.01 0.01 
67 35.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 
68 59.98 0.03 0.01 0.05 
69 1.40 0.07 0.01 0.01 
70 22.32 0.01 2.97 1.42 
71 22.32 0.01 3.83 0.35 
72 9.97 0.01 15.65 0.16 
73 30.45 0.06 8.21 1.25 
74 193.74 0.04 0.01 0.01 
75 2.80 0.24 0.01 0.01 
76 138.45 1.17 0.00 0.06 
77 14.94 0.33 0.01 0.01 
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correspond to the v^iper factorial levels of Q and A. This suggests 
that as the level of output to be hedged increases, the error in the 
standard VN model results increase and that as the level of risk 
aversion increases, the iirportance to the CM of any existing error also 
increases. 
Tables 6.13 and 6.14 contain the results of regressing the value 
of the optimal market positions over the standard M7 and reduced 
regression market positions on a second-order polynomial of the coded 
market factors for the 00 and CFO strategies. Ihe value of the optimal 
market positions over standard M7 model market positions for the 00 
strategy is affected primarily by VAR, QNT, RA, and some of their 
interactions. Hie estimated regression model for the value of the 
optimal market positions over the standard MV model market positions 
for the CFO strategy is a relatively poor fit but does suggest that the 
bias variables play a role in determining the value of the standard MV 
model. One duplication is that as the magnitude of the options 
position in the eiqiected utility solution increases, the error in the 
standard MV solution goes up and the more value the optimal solutions 
provide the EM relative to the standard MV solutions. As the options 
position increases the resulting income distribution deviates further 
from the two parameter normal distribution assumed by the MV model. As 
a result, the MV model results would probably increase in error as the 
inccane distribution becomes "less normal". In addition, as the level 
of risk aversion rises, any deviation from the optimal solution is 
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Table 6.13. Second-order polynomial regression models of the value of 
the optimal market positions over the standard MV market 
positions for the 00 and CFO strategies 
Ô5 CTÔ 
Coded 
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error 
Intercept 22.12 13.705 -0.10 1.433 
EXER -7.39** 2.412 0.42 0.252 
VKR 22.13** 2.412 -0.89** 0.252 
BF 0.00 2.412 -0.44* 0.252 
BO -7.41** 2.412 0.57* 0.252 
QWr 48.94** 2.412 0.00 0.252 
RA 47.71** 2.412 -1.40** 0.252 
EXER*EXER 0.34 4.08 V 0.03 0.427 
VAR*VAR 2.15 4.087 0.03 0.427 
BF*BF 0.06 4.087 0.88* 0.427 
BO*BO -0.47 4.087 3.01** 0.427 
QJJr*QHT 19.05** 4.087 0.03 0.427 
13.66** 4.087 0.03 0.427 
EXER*VAR -1.87 2.559 -0.17 0.268 
EXER*BF 0.00 2.559 -0.05 0.268 
EXER*BO 1.52 2.559 0.06 0.268 
EXER*WT -6.55* 2.559 0.00 0.268 
EXER*PA -6.32* 2.559 -0.19 0.268 
VaR*BF 0.00 2.559 0.17 0.268 
VAR*BO -1.84 2.559 -0.15 0.268 
VaR*C3JW 19.69** 2.559 0.00 0.268 
VAR*RA 19.44** 2.559 0.40 0.268 
BF*BO 0.00 2.559 -3.31** 0.268 
BF*WT 0.00 2.559 0.00 0.268 
BF*PA 0.00 2.559 0.19 0.268 
BO*QWr -6.28* 2.559 0.00 0.268 
BO*RA -6.22* 2.559 -0.16 0.268 
QNT*RA 45.62** 2.559 0.00 0.268 
F-value 51.82** 9. 95** 
Total Conservations 77 77 
Model 0. 9661 0. 8458 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.14. Seoond-oicler polynomial regression models of the value of 
the optimal market positions ever the reduced regression 
market position for the 00 and CFO strategies 
55 CTÔ 
Ooded 
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
Variable Ooefflcient Error Coefficient Error 
Interc^ 0.21* 0.083 0.19 0.177 
EXER 0.02 0.015 -0.01 0.031 
VAR 0.02 0.015 0.09** 0.031 
BF 0.00 0.015 0.05* 0.031 
BO -0.01 0.015 -0.05* 0.031 
QNT -0.02 0.015 0.00 0.031 
RA 0.04** 0.015 0.11** 0.031 
EXER*EXER —0.06* 0.025 -0.06 0.053 
VAR*VAR -0.05* 0.025 -0.05 0.053 
BF*BF —0.06* 0.025 0.16** 0.053 
BO*BO —0.06* 0.025 0.12* 0.053 
QNT*QNT -0.03 0.025 -0.06 0.053 
0.12** 0.025 -0.05 0.053 
EXER*VAR 0.03* 0.016 -0.03 0.033 
EXER*BF 0.00 0.016 -0.02 0.033 
EXER*BO -0.02 0.016 0.01 0.033 
EXER*Wr -0.01 0.016 0.00 0.033 
EXER*RA 0.04* 0.016 -0.03 0.033 
VMl*BF 0.00 0.016 0.06* 0.033 
VAR*BO 0.00 0.016 -0.06* 0.033 
vaR*QNr 0.02 0.016 0.00 0.033 
VaR*RA 0.03* 0.016 0.11** 0.033 
BF*BO 0.00 0.016 -0.18** 0.033 
BF*GNT 0.00 0.016 0.00 0.033 
BF*RA 0.00 0.016 0.06* 0.033 
BO*QNT 0.03* 0.016 0.00 0.033 
BO*RA -0.01 0.016 —0.06* 0.033 
QWr*RA -0.02 0.016 0.00 0.033 
F-value 3.44** 3 1.86** 
Totêil C&servations 77 77 
Model 0.6549 0. 6804 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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translated Into a hl^ier value being attached to the cptimal solutions. 
In the 00 strategy, the primary function of the crions market is 
hedging and one would then e)^)ected that the variables that effect the 
level of hedging the most, such as QNT, VKR, and Pk, and their 
interactions, would have the largest effect on the accuracy and value 
to the EM of the e)q)ected utility solution over the standard M7 model 
solution. On the other hand, in the CPO strategy, the options position 
serves only a speculative function and one would eiqaect that the 
variables that effect the level of speculation in the options market 
the most, sudi as BF, BO, RA, and their interactions, would have the 
largest effect on the accuracy, and in turn the value to the EM, of the 
standard M7 model. 
Ihe regression models for the value of the optimal market 
solutions over the reduced regression model solutions in the CO and CFO 
strategies are very poor fits reflecting the accuracy of the reduced 
regression models and the very small value of the optimal solutions 
relative to the reduced regression models' solutions. 
Institutional Value of Futures and Options Markets 
Ihe value to a EM of futures, options, and futures-options market 
institutions can be studied from the viewpoint of a EM vrtiose primary 
use for the markets is risk management. Ihe value to the EM of each 
market by itself and of both markets combined is measured by 
determining the amount of fixed monetary compensation required to 
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provide a Of using one market institution with the same level of 
e}^)ected utility as he/she would obtain under an alternative market 
institution. Ihe numerical integration software used to solve the 
expected utility maximization problem is used to find the ejq^ected 
utility from taking the optimal market position (s) for a specified 
strategy, e.g., the CfO strategy. Next the eiqaected utility is 
cedculated using the c^imal market positions from an alternative 
strategy, e.g., the CF strategy. Then the amount of fixed income 
necessary to raise the e}^>ected utility level of a CM using the CF 
strategy to the expected utility level adiieved from the CPO strategy 
is calculated (see pages 97-98 in Chapter 4 for further discussion of 
this concept). The total amount of monetary condensation can be 
thou^it of as the value to the CM of adding an options market vAien only 
a CF market currently exists given the specified levels of each market 
factor. 
Table 6.15 lists the value to a CM of futures, options, and 
futures-options institutions vAien each is added to a cash market for 
the market factors in each observation in Table 5.2. Adding a futures 
or futures-options institution clearly provides more value to the CM 
than does adding an cptions institution vAien only a cash market 
currently exists. When no bias exists in either the futures or the 
options markets (observations 65-69 and 74-77) the value of the futures 
54 The measured value of a particular institution may also be 
interpreted as the value of learning to use the alternative institution. 
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Value of futures, options, and futures-options 
institutions when only a cash market exists 
Institutionéil change 
CF vs. Cash 00 vs. Cash CFO vs. Cash 
($) ($) ($) 
60,357.14 
35,901.58 
20,286.49 
9,508.88 
60,357.14 
35,901.58 
20,286.49 
9,508.88 
59,557.14 
35,101.58 
19,886.49 
9,108.88 
59,557.14 
35,101.58 
19,886.49 
9,108.88 
41,665.35 
22,342.93 
12,806.30 
5,804.12 
41,665.35 
22,342.93 
12,806.30 
5,804.12 
40,865.35 
21,542.93 
12,406.30 
5,404.12 
40,865.35 
21,542.93 
12,406.30 
5,404.12 
54,070.88 
31,302.37 
17,816.73 
7,982.51 
53,153.96 
30,309.67 
17,327.56 
7,456.17 
54,070.88 
31,302.37 
17,816.73 
7,982.51 
53.153.96 
30,309.67 
17,327.56 
7,456.17 
37,237.51 
19,303.92 
11.152.97 
4,856.51 
36,301.53 
18.291.50 
10,653.66 
4,323.07 
37.237.51 
19,303.92 
11,152.97 
4,856.51 
36,301.53 
18,291.50 
10,653.66 
4,323.07 
60.358.35 
35,904.40 
20.287.70 
9,511.70 
60.368.36 
35,927.75 
20.297.71 
9,535.06 
59,569.24 
35,129.81 
19,898.59 
9,137.11 
59.558.28 
35.104.24 
19,887.63 
9,111.54 
41,667.33 
22,347.56 
12.808.29 
5,808.75 
41,684.01 
22,386.48 
12,824.97 
5,847.67 
40,885.91 
21,590.91 
12,426.87 
5,452.10 
40,867.20 
21.547.25 
12,408.16 
5,408.44 
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Table 6.15. (Oontlnued) 
Institutioneil change 
CF vs. Cash 00 vs. Cash CPO vs. Cash 
CSsservation ($) ($) ($) 
33 60,357.14 53,331.35 60,358.53 
34 35,901.58 30,765.37 35,904.84 
35 20,286.49 17,527.81 20,287.88 
36 9,508.88 7,806.52 9,512.14 
37 60,357.14 52,398.36 60,367.87 
38 35,901.58 29,747.84 35,926.61 
39 20,286.49 17,027.01 20,297.22 
40 9,508.88 7,264.68 9,533.91 
41 59,557.14 53,331.35 59,568.64 
42 35,101.58 30,765.37 35,128.40 
43 19,886.49 17,527.81 19,897.98 
44 9,108.88 7,806.52 9,135.71 
45 59,557.14 52,398.36 59,558.45 
46 35,101.58 29,747.84 35,104.64 
47 19,886.49 17,027.01 19,887.80 
48 9,108.88 7,264.68 9,111.95 
49 41,665.35 36,555.40 41,667.74 
50 22,342.93 18,840.62 22,348.51 
51 12,806.30 10,900.26 12,808.70 
52 5,804.12 4,714.29 5,809.70 
53 41,665.35 35,595.28 41,682.98 
54 22,342.93 17,792.88 22,384.08 
55 12,806.30 10,384.24 12,823.94 
56 5,804.12 4,159.68 5,845.27 
57 40,865.35 36,555.40 40,884.58 
58 21,542.93 18,840.62 21,587.79 
59 12,406.30 10,900.26 12,425.53 
60 5,404.12 4,714.29 5,448.98 
61 40,865.35 35,595.28 40,867.57 
62 21,542.93 17,792.88 21,548.12 
63 12,406.30 10,384.24 12,408.53 
64 5,404.12 4,159.68 5,409.31 
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Table 6.15. (Continued) 
Institutional change 
CF vs. Cash 00 vs. Cash CFO vs. Cash 
(Saservation ($) ($) ($) 
CENTER POINT 
65 26,073.32 22,567.92 26,073.32 
AXIAL POINTS 
66 26,073.32 22,985.83 26,073.32 
67 26,073.32 22,117.24 26,073.32 
68 37,047.89 32,384.97 37,047.89 
69 13,690.91 11,594.36 13,690.91 
70 26,676.53 22,567.92 26,684.88 
71 25,476.53 22,567.92 25,485.88 
72 26,073.32 23,524.43 26,131.84 
73 26,073.32 21,837.17 26,107.13 
74 60,508.00 53,458.28 60,508.00 
75 3,113.32 2,498.95 3,113.32 
76 37,700.90 33,373.76 37,700.90 
77 5,614.71 4,374.90 5,614.71 
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and futures-options institutions are equivalent and are above the Vcilue 
of the options institution. If no bias exists in either market, the 
value to the CM of adding a futures or futures-options institution when 
only a cash market currently exists are both $26,073, or $1.73 per 
bushel, vMle the value of adding an options market in addition to a 
cash market is $22,568, or $1.50 per bushel. Ihe value to the CM of an 
unbiased futures market exceeds that of an options market in vAiich the 
EM believes a $0.04 bias exists as is seen in observation 72. The EN 
also seems to dislike negative biases in the futures and options 
markets. For example, in observation 72 the EM believes a -$0.04 bias 
exists in the futures market and the values of adding a futures or 
futures-options market to an existing cash market is less than in the 
unbiased case shown in dsservation 65. In observation 73, the EM 
belives a -$0.04 bias exists in the options market and the value of the 
options market is less than in the unbiased case shown in observation 
65. Hie negative bias levels make hedging in each market more 
e)$)ensive and reduces each market's value to the EM enou^ to offset 
the potential value of any speculative gains associated with the biased 
market(s). Note, however, that in observation 73, vAien the EM has both 
the futures and options market available, the value of an options 
market with a -$0.04 bias is greater than an unbiased options market 
but not as great as the value of a $0.04 bias as seen in observation 
72. Because hedging takes place completely in the unbiased futures 
market, the EM can take advantage of the negative bias in the options 
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market by speculating vAiile the cost of the hedged position is 
uneiffected ky the bias in the options market. Finally, vAien a bias 
exists in either market, the futures-options institution becomes more 
valuable to the EM than the futures market alone, althou^ the 
additional value is relatively small. 
Table 6.16 lists the value to the CM of the cash, futures, and 
options institution over the cash-futures and cash-options institutions 
ly themselves. As was seen in the results in Table 6.15, there is no 
value to the CM of adding an options market vdien a futures market 
cdreac^ exists if both the futures and options markets are unbiased 
(see observation 65-69 and 74-77) and relatively little value even vAien 
a bias exists in one or both markets. However, adding a futures market 
to a market vAiere only cash and options markets exist is of value to 
the CM regardless of vAiether the markets are biased or not. Uie 
seemingly small value of the options market to the CM appears to 
reflect the siçjerior hedging ability of futures contracts and the 
tendency of futures and options to offset each other from a speculative 
stan^xaint. 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 contain the results of regressing the value 
of adding a futures, cptions, and futures-options institution each to a 
cash market on a second-order polynomial function of the coded market 
factors in an effort to see the effect each factor has on the value of 
the given institution. Interestingly, the values of the estimated 
coefficients related to the variables EXER, BF, and BO have little or 
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Value of a CFO institution over CF or 00 institution 
Institutioneil Change 
CFO vs. CF CFO vs. 00 
($) ($) 
1.21 6,287.47 
2.83 4,602.04 
1.21 2,470.97 
2.83 1,529.20 
11.22 7,214.40 
26.18 5,618.09 
11.22 2,970.15 
26.18 2,078.90 
12.10 5,498.36 
28.24 3,827.44 
12.10 2,081.86 
28.24 1,154.61 
1.15 6,404.33 
2.67 4,794.57 
1.15 2,560.07 
2.67 1,655.38 
1.99 4,429.82 
4.64 3,043.65 
1.99 1,655.32 
4.64 952.25 
18.67 5,382.49 
43.55 4,094.98 
18.67 2,171.31 
43.55 1,524.61 
20.57 3,648.40 
47.99 2,287.00 
20.57 1,273.90 
47.99 595.60 
1.86 4,565.68 
4.33 3,255.76 
1.86 1,754.50 
4.33 1,085.38 
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Table 6.16. (Continued) 
Institutional Change 
CFO vs. CF GEO vs. 00 
(Ssservatlon ($) ($) 
33 1.40 7,027.19 
34 3.26 5,139.47 
35 1.40 2,760.08 
36 3.26 1,705.62 
37 10.73 7,969.52 
38 25.04 6,178.77 
39 10.73 3,270.21 
40 25.04 2,269.24 
41 11.50 6,237.29 
42 26.83 4,363.04 
43 11.50 2,370.18 
44 26.83 1,329.19 
45 1.32 7,160.10 
46 3.07 5,356.81 
47 1.32 2,860.80 
48 3.07 1,847.27 
49 2.40 5,112.34 
50 5.59 3,507.90 
51 2.40 1,908.44 
52 5.59 1,095.41 
53 17.64 6,087.71 
54 41.15 4,591.20 
55 17.64 2,439.70 
56 41.15 1,685.60 
57 19.23 4,329.18 
58 44.87 2,747.18 
59 19.23 1,525.27 
60 44.87 734.70 
61 2.23 5,272.30 
62 5.19 3,755.24 
63 2.23 2,024.29 
64 5.19 1,249.64 
Table 6.16. (Continued) 
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Institutional Change 
CFD vs. CF CEO vs. 00 
(SDservation ($) ($) 
CENTER FOBn? 
65 0.01 3,505.40 
AXIAL POINTS 
66 0.01 3,087.50 
67 0.01 3,956.09 
68 0.01 4,662.93 
69 0.01 2,096.55 
70 8.36 4,116.96 
71 9.36 2,917.96 
72 58.53 2,607.42 
73 33.82 4,269.97 
74 0.01 7,049.72 
75 0.01 614.38 
76 0.01 4,327.14 
77 0.01 1,239.82 
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Table 6.17. Second-order polynomial regression models of the value of 
the CF and CO institutions over a cash market 
CF vs. Cash 00 vs. Cash 
Coded 
Independent 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standarx 
Error 
Interest 26,563.80** 229.906 23,109.44** 210.705 
EXER 0.00 40.468 211.04** 37.088 
VAR 5,474.96** 40.468 4,861.56** 37.088 
BF 300.00** 40.468 0.00 37.088 
BO 0.00 40.468 379.59** 37.088 
QJNT 13,934.43** 40.468 12,350.11** 37.088 
RA 7,731.04** 40.468 7,097.66** 37.088 
EXER*EXER -153.28* 68.565 -173.32** 62.839 
VAR*VAR -329.26** 68.565 -313.79** 62.839 
BF*BF -152.47* 68.565 -169.23** 62.839 
BO*BO -153.28* 68.565 -141.01* 62.839 
QWr*QNT 1,281.05** 68.565 1,183.45** 62.839 
RA*RA -1,257.15** 68.565 -1,092.62** 62.839 
EXER*VAR 0.00 42.923 11.65 39.338 
EXER*BF 0.00 42.923 0.00 39.338 
EXER*BO 0.00 42.923 -5.17 39.338 
EXER*QWR 0.00 42.923 98.74* 39.338 
EXER*RA 0.00 42.923 39.41 39.338 
VAR*BF 0.00 42.923 0.00 39.338 
VKR*BO 0.00 42.923 -4.42 39.338 
VFTR*C2NT 2,633.19** 42.923 2,378.03** 39.338 
VAR*FA 1,113.57** 42.923 1,047.50** 39.338 
BF*BO 0.00 42.923 0.00 39.338 
BF*QNT 100.00* 42.923 0.00 39.338 
BF*RA 0.00 42.923 0.00 39.338 
BO*GMR 0.00 42.923 114.21** 39.338 
BO*RA 0.00 42.923 -14.85 39.338 
3,249.77** 42.923 3,064.48** 39.338 
F-value 6,833.33** 6,524. 18** 
Total Observations 77 77 
Model 0.9997 0.9997 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 6.18. Second-order polynomial regression model of the value of a 
CEO Institution over a cash market 
CEO vs. Cash 
Coded 
Independent Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Interc^)t 26,563 .45** 230 .871 
EXER 0 .22 40 .638 
VKR 5,471 .81** 40 .638 
BF 299 .54** 40 .638 
BO 1 .21 40 .638 
ONT 13,934, .43** 40, .638 
RA 7,726 ,03** 40, .638 
EXER*EXER -153, .16* 68, .853 
v»R*vaR -329, .14** 68, .853 
BF*BF -150. 15* 68. 853 
BO*BO -141. 62* 68. 853 
QJJT*QJJT 1,281. ,17** 68. ,853 
-1,257. 04** 68. ,853 
EXER*VAR -0. ,09 43. ,103 
EXER*BF -0. ,05 43. ,103 
EXER*BO 0. 04 43. 103 
EXER*0TR 0. ,00 43. 103 
EXER*RA -0. 10 43. 103 
V»R*BF 0. 18 43. 103 
VAR*BO -0. 21 43. 103 
VAR*QNT 2,633. 19** 43. 103 
VAR*RA 1,114. 99** 43. 103 
BF*BO -11. 26 43. 103 
BE^  ^ 100. 00* 43. 103 
BF*RA 0. 19 43. 103 
BO*QMr 0. 00 43. 103 
BO*RA -0. 23 43. 103 
QNT*RA 3,249. 77** 43. 103 
F-value 6,773. 86** 
Total Conservations 77 
Model 0.9997 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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no inpact in detennining the value of the institutions and many of the 
coefficients for interaction terms involving these variables have 
estimated values of zero. The estimated value of the BF coefficient is 
significant in the CF vs. cash and CFO vs. cash regression models as 
ejqsected. Ihe estimated coefficients for the BF*BF variable are 
significant in each regression model althou^ there is no economic 
justification for this in the CO vs. cash regression model. All cross 
product terms involving BF are nonsignificant in each model. The 
estimated value of the coefficient for the BO variable is significant 
in the 00 vs. cash model but, surprisingly, not in the CFO vs. cai^ 
model. Hie estimated coefficients for the BO*BO variable are 
significant in all three regression models although there is no 
economic reason for this coefficient to be significant in the CF vs. 
cash regression model. All cross product terms involving BO have 
nonsignificant coefficients. In addition, the estimated coefficients 
for the bias factors are relatively small. On the other hand, the 
variables VAR, OfT, RA, and their interactions play major roles in 
determining the value of each institution. The set of significant 
coefficients in each regression model is the same and the coefficients 
have the same signs. The estimated value of the coefficients in the CF 
vs. cash and CPO vs. cash regression models are nearly the same vAiile 
the estimated values of the coefficients in the 00 vs. cash regression 
model are generally smaller than in the other two regression models, 
reflecting the value of the futures market relative to the crions 
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market for a given level of market factors. The results suggest the 
importance of these institutions to the CM as a hedging tool as c^^xjsed 
to a speculative tool. The level of bias in each market seems to play 
a small role in determining the value of the institutions to the CM but 
the income level (as measure QNT), the potential variability in 
income (as measured by VAR), the level of risk aversion (as measured ky 
RA), and their interactions play a major role in determining the value 
of each institution. For example, in the CPO vs. cash regression model 
the estimated coefficients suggest that if a CM's end-of-period output 
level increases from 15,000 to 20,000 bushels the value of adding both 
a futures and crions market to a cash market goes up $15,216, or about 
$3.04 for each additional bushel, vAien the remaining market factors, are 
valued at their center point values. Alternatively, the estimated 
coefficients suggest that if the bias in the futures market goes from 
$0.00 to $0.02 vAile all other market factors are valued at their 
center points, the value of adding both a futures and options market to 
a cash market goes vç) only $149. 
Table 6.19 contains the results of regressing the value of the CPO 
institution relative to CF and CO institutions on second-order 
polynomials of the coded market factors for each observation in Table 
5.2. The CPO vs. CP regression model is a relatively poor fit and 
prdaably reflects the small value of adding the options market vAien 
cash and futures markets currently exist. The CPO vs. 00 regression 
model is a better fit than the CPO vs. CP regression model. The 
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variables with the largest effects on the value of adding a futures 
market to cash and options markets are, as before, VAR, QMT, RA, and 
somme of their interactions. Once again, the results seem to reflect 
the superior hedging ability of futures contracts over options 
contracts. 
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Table 6.19. iSeoond-order polynomial regression models of the value of 
a CFO institution over CF and CD institutions 
GEO vs. CF CPO vs. CO 
Coded 
Independent Estimated Standard Estimated Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error 
Intercept -0.34 4.735 3,454.01** 46.298 
EXER 0.22 0.834 -210.83** 8.149 
VAR -3.14** 0.834 610.26** 8.149 
BF -0.46 0.834 299.54** 8.149 
BO 1.20 0.834 -378.39** 8.149 
QOT 0.00 0.834 1,584.32** 8.149 
RA -5.01** 0.834 628.37** 8.149 
EXER*EXER 0.11 1.412 20.16 13.808 
VAR*VAR 0.11 1.412 -15.36 13.808 
BP*BF 2.32 1.412 19.07 13.808 
BO*BO 11.65** 1.412 -0.62 13.808 
Qfïr*QJir 0.11 1.412 97.72** 13.808 
0.11 1.412 -164.42** 13.808 
EXER*VAR -0.09 0.884 -11.74 8.644 
EXER*BF -0.05 0.884 -0.05 8.644 
EXER*BO 0.04 0.884 5.21 8.644 
EXER*WT 0.00 0.884 -98.74** 8.644 
EXER*R^ -0.10 0.884 -39.51** 8.644 
VAR*BF 0.18 0.884 0.18 8.644 
VAR*BO -0.21 0.884 4.21 8.644 
VRR*Qîir 0.00 0.884 255.16** 8.644 
VAR*RA 1.41 0.884 67.48** 8.644 
BF*BO -11.26** 0.884 -11.26 8.644 
BF*QNT 0.00 0.884 100.00** 8.644 
BF*RA 0.20 0.884 0.20 8.644 
BO*WR 0.00 0.884 -114.21** 8.644 
BO*RA -0.23 0.884 14.62 8.644 
0.00 0.884 185.30** 8.644 
F-value 10.90** 2,060 .48** 
Total (&)servations 77 77 
Model 0.8573 0.9991 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
207 
CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND OONCUJSIŒS 
Agricultural ocmmodity prices have historicédly been subject to a 
hi^ degree of volatility vAiich has helped create a business 
environnent characterized ky a hi^ level of financial risk and income 
variability. Rxtures contracts have been, and are still, available to 
help agricultural firms and producers manage in the presence of price 
level risk. A futures market participant enters into an agreement to 
either buy or sell a given amount of commodity at a fixed price at some 
specified date in the future and thereky eliminates, or reduces, price 
level risk. Recently commodity crions contracts have became available 
as risk management tools to be used decision makers (CMis) in 
conjunction with, or in place of, futures contracts. Options contracts 
differ from futures contracts in that the owner of the option has the 
ri^t but not the obligation to engage in the futures transaction. Ihe 
owner of the commodity option only "exercises" the option if it is 
economically favorable for hiny^er to do so. Ihe drav^ck to using 
commodity options in place of futures contracts is that the CM must 
purchase the option at some market determined premium. Ihe features of 
commodity qptions allow users to create many new types of income 
distributions vMch were previously unavailable. 
Much of the previous research done in the area of risk management 
with futures contracts has employed the mean-variance (M7) modeling 
framework. By assuming a preference function with constant absolute 
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risk aversion and a normally distributed income attribute, the results 
of the "standard" MV model are consistent with maximizing expected 
utilily. Ihe standard MV model has been used extensively because of 
the strai^tforward aneHytical and numericed solutions it provide. 
Unfortunately, the income function that results «Aien options are 
included in a EM's portfolio was shown to violate the normality 
assumption and in turn raise doubts as to the justification for using 
the standard MV model to study risk management in the presence of 
commodity options. 
Ihis study employs numerical integration and numerical 
optimization techniques to solve the expected utility maximization 
problem for a CM vAio has a certain level of output to sell at the end 
of the period and includes commodity options in his/her risk management 
portfolio. Ihe c^jtimal market positions are found for a predetermined 
set of market factors assuming the CM uses: 1) cash and futures 
markets, 2) Ccish and crions markets, and 3) cash, fUlrures, and estions 
markets to market his/her output in the presence of a random output 
price for the underlying commodity. Ihe comparative static behavior of 
the in is then studied graphically at localized levels of 1±e various 
market factors. Second-order polynomial functions of t±e optimal 
market positions are estimatzed in terms of the relevant market factors 
for the cash and options marketing stratiegy and the cash, futures, and 
crions marketing strategy. Ihe variables vAiich do not significantly 
contxibute tx> the approximation are removed to sinplify the regression 
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models and reduced regression models are then estimated. The reduced 
regression models aid in understanding the bdiavioral characteristics 
of the EH and also measure the effects that the market factors have on 
the optimal market positions. In addition, the regression models may 
be used ly a EH in place of numerically solving the es^pected utility 
maximization prdalem. The value of futures, (^ions, and futures-
options institutions are then examined from the viewpoint of a EM vtiose 
primary interest in the institutions is for risk management purposes. 
Fineilly, the results of the standard M7 and approximation models are 
conpared to the results of the eiqiected utility model in a value of 
information framework. 
Conclusions 
The e)^)ected utility maximization results for a EM using the cash, 
futures, and options markets simultaneously show that the EM hedges his 
output in the futures market using the "traditional" hedge and then 
speculates in both markets according to his/her eiqiected level of bias 
in the markets, risk aversion level, and perception of the resulting 
inocne distribution. If a bias exists in either market the EM 
speculated ky taking an additional position in the estions market and 
adjusting his/her futures position away from the traditional hedge. A 
speculative tradeoff behavior exists between futures and crions 
contracts ih that biying additional put options tends to be associated 
with obtaining additional long futures contracts, or reducing a short 
210 
futures position, and writing additional put options tends to be 
associated with obtaining additional short futures contracts. In 
addition, the speculative component in the options market is eilways 
larger than in the futures market. ïhis ^pe of speculative behavior 
shows a preference for vAiat are known as "straddle" speculative 
positions. In general, as the spot price variance and risk aversion 
levels increase, the CM speculates less in both markets. As the bias 
in the futures market increases, i.e., becomes less negative or more 
positive, the CM increases his/her short futures position and buys 
fewer, or writes more, put options. This tradeoff behavior between 
futures and options contracts reverses itself vAien the bias in the 
options market increases. If both markets are biased in the same 
direction, the EK tends to speculate less as the level of the exercise 
price iixareases relative to the esq^ected spot price. If the markets 
are biased in opposite directions, the CM tends to speculate more as 
the exercise price rises relative to the eiqaected spot price. If 
neither market is biased, the CM takes the traditional hedge in the 
futures market and no position in the options market. The hedging 
position ejdiibits a one-to-one relationship with the known level of 
end-of-period output and dominates the speculative positions in both 
the futures and options markets. The dcaninance of the hedging 
component in the futures market results in the options market playing a 
relatively minor role for the set of market factors considered in the 
study. From a pure risk minimizing standpoint, the options market 
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Offers no aid in risk management if a futures market currently exists. 
Ihe situation is quite different for a CM v^o uses only the cash 
and options markets. Now the (^tions market plays both the hedging and 
speculative role and the crions positions are much larger than vdien 
the cash, futures, and options markets were used. Ihe futures market 
has no inpact on the size of the crions position. The options 
position now varies positively with the level of end-of-period output 
exhibiting a greater than one-to-one hedging relationship. Even vAien 
the crions market is unbiased, the EM hedges his/her end-of-period 
output level by taking an options position Wiich is greater than 
his/her end-of-period output level. As the variance of the spot price, 
risk aversion level, and exercise price increase, the crions position 
decreases even vAen the options market is unbiased indicating a 
decrease in the hedging cmponent relative to the output level. Hie 
decrease in the c^ions-cash hedge ratio as these market factors change 
represents a shift in the type of income distribution preferred by the 
CM. Ihe speculative position also decreases as the spot price 
variance, risk aversion level, and exercise price increase. As 
eigaected, the options position tends to increase as the bias level in 
the options market increases. 
Ihe standard MV and reduced regression models both provide results 
vliich can be used as reasonable approximations of the e^^ïected utility 
solutions. The value to the CM of tzaking the optimal market positions 
instzead of those suggested by the standard MV or the reduced regression 
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models is negligible in both cases for the set of market factors 
considered in the stuc^. The results do indicate the approximation 
model does marginally better than the standard M7 model, particularly 
in the cash and qptions strategy. 
The estimated values of futures, options, and futures-c^ions 
institutions to the CM indicate that the futures market has greater 
value to the CM than does the crions market. This dominance reflects 
the superior hedging ability of futures contracts relative to qptions 
contracts. Furthermore, from a speculative standpoint, futures and 
options contracts ag^iear to somewhat offset one another, and alleging 
the CM to speculate in both markets does not appear to add much value 
to the CM over allowing hiitv/her to speculate in just one market when 
the bias levels are in the same range. There is value to the CM from 
adding a futures market vAien only a cash market or cash-options market 
currently exists. There is also value to the CM in adding an options 
market if only a cash market currently exists. However, from the 
stanc^int of the CM, adding an options market when a cash and futures 
market currently exists adds no value if the markets are unbiased and 
adds little value even if the markets are biased. The primary factors 
determining the value of the institutions are the level of end-of-
period out^wt, the variability in output price, and the level of risk 
aversion. The strong relationship between the value of the 
institutions and these factors reflects the importance to the CM of 
these institutions for hedging purposes as opposed to speculating 
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purposes. 
This stucfy is subject to several limitations vAiich may restrict 
the generalization of the results. The EM is assumed to exhibit a 
constant absolute risk aversion utility function. Speci^ing a 
preference function with different risk aversion characteristics, such 
as constant relative risk aversion, may result in somevdiat different 
market b^iavior than is indicated in the results of this stucty. In 
addition, the HI was assumed not to ejdhiibit any time value of money 
over the single period under consideration in the model. 
The income function was specified with the inclusion of several 
simplifying assumptions such as no basis uncertainty, no oul^ut 
uncertainty, no margin calls, no cedl options, and no transactions 
costs. The EH was also assumed to believe that the oul^t price is 
normally distributed with a known mean and variance. In addition, the 
exercise price was considered to be an exogenous variable to the CM. 
The relaxing of one or more of these assunptions will futher complicate 
the income distribution faced by the CM and potentially effect the 
results of the stucty. For example, if the end-of-period output level 
is stochastic, as was definitely the case for producers affected by the 
1988 drou^t, cations would likely become relatively more attractive 
from a hedging standpoint. The additional uncertainty regarding the 
end-of-period cash output position may make crions contracts more 
attractive than futures contracts because the owner of an option 
contract has the ri^it but not the obligation to exercise the option 
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vAiUe the futures obligation is contractual and must be offset, ky some 
means, regardless of the financial iirpact on the CM. For example, if 
the CM takes a traditional hedge in the futures market based on his/her 
eiqiected end-of-period output level and the resulting out^xtt level 
turns cut to be much less than expected, the CM is faced with 
potentially large losses on the futures contracts which are not offset 
by a corresponding cash out^t position. However, if crions contracts 
had been used to hedge the out^t level the CM would not face any 
additional risk from an unexpected out^xit shortage because he/she would 
only exercise the option if it was profitable to do so. The solution 
to the standard RV model in Chapter 3 lends siçiport to the notion that 
options beccme relatively more iirportant frcsn a hedging stan%oint vAien 
the end-of-period output level in not known with certainty. Under the 
case of output uncertainty, the end-of-period income variability is 
shewn to be minimized ky hedging with a combination of futures and 
options contracts. When the end-of-period output level is known with 
certainty, taking the traditional hedge in the futures market and no 
position in the options market minimizes the end-of-period income 
variability. 
Adding the risk of margin calls to futures contracts vrould also 
seem to make options contracts relatively more attractive when conpared 
to futures contracts. The addition of margin calls introduces the risk 
of cash flew difficulties to the user of futures contracts if the 
futures price moves against his/her futures contracts; however, 
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using options oontracts the CM makes a single predetermined cash 
outlay. 
Ihe "lumpiness" of contract sizes on the organized exchanges adds 
some practical difficulties to the interpretation of the results of the 
stuc^. For example, sig^pose the standard M7 model suggests a put 
options position of 2,500 bushels and the expected utility model 
indicates the optimal put options position to be 3,500 bushels. If 
options contracts can only be purchased in increments of 5,000 bushels, 
it is unclear vAiether the e)q)ected utility model actually produces 
sL%)erior results to the standard M7 model. It is possible that the CM 
would prefer no options position to t±e altzemative of purchasing 5,000 
bushels in put options and, if so, the standard MV model would have. 
been closer to the constrained optimal solution than was the expected 
utility model. 
Ihe resultzs are also restricted by the levels of the market 
factors used in the stwty. It may be inappropriate to extend the 
results of the stu{^  to cases where the market factors are outside the 
ranges used in the study. For eirample, if the bias in the crions 
market is in reêdity much larger than the values used in this study the 
options market may increase in value to the CM relative to the futures 
market. 
Further work in this area should concentxatze on relaxing tiie 
assumptions and restarictions employed in tiiis study and ei^loring the 
rdaustness of the results reported here. In addition, more effort is 
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needed to develop an anedytical framework within vAiich to stucfy 
behavior of a firm in the presence of options œntracts. 
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APPENDIX A. FROBABILITÏ THEOREMS AND DEFINITIŒS 
The theorems and definitions shown in this appendix are taken from 
Rreund and Walpole (1980). The corresponding theorems and page numbers 
are indicated along with the theorems. 
Theorem A.l (FW theorem 2.7, p.41) 
If A and B are any two events in a sairple space S, then 
P(ADB) =P(A) +P(B) -P(AnB) 
Theorem A.2 (FW theorem 2.9, p.53) 
If A and B are any two events in a sairple space S and P(A) does 
not equal zero, then 
P(AnB)=P(A)*P(B|A) 
Theorem A.3 (IW theorem 3.6, p.89) 
If f{x) and F{x} are respectively, values of the probability 
distribution and the distribution function of x at x, then 
P(a:<*sb)=F(b)-F(a) 
for any real constants a and b with a<b, and 
f{x)=dF{x}/dx 
vAiere the derivative exists. 
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Theorem A.4 (ïW theorem 1.1, pp.232-33) 
Let f{x} be the value of the probability density of the continuous 
random variable x at x. If the fonction given ty y=u{x} is 
differentiable and either increasing or decreasing for all values 
within the range of x for which f{x} does not equal zero, then, 
for these values of x, the equation y^{x) can be uniquely solved 
for X to give x=w{y), and the probability density of y is given ty 
g(y}=f(w{y))*|w'{y} I provided u'{x) does not =0 
Elsev&iere, g{y}=0. 
Definition A.l (FW definition 2.1, p.51) 
If A and B are any two events in a sample space S and P(A) does 
not =0, then the conditional probability of B given A is 
P(B|A)=P(AlB)/P(A) 
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APPENDIX B. COMPARATIVE STATIC OBSERVATION POINTS FOR THE 
CASH-OPnOIS STRATEGY 
A. Observations for Figure 5.1.^ 
Futures Market B^=$0.02 B^=-$0.02 
Bias (B_) 
($) f 
-0.04 19,021 18,265 
-0.03 19,021 18,265 
-0.02 19,021 18,265 
-0.01 19,021 18,265 
0.00 19,021 18,265 
0.01 19,021 18,265 
0.02 19,021 18,265 
0.03 19,021 18,265 
0.04 19,021 18,265 
B. CSsservations for Figure 5.2. 
End-of-period B =$0.02 B =-$0.02 B =$0.00 
output (Q) O O O 
(bu) 
11,000 
12,000 
13,000 
14,000 
15,000 
16,000 
17,000 
18,000 
19,000 
14,438 
15,600 
16,751 
17,891 
19,021 
20,143 
21,257 
22,363 
23,464 
13,737 
14,884 
16,021 
17,148 
18,265 
19,375 
20,477 
21,573 
22,663 
14,076 
15,231 
16,374 
17,507 
18,631 
19,747 
20,854 
21,956 
23,051 
^nve input variables used to generate the observation points for 
each figure are set at the center point values shown in Table 5.2 
unless noted otherwise. 
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(%)servations for Figure 5.3. 
Ej^iected Spot 
Price Variance 
($2) 
BQ=$0.02 Bq=~$0 .02 Bq=$0.00 
0.60 19,714 18,529 19,097 
0.70 19,494 18,460 18,958 
0.80 19,312 18,392 18,836 
0.90 19,156 18,327 18,728 
1.00 19,021 18,265 18,631 
1.10 18,902 18,207 18,543 
1.20 18,795 18,151 18,463 
1.30 18,698 18,098 18,340 
1.40 18,611 18,049 18,322 
(Ssservations for Figure 5.4. 
Risk Aversion B =$0.02 B=-$0.02 B =$0.00 
Level (A) ° ° ° 
0.00005 22,397 19,658 20,988 
0.00010 20,969 19,435 20,179 
0.00015 20,119 19,004 19,544 
0.00020 19,500 18,606 19,039 
0.00025 19,021 18,265 18,631 
0.00030 18,636 17,978 18,296 
0.00035 18,320 17,734 18,017 
0.00040 18,055 17,526 17,781 
0.00045 17,829 17,346 17,580 
227 
E. Observations for Figure 5.5. 
Options Market 
($) ° 
-0.04 17,921 
-0.03 18,091 
-0.02 18,265 
-0.01 18,445 
0.00 18,631 
0.01 18,823 
0.02 19,021 
0.03 19,226 
0.04 19,438 
F. Conservations for Figure 5.6. 
Eœrcise Price less B =$0.02 B =-$0.02 B =$0.00 
. 1 , 1  — / T B  \  O  O  O  
($) 
-0.20 20,304 19,255 19,757 
-0.15 19,949 18,986 19,449 
-0.10 19,618 18,732 19,159 
-0.05 19,309 18,492 18,887 
0.00 19,021 18,265 18,631 
0.05 18,752 18,051 18,391 
0.10 18,500 17,849 18,165 
0.15 18,265 17,658 17,953 
0.20 18,045 17,477 17,754 
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APPENDIX C. OOMPARAnVE STATIC OBSERVATIŒ POINTS FOR THE 
CASH-FUTURES-OPTimS STRATEGY 
A. caaservations for Figures 5.7a and 5.7b.^ 
Futures Positions: 
End-of-period 
Output (Q) 
(bu) 
B_=$0.02 
BQ=$0.02 
B-=$0.02 
BQ=-$0.02 
B_=-$0.02 
BJ=$0.02 
B-=-$0.0! 
BJ=-$O.O: 
11,000 10,857 11,700 10,208 11,138 
12,000 11,857 12,700 11,208 12,138 
13,000 12,857 13,700 12,208 13,138 
14,000 13,857 14,700 13,208 14,138 
15,000 14,857 15,700 14,208 15,138 
16,000 15,857 16,700 15,208 16,138 
17,000 16,857 17,700 16,208 17,138 
18,000 17,857 18,700 17,208 18,138 
19,000 18,857 19,700 18,208 19,138 
Options Positions: 
End-of-period B-=$0.02 B-=$0.02 B_=-$0.02 B_=-$0.02 
Output (Q) B^=$0.02 B~=-$0.02 BJ=$0.02 B =$0.02 
(bu) ° o o o 
11,000 454 -1,259 1,399 M3Ô 
12,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
13,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
14,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
15,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
16,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
17,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
18,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
19,000 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
^e input variables used to generate the observation points for 
each figure are set at the center point values shown in Table 5.2 
unless noted otherwise. 
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B. Oaservations for Figures 5.8a and 5.8b. 
Futures Positions; 
Expected Spot _ 
Price Variance {a ) 
($2) 
o
 o
 
d
 d
 
B_=$0.02 
B^=-$0.02 
B.=-$0.02 
B^=$0.02 
B-=-$0.02 
BJ=-$0.02 
0.60 14,761 16,149 13,654 15,230 
0.70 14,795 15,990 13,854 15,197 
0.80 14,821 15,870 14,003 15,173 
0.90 14,841 15,776 14,117 15,153 
1.00 14,857 15,700 14,208 15,138 
1.10 14,870 15,638 14,283 15,126 
1.20 14,881 15,586 14,344 15,115 
1.30 14,890 15,542 . 14,396 15,106 
1.40 14,898 15,504 14,440 15,099 
Options Positions: 
E>Ç)ected Spot _ B_=$0.02 B_=$0.02 B-=-$0.02 B_=-$0.02 
Price Variance (ff) B^ =$0.02 B^ =-$0.02 BJ=$0.02 BQ=-$0.02 
($f) 
0.60 761 -2,070 2,372 -712 
0.70 651 -1,782 2,022 -611 
0.80 569 -1,565 1,761 -536 
0.90 505 -1,395 1,560 -477 
1.00 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
1.10 412 -1,147 1,269 -391 
1.20 377 -1,053 1,160 -359 
1.30 348 -974 1,069 -331 
1.40 323 -906 991 -308 
Ooservations for Figures 5.9a 
230 
and 5.9b. 
Futures Positions: 
Risk Aversion 
Level (A) 
0.00005 
0.00010 
0.00015 
0.00020 
0.00025 
0.00030 
0.00035 
0.00040 
0.00045 
B-=$0.02 
Bq=$0.02 
14,285 
14,642 
14,762 
14,821 
14,857 
14,881 
14,898 
14,911 
14,921 
B_=$0.02 
BJ=-$0.02 
18,500 
16,750 
16,167 
15,875 
15,700 
15,583 
15,500 
15,438 
15,389 
B-=-$0.02 
BQ=$0.02 
11,042 
13,021 
13,681 
14,011 
14,208 
14,340 
14,435 
14,505 
14,560 
B_=-$0.02 
Br=-$0.02 
15,691 
15,345 
15,230 
15,173 
15,138 
15,115 
15,099 
15,086 
15,077 
Options Positions: 
Risk Aversion 
Level (A) 
B_=$0.02 
BQ=$0.02 
B_=$0.02 
BQ=-$0.02 
B-=-$0.02 
Bq=$0.02 
B-=-$0. 
B^=-$0.i 
0.00005 2,268 -6,294 6,996 -2,149 
0.00010 1,134 -3,147 3,498 -1,074 
0.00015 756 -2,098 2,332 -716 
0.00020 567 -1,574 1,749 -537 
0.00025 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
0.00030 378 -1,049 1,166 -358 
0.00035 324 -899 999 -307 
0.00040 283 -787 875 -269 
0.00045 252 -699 777 -239 
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D. (%)servatlons for Figures 5.10a and 5.10 b. 
Ritures Positions: 
Futures Market B =$0.02 B^=-$0.02 
Bias (B_) ° ° 
($) f 
-0.04 13,850 14,832 
-0.03 14,033 14,987 
-0.02 14,208 15,138 
-0.01 14,378 15,285 
0.00 14,543 15,427 
0.01 14,702 15,565 
0.02 14,857 15,700 
0.03 15,007 15,831 
0.04 15,153 15,959 
Options Positions: 
Ritures Market B -$0.02 B =-$0.02 
Bias (B-) ° ° ($) f 
-0.04 1,913 15 
-0.03 1,652 -210 
-0.02 1,399 -430 
-0.01 1,153 -644 
0.00 914 -854 
0.01 681 -1,059 
0.02 454 -1,259 
0.03 232 -1,455 
0.04 15 -1,647 
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Conservations for Figures 5.11a and 5.11b 
Futures Positions: 
Options Market B.=$0.02 B_=-$0.02 
Bias (B„) ^ ^ ($) ° 
-0.04 16,086 15,559 
-0.03 15,895 15,352 
-0.02 15,700 15,138 
-0.01 15,499 14,918 
0.00 15,292 14,689 
0.01 15,078 14,453 
0.02 14,857 14,208 
0.03 14,629 13,954 
0.04 14,392 13,690 
Options Positions: 
Options Market B_=$0.02 B_=-$0.02 
Bias (BJ ^ ^ ($) ° 
-0.04 -2,041 -1,259 
-0.03 -1,655 -851 
-0.02 -1,259 -430 
-0.01 -851 5 
0.00 -430 454 
0.01 5 918 
0.02 454 1,399 
0.03 918 1,899 
0.04 1,399 2,418 
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F. (Ssservatlons for Figures 5.12a and 5.12b. 
Ritures Positions: 
Exercise Price B-=$0.02 B_=$0.02 B-=-$0.02 B_=-$0.02 
less ESqpected Br=$0.02 B_=-$0.02 B^=$0.02 B =-$0.02 
-0.20 14,856 15,595 14,343 15,139 
-0.15 14,856 15,618 14,315 15,139 
-0.10 14,857 15,643 14,283 15,138 
-0.05 14,857 15,670 14,247 15,138 
0.00 14,857 15,700 14,208 15,138 
0.05 14,857 15,732 14,165 15,138 
0.10 14,857 15,767 14,118 15,138 
0.15 14,856 15,805 14,065 15,139 
0.20 14,856 15,847 14,006 15,139 
ppLions Positions: 
Eœrcise Price B_=$0.02 B_=$0.02 B_=-$0.02 B-=-$0.02 
less E}Ç)ected B^=$0.02 Bf=-$0.02 B_=$0.02 B =-$0.02 
spot %ice (E^nj) ° 
-0.20 546 -1,234 1,358 -509 
-0.15 519 -1,234 1,360 -487 
-0.10 495 -1,238 1,367 -466 
-0.05 473 -1,247 1,380 -447 
0.00 454 -1,259 1,399 -430 
0.05 436 -1,275 1,424 -414 
0.10 419 -1,296 1,456 -400 
0.15 405 -1,321 1,495 -386 
0.20 391 -1,351 1,541 -374 
